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1 Introduction and main results
This paper constitutes the Final Report of the Study on The measurement of the intensity of
competition in goods and services markets. The Report is meant to complement the already
ongoing Market Monitoring exercise carried out by the European Commission services within
DG ECFIN, whose general aim is to assess the extent of market functioning in goods and services
markets, in order to identify those areas in which the potential of the internal market might
not have been fully exploited. To that extent, a number of indicators related to the evolution
of the competitive conditions in the single market, as derived from rm-level observable data,
are constructed and analysed in this Report. The use of rm-level data allows to grasp not only
information on the average changes taking place in each industry and across countries, but also
the distribution and sources of these changes, in terms of individual rmspricing behaviour and
market shares, an information which is impossible to gather in detail from aggregate, traditional
sector-level measures.
Operationally, we have constructed a Pilot database encompassing rm-level observations
in a selected number of both manufacturing and services industries (Food, Chemicals, Car
Production, Retail services, Telecom, Real Estate) at the NACE 3-digit level in a given number
of Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain and Sweden), for
an average of around 330,000 rms observed each year over the period 1999-2007. In the nal
part, the study also evaluates the extent to which aggregate indicators can be constructed for the
entire EU, as well as the possibility of extending the entire exercise to all industries/countries
in the EU.
Before summarising the main nding of the Report, a general caveat has to be made. Al-
though the Report explicitly aims at measuring the extent of product market competition
in the Single Market, it has to deal with the level of statistical aggregation of the industries
examined. Such a level, being rm-based, is certainly subtler with respect to the aggregation
level of existing indicators of product market functioning, but it does not coincide with the
denition of relevant market which is normally employed by the European Commission in
assessing competition issues. In fact, the level of statistical denition employed in this Report
(rms pooled within NACE 3-digit industries) is more aggregate than what would be necessary
to identify what a relevant market could be. Nor a change in the aggregation would help to
that extent. In fact, most rms in most sectors are multiproduct, with the result that most of
the products o¤ered by each rm are very likely to compete in a di¤erent relevant market. Our
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cross-country comparable data, however, consider balance sheet information on the total sales
and costs of rms, thus extracting information on the pricing behaviour of rms across their
bundle of products, that is across potentially di¤erent relevant markets.
As a result, a better denition of what the indicators measure in the context of the present
Report is a proxy of protability. While in the relevant market case protability is a good proxy
of market power, and therefore of the level of competition in the market, analysing protability
by industry across rms, as we do in the present Report, allows to extract information not
on the evolution of competition (in the sense described above) but rather on the changes in
the competitive behaviour of rms (possibly induced by changes in pricing strategy, quality
upgrading, dynamic e¢ ciency, product mix changes, evolution of market shares, entry or exit)
within the single market. But the latter, rather than an analysis of competition problems, is
precisely one of the ultimate goals of the Market Monitoring exercise, to which this Report hence
contributes. It is with this caveat in mind that one has therefore to read the messages of the
Report, and its eventual reference to competitionissues.
The Final Report is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the source of our rm-level
data, the choice of countries and industry that enter in the Pilot study, as well as the short-
comings deriving from our sources of data. In Section 3 we start analysing a simple structural
indicator, the Price-Cost Margin (PCM), retrieved from rm-level balance sheet data across
industries and time. The use of the latter index allows for an immediate and easy to divul-
gate introduction to the main results of the study. The analysis also includes the variation
over time of the density distribution of the index across rms, a datum which allows observing
some features of the changes in the intensity of competition impossible to gather with standard,
industry-level indicators.
In Section 4, using a sub-sample of our data, we start assessing the robustness of the PCM
as observed from balance sheet data against the methodology proposed by Roeger (1995), where
the PCM is estimated as an industry average at the NACE 3-digit level across rms and over
time. We discuss the correlation between the observed PCM and the estimated one, as well
a comparison between these two measures and the PCM calculated as a weighted average of
the rm-level observed PCM. In general, we are able to validate both the observed and the
weighted PCM against the Roeger-based estimated one for the various industries and across
countries. However, our recommendation is against the use of the Roeger-based estimated
PCM as a main instrument of analysis when performing disaggregated studies, as the aggregate
PCMs retrieved via the Roegers approach are very sensitive to the level of aggregation used.
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In fact, the implicit assumption in Roeger (1995) is that the estimated PCMs are common to
all the rms in a given sample. It then follows that a trade-o¤ exists between a progressively
ner levels of disaggregation in which the rm-level heterogeneity can be accounted for, and
the accuracy of the same estimates (as PCM would be estimated over a smaller number of
observations, therefore with higher standard errors). Moreover, a synthetic indicator of PCM as
retrieved from the Roegers approach is such that dynamic e¢ ciency, i.e. e¢ ciency gains due to
innovation, a particularly relevant feature in our analysis, can hardly be disentangled from the
retrieved estimates, as the individual contribution of each rm to the aggregate PCM is hard to
disentangle.
For all these reasons, in the follow-up of the analysis we have chosen to use as the main
indicator of competitive pressures a decomposition of the (weighted) price-cost margin changes
at the rm-level. Using the Roeger methodology we have in fact veried that directly ob-
served PCMs can be aggregated without particular distortions with respect to estimated ones,
and therefore can be used avoiding computational intensive steps to be undertaken should the
analysis be extended or repeated over time. Most importantly, the aggregation from the bottom
of directly observed rm-level mark-ups allows to actually exploit rm-level heterogeneity in
order to extract information on the evolution of industrial dynamics as competitive pressures in
the single market evolve.
To that extent, in Section 5 we perform a Laspeyres-type decomposition of the changes in
the PCM index, in order to retrieve the within, reallocation and interaction e¤ects of the rms
pricing strategies on their market shares, as well as the impact of the entry and exit dynamics
in the various industries/countries/years. Such an analysis is carried out for three prototype
countries: France for the Euro area, Sweden as a EU-15 non Euro area country and Poland, a new
member state formerly under transition. The PCM decompositions are reported and discussed
for the years 2000 and 2006, in order to grasp the e¤ects of the adoption of the euro and the
accession of the new member States to the EU. In general, we nd a general trend towards lower
PCMs in both manufacturing and (to a lesser extent) services industries in France, a more or less
homogeneous pro-competitive e¤ect in Sweden, and interesting catching-up dynamics in Poland.
When overlooking the entire range of PCM decompositions for every countries and years1, we
also nd a very high deal of heterogeneity across industries and across countries. That points to
a situation of industrial dynamics which is still a¤ected to a certain extent by country-specic
factors.
1Detailed results are reported in the Statistical Annex of the Report, available upon request.
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In Section 6 we validate these ndings by looking at a novel indicator of competition, the
Relative Prot Di¤erence (RPD) as proposed by Boone (2008); the basic idea is that more
competition should reallocate prots towards more e¢ cient rms, i.e. relative prot di¤erences
should widen following an increase in competitive rivalry. Thus, in general, relatively more e¢ -
cient rms should make relatively higher prots the more competitive the industry, compressing
the prots of relatively less e¢ cient rms. Because of its construction, the RPD measure should
be able to overcome some of the shortcomings deriving from the analysis of the PCM decom-
position. In particular, when industries are subject to intense reallocation dynamics entailing
important changes in market shares, the PCM measure might not be monotonic in competition,
while the RPD measure instead increases (decreases) not only for the higher (lower) competi-
tion that arises from lower entry barriers, but also for competition that reallocates output to
more e¢ cient incumbent rms within the sector, thus ensuring the respect of monotonicity with
respect to the direction of the competition shock. An advantage of the RPD measure, moreover,
is that it su¤ers less from problems in the quality of the data (in particular missing observations
or outliers), while it can be constructed starting from the same balance sheet data needed to
retrieve the price-cost margin at the rm level.
We thus proceed in measuring the standard RPD indicator for our selected countries and
industries using costs as a proxy for e¢ ciency, as originally proposed by Boone (2008), again
discussing the case of France, Sweden and Poland in detail2. Looking at the indicator across
countries, we nd a prevalence of a reduction of our slope coe¢ cient, thus indicating a general
pro-competitive e¤ect, a result especially true for France when comparing the pre and post-euro
periods. The situation for Sweden is instead more heterogeneous, while again Poland displays
marked improvements in relative prot di¤erences, albeit for di¤erent reasons than France. All
these ndings are consistent with the dynamics detected when analysing the PCM decomposition
in the previous section.3
After having noted some of the potential drawbacks of the Boone indicator, essentially linked
to the fact that the relationship between cost e¢ ciency and prots might be non-monotonic,
due to underlying changes in the relevant (unobserved) elasticity of substitution perceived by
individual rms, we implement two robustness checks of the RPD indicator. First, following
Boone et al. (2007), we run a simple regression evaluating the prot elasticity of each rm to
2The RPD for all the countries / industries / years is reported in the Statistical Annex of the Report, available
upon request.
3Again, all the indexes calculated for every country, industry and year included in the Pilot study are reported
in the Statistical Annex of the Report.
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its costs, based on the same data we use for the construction of the RPD index. Second, we
re-evaluate the RPD measure by using an alternative proxy of e¢ ciency based on the estimation
of a stochastic frontier production function model.
In Section 7 we combine the information provided by the PCM decompositions and the latter
two RPD-related indicators (RPD frontier-based and prot elasticity) in order to develop, for
every industry/country pair, a number of screening tests for market functioning based on the
overall divergence of the PCM indicator, its increases and its persistency over time, each time
combined with the RDP indicators. As a general nding, we nd that Romania and Poland are
the countries in which a certain lack of convergence of the PCM indicator to the EU average
is also associated to a sluggish relationship between prots and e¢ ciency, as measured by our
RPD indexes of changes of competition dynamics. The same nding is true when considering
long-term increases in the PCM indicator.
In the Euro area, industries with diverging PCMs are relatively less present and in general
concentrated in the services sector, but such features do not tend to be associated to problematic
changes in competition dynamics (with Spain displaying however a relatively higher number of
controversial cases). When considering long-run increases in PCMs, instead, the feature is quite
present across both manufacturing and services industries across all the considered countries.
Apart from the already discussed cases of Poland and Romania, the latter could be a potential
indication of dynamic e¢ ciency gains (lower costs or quality upgrading) taking place across
industries; however, in a number of cases (especially in Sweden and France) the feature tends to
be associated also to unclear changes in competition dynamics. Once again, the latter nding
does not necessarily entail the existence of a problem of competition (to the extent that rms
are repositioning themselves in the product market in order to exploit a lower elasticity of
substitution), but certainly signals an evolution in the competitive behaviour of rms which is
worth exploring in greater detail.
Finally, very few industries tend to display a persistency in PCM levels, with the majority
of them concentrated in Romania.
Based on these general screening tests, we have then performed a detailed analysis of the com-
petitive behaviour of rms in three selected industries across countries: NACE 159 (beverages),
NACE 341 (car industry) and NACE 522 (distribution of food), comparing our results with
the information obtained through the use of a standard measure of competition, the Herndahl
index. When our combined indicators in a given country highlight a peculiar evolution of the
competitive behaviour of rms, we exploit rm-level information and a ner disaggregation of
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the PCM decomposition in order to discuss in detail the reasons which might be behind the
detected dynamics. We feel that such a narrow industry-specic approach, combining di¤erent
indicators measured starting from rm-level data across countries and over time, is the most
suitable complement to be used in future analyses of product market functioning.
In Section 8 we discuss more in general how to aggregate data coming from di¤erent country
or industry-specic distributions in order to retrieve a EU-wide (or Euro-area wide) indicator of
the dynamics discussed above. In order to obtain an unbiased aggregation, PCM-type indicators
constructed at the EU level should in fact derive from similar country-specic distributions of
prices and costs. While the former might be true to a certain extent, as a number of studies
report that consumersprice dispersion in Europe has experienced a downward trend since 1996,
it could be the case that, within the single market, systematic di¤erences in costsdistribution
exist across countries, e.g. due to di¤erent employment subsidies, payroll taxes, social security
payments, infrastructures, and other country-specic conditions.
An analysis performed comparing data from Italy and France (whose sample composition is
similar in terms of rmssizes and numerosity) has actually revealed important country-specic
di¤erences in the distribution of PCM levels which make their aggregation potentially biased.
On the contrary, we have found that the distribution of PCM changes (on which this Report is
based) is highly comparable across countries.
Assuming that a pooled distribution of rms is sensible at the European level, we would
nd that, on average, the PCMs levels across EU industries have displayed an increasing trend
over time (at an average annual rate of 1.3 per cent), but their dispersion, as measured by
the coe¢ cient of variation, has indeed been decreasing (at an average annual rate of -2.4 per
cent). The latter signals that a process of quality upgrading induced by dynamic e¢ ciency
considerations is certainly in place across European industries, while at the same time the
overall dispersion of the PCMs of these industries is being reduced, in line with the theoretical
priors of a functioning internal market where important reallocation forces are at play. When
distinguishing between industries operating in eurozone countries vs. other countries, we see
that the former have experienced a much smaller increase of their PCM over time (an average
increase of 0.8% vs. 2.3% for industries within non-euro area countries), thus ending up with
an average PCM over the considered period of 20.8%, that is ve points smaller than the
PCM of industries operating within non-eurozone countries (25.8%). In terms of dispersion, the
coe¢ cient of variation of PCM across industries in the euro area is also signicantly smaller (.97
vs. 1.72), and, most interestingly, it displays a clear and signicant downward trend (-3.4 %)
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which essentially drives the downward trend detected for our full sample (the trend in the PCM
dispersion of industries belonging to non-euro area countries is not signicant).
Actually, these messages are conrmed when looking at PCM changes (thus using the correct
aggregating function): we observe that in a number of industries in the euro area the average
PCM change over the period has been negative, while this result does not hold in the non-
euro countries. Moreover, the average change in PCM, even when positive, is always lower
in euro countries compared to non-euro ones, and this di¤erence is almost always statistically
signicant. Finally, and most interestingly, when splitting our dynamics before and after the
introduction of the euro (2002), we observe that the competitive shock entailed by the single
currency has limited the increase in PCM for those countries which were about to enter the
single currency, with many industries experiencing a reduction in protability. Once the euro
has been introduced, however, industries in the euro area have started to experience slightly
upward changes in PCM, again possibly due to phenomena of dynamic e¢ ciency stimulated by
the higher competitive pressures operating in the single market.
In Section 9 we develop a number of technical discussions related to the potential extension of
the Pilot study to the entire range of industries and countries in the EU as well as some possible
developments of the detected measures of competition as stimulus indicators. In particular,
in terms of extension of the database, we discuss the availability and quality of data of other
European countries not analysed in this Pilot study, how to deal with di¤erent representativeness
of data, and the extent to which the NACE 3-digit vs. NACE 4-digit aggregation matters. In
order to provide an example of a potential application of the retrieved PCMs in terms of stimulus
indicators, we also present the results of an exercise where, for all NACE 3-digit industries of
Italy and Germany, we have regressed the PCM at the rm level against di¤erent industry-
based measures of trade penetration (both horizontal and vertical), in order to provide a rst
assessment of the impact of trade openness on competition dynamics.
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2 Data description
2.1 Sources of rm-level data
A critical starting point of any rm-based measure of competition is clearly related to the
availability of reliable rm-level balance sheet data, according to two important dimensions: the
coverage of the database and the quality of the data available for each rm.
In terms of coverage, a study as the current one, potentially encompassing all the EU, or the
Euro-zone, requires rm-level data to be available across time and across sectors at a relatively
ne level of disaggregation (NACE 3-digit) and, most importantly, to be derived from a common
informational source, rather than a sum of national ones, in order to avoid possible measurement
errors in matching data and thus ensure the maximum level of comparability across the EU-27
Member States. Moreover, in terms of quality of data, it is necessary to have detailed and
complete over time balance sheet information for the largest possible number of rms, in order
to avoid the aggregation problem typical of micro-data4.
The only currently available database that satises all these characteristics across European
rms is the AMADEUS database developed by Bureau van Dijk, a consulting company which
collects balance sheet data and ownership data for more than 11 million of active rms in
41 European countries (2008 version). Other commercially available databases in fact fail to
pass the test either in terms of coverage (they do not have coverage of the universe of rms,
but include only, for example, large or incorporated or listed companies), or in terms of data
(detailed balance sheet data are not available, only some variables related to the rmsactivity).
The geographic coverage of AMADEUS encompasses information for all the 27 members of
the European Union (albeit with di¤erent qualities in terms of national coverage, see infra) as
well as other 14 European countries that complete the geographical and political denition of
the continent. Another interesting feature of the database is given by the detailed denition
of a rms location, with data available on the region (NUTS2) and the city in which the rm
operates. These data could be useful in a competition analysis that would go beyond traditional
national frontiers, allowing to explore both disaggregated geographical region and/or broader
sub-European markets, progressively relevant in a more and more integrated common market.
In terms of comparable economic and nancial rm-level data, the database contains 22
balance sheet items, 25 prot and loss account items and 26 ratios. It is possible to derive
4 If samples are selected along certain variables (e.g. rmssize) due to the lack of data, the resulting aggregate
variables would be biased.
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descriptive information on activity codes (NACE 4-digit), which cover both manufacturing and
services sector in detail. The recently revised NACE Rev. 2 classication has also been added
to the data, thus ensuring full comparability with Eurostat in the future. The database contains
also a so-called Ownership Database that permits to retrieve information on the control chain
and the ownership type (foreign or domestic; industrial or individual; controlled or independent),
information which could be used as an additional control for assessing the extent of competition
levels.
Finally, another interesting feature of the AMADEUS database is that it allows a relatively
straightforward link between the estimated measures of competition based on balance sheet
data and other complementary indicators of conditions conducive to competition (e.g. trade
or product di¤erentiation). Apart from NACE Rev. 1 and 2, AMADEUS in fact reports
di¤erent classications of economic activities for each rm (NACE 4-digit, NAICS or US SIC).
Since it is possible to convert product codes (for example CN 8-digit) into activity codes (for
example NACE), these data can then be easily matched with data on international openness
of the sector (for example import penetration, intensive and extensive margins of trade), freely
available through the Eurostat COMEXT database, or data on the changes and complexity
of the product mix, via the link to the PRODCOM database, also developed by Eurostat.
A major shortcoming of the AMADEUS database is that it records rms as they become
available to the national information providers, which then transfer the data to the main data-
base. The database then stores the information on these rms eventually providing also past
balance sheets, and keep these rms as long as they continue to update their balance sheets.
As a result, the number of rms available in a given country might change from year to year as
new rms are added to the database, while at the same time inactive rms are dropped from
the database if they stay inactive for more than ve years. Hence, entry and exit are tricky
to measure on these data. We have designed specic routines to deal with these problems, in
particular distinguishing entry based on the year of incorporation of a given rm (economic
entry) vs. the year in which it appears in the database (database entry). At the same time, we
have made sure to measure exit of inactive rms considering as exiting those rms who report
two or more blanks in the balance sheet starting from our last available year5. However, there
is no way we can deal with the potential biases induced, on the entry side, by rms appearing
in the data in a given year but active already in previous years, and on the exit side by rms
5See the beginning of Section 5 for a detailed discussion of this issue.
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which, being inactive for more than ve years, have been dropped from the database6.
An alternative database which could be used to retrieve the same information is ORBIS, pro-
vided by the same Bureau van Dijk. The database incorporates the same data as of AMADEUS,
extended to world rather than European-only coverage (60M of rms in ORBIS, vs. 11M in
AMADEUS). The advantage of ORBIS is that rms are not dropped when inactive, and thus
exit can be better measured. However, a crucial issue is which version of these databases is
available, as both come in three di¤erent version with a di¤erent coverage, encompassing re-
spectively large-only, up to medium or the entire universe of rms. For this study, we clearly
need to use a version of the database which includes the entire universe of rms.7
2.2 Pilot database: choice of countries, industries, years and validation
The choice of the countries in the Pilot study is based on a combination of two criteria: the
availability of data providing a good validation with respect to o¢ cial statistics (see infra), and
the signicance of the country in terms of its economic size and/or structural characteristics.
In particular, the countries to be included in the Pilot study have been chosen not only for
their economic magnitude, but also because of their structural di¤erences in terms of institutions
and labour markets, all factors which might a¤ect the retrieved competition measures. To that
extent, we have taken into account the partition of social models identied by Sapir (2005), in
which countries are classied on the basis of a combination of e¢ ciency and equity that their
institutions are able to achieve. As it is well known, the partitioning identies four heterogeneous
groups of countries, as reported in Figure 1.
On the basis of the availability of data, both in terms of number of observations and quality
of the balance sheet information, we have thus identied the following countries for each group:
Italy and Spain for the Mediterranean; France and Germany for the Continentals; Belgium for
the Continentals but with features typical of a small open economy; Sweden for the Nordics
and Poland and Romania as a representative of a new member of the European Union, with a
model of economic governance still in evolution. Ideally we would have liked to include also data
6 If a rm appears in the dataset, say, in 2006, but reports an incorporation year of, say, 2002, we cannot
consider this rm as entrying in 2006, but rather have to incorporate it among the active rms. Clearly, for
those measures who depend on the aggegation property of our data (e.g. total number of rms or total turnover),
comparing the data from 2002 to 2005 with the data in 2006 one could get an unobserved variable bias. The bias
should be much less severe when considering the PCM (as rms in 2002 to 2005 would already incorporate in
their PCM the presence of the missingrm), and non existant for the RPD measure, which by construction is
not sensitive to the presence of missing information. As far as exit is concerned, the reader has to consider that
exit rates for the early years of our sample might be downward biased.
7This version of AMADEUS database was available through Bocconi University.
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of countries according to social models (Sapir, 2005)
from the United Kingdom as a prototype Anglo-Saxon economy, but the quality of the available
balance sheet information (very few rms reporting sales or turnover, with existing data generally
biased towards large rms) made the exercise not comparable to the other countries analysed in
the Report.
The eight countries included in the Pilot study report a large enough number of rms (in
most cases the census of rms formally obliged to present balance sheets) which ensures a high
coverage, as reported in Table 1, presenting the number of rms extracted at the time in which
we have started the study (January 2009).
Table 1: Pilot countries and number of rms in Amadeus database
Country N. of firms
Belgium 375,779
France 1,062,268
Germany 1,062,524
Italy 690,244
Poland 59,848
Romania 505,428
Spain 980,797
Sweden 280,320
We have downloaded the data on all the rms in a given country in a given year, for all
the sectors of economic activity (NACE Rev. 1)8. We have then aggregated the available
8Note that data in Amadeus have a stratied nature: when a new rm is added to the database, all the balance
sheets available for the same rm also in the past years (up to 10) are added. It then follows that the coverage in
terms of information for any given year is constant. As a result, the extension of this analysis to any other year
is straightforward, without a signicant loss in the quality of the data.
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rm specic information at the NACE 2-digit level, in order to compare our samples with the
Eurostat o¢ cial statistics. In particular, the Structural Business Statistics of Eurostat allows
us to retrieve information for every country and for each NACE 2-digit (with the exclusion
of NACE code J Finance, for some countries) in terms of number of active enterprises and
total turnover. Since the last available year in Eurostat data is 2006 we have chosen the latter
as a benchmark. For those two measures, we thus present in Table 2 the correlation between
the o¢ cial Eurostat statistics and our measures aggregated from rm-level data, together with
information on the total available number of observed rms.
Table 2: Correlations between Amadeus and Eurostat, turnover and number of rms, year 2006
Correlation by n. of
firms
Correlation by
turnover
N. of observed
firms
Belgium 0.94 0.87 327,366
Germany 0.90 0.59 684,416
France 0.98 0.64 476,802
Italy 0.84 0.78 656,629
Poland 0.72 0.83 51,432
Romania 0.99 0.99 302,486
Spain 0.89 0.89 519,041
Sweden 0.85 0.83 271,226
In particular, correlations in terms of number of rms are calculated comparing the number
of rms recorded in the database in each industry with the corresponding o¢ cial Eurostat
statistics, according to the NACE Rev. 1 denition. For those correlations, the year of reference
is always 2006. Correlations by turnover have been computed comparing the rm-level balance
sheet item total sales volumeaggregated within each industry, and are referred to 2006 data9.
These validations refer to the general quality of the data contained in the AMADEUS data-
base, and leave us quite comfortable as a starting point. However, in our exercise we limit our
analysis to certain industries, and require the contemporaneous presence of a number of balance
sheet items necessary to calculate our indicators. As a result, we have to explore the quality of
the data with which we ultimately will end up working.
To this extent, in this Pilot study we have agreed to analyse at the NACE 3-digit level
the Food (15), Chemical (24) and Automotive (34) industries for manufacturing, one network
industry, Telecom (642), and two services industries: Retail (52) and Real Estate (70). In terms
9Correlations for other EU countries are technically possible to retrieve, but require a fair deal of work, has
one has to download all the rms in all the EU countries by NACE 2-digit industries, a task implying around one
day of computing time per country.
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of years, our data cover the period from 1998/1999 (according to data availability) to 2007, i.e.
they are able to address the competitive situation in Europe before and after the introduction
of the euro in 2002 and the entry of China into the WTO.
Downloading our rm-specic data in the selected countries, industries and years, and con-
sidering only those rms whose information is complete across the required balance sheet items,
we then come up with the following gures in terms of number of rms and turnover, always
with respect to the o¢ cial Eurostat data.
Table 3: Degree of coverage of AMADEUS database, number of rms, year 2006
Country Nace 15 Nace 24 Nace 34 Nace 52 Nace 642 Nace 70
BE 6.2% 37.9% 16.0% 0.9% 4.0% 1.8%
DE 3.0% 17.1% 11.6% 0.9% 200.3% 0.1%
ES 40.2% 67.0% 51.7% 11.6% 146.7% 14.9%
FR 24.7% 56.2% 57.4% 21.9% 16.7% 7.9%
IT na 56.5% 66.1% 5.5% 24.9% 21.2%
PL 9.9% 22.5% 17.7% 0.6% 5.4% 6.4%
RO 71.9% 71.6% 63.5% 55.4% 61.1% 50.0%
SE 37.7% 32.5% 35.0% 22.1% 17.1% 5.5%
N. of firms in % of official Eurostat data in 2006; na: not available in Eurostat
 COVERAGE N. of FIRMS
Table 4: Degree of coverage of AMADEUS database, turnover, year 2006
Country Nace 15 Nace 24 Nace 34 Nace 52 Nace 642 Nace 70
BE 91.4% 83.0% 85.9% 33.8% 71.4% 62.1%
DE 59.6% 69.6% 53.5% 38.7% 112.1% 44.3%
ES 88.3% 103.3% 126.1% 67.2% 258.8% 98.6%
FR na 95.2% 120.9% 71.7% 56.1% 35.3%
IT na 95.0% 77.7% 40.2% 131.8% 155.9%
PL 46.2% 39.0% 60.4% 29.6% na 63.9%
RO 86.6% 87.6% 36.3% 82.3% 103.1% 81.7%
SE na 23.0% 9.1% 48.3% 7.5% 31.5%
Turnover in % of official Eurostat data in 2006; na: not available in Eurostat
 COVERAGE TURNOVER
Three features of the data are worth noticing. First, in Germany the quality of the balance
sheet data (in particular information on the turnover / sales variables) is not perfect especially
for small rms, with the result that our working sample of German rms is relatively small with
respect to the o¢ cial number of operating rms (upper table); however, since large rms are
comprised in the sample, the coverage with respect to o¢ cial Eurostat turnover data remains
high (bottom table). Second, note that for Poland the database has a limited coverage, as in
the AMADEUS database very few small rms are included: in Section 8 we provide a discussion
of the extent to which these data limitation might change our results. Third, note that in some
cases the primary activity code included in AMADEUS, on the basis of which we attribute the
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classication of rms to an industry, is such to let us record a higher number of operating rms
than those recorded by Eurostat: for example we record 2333 rms operating in the German
telecoms industry (642) vs. 1165 recorded by Eurostat. As the o¢ cial criterion is based on the
initial classication of a company at the time of its setup, while the AMADEUS primary activity
code is based on the current production of a company, we believe the AMADEUS classication
matches more closely the actual product market dynamics of an industry (rms change their
primary activity codes over time). In any case, there is no way to reconcile these data; however,
to the extent that all these rms operate within the same distribution of data, that should not
a¤ect the quality of our estimates.
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3 The baseline indicator of competition: PCM
3.1 Retrieving the price-cost margin (PCM) at the rm level
The Price-Cost Margin (PCM) is in general considered a rivalry indicator of competition, since
it relates to the average protability of a given industry. Firms within an industry compete
by choosing their pricing or output strategies, with enhanced competition having the e¤ect of
lowering the equilibrium price, once we correct for the quality of the product. At the limit,
the price will equal the marginal cost of production, forcing less e¢ cient rms to exit. As a
consequence, the price-cost margin provides an inverse measure of the intensity of competition.
However, when looking at it from a rm-level perspective as we do here, the PCM might be
considered also as a structural indicator, since if the price-cost margin is measured at the rm
level, the relevant notion of demand in this theoretical relationship is that of residual demand,
which measures the variation of the equilibrium output of a rm due to a change in its price,
given the strategic reaction of all actual and potential competitors. Such a strategic reaction can
be considered itself a function of the market structure (e.g. driven by barriers to entry, minimum
e¢ cient scale, etc.). It then follows that the price elasticity of the residual demand summarizes
the competitive conditions faced by a rm that stem from both the structural features of the
market in which it operates and the conducts of all the other market players. When measured at
the rm-level, thus, the PCM, by combining a structural and a rivalry component, can represent
a solid indicator of the intensity of competition. Indeed, the standard approach used by the
literature to retrieve the PCM species a demand function and the derivation of its rst-order
equilibrium condition, in which it can be shown that (e.g. in the Cournot case) for a given
rm i the FOC (First Order Condition) amounts to Li = i=", where i is the market share
of the rm, " is the elasticity of demand and Li is the PCM, or Lerner Index, calculated as
(P  MC)=P , i.e. how far a rms price is from its marginal cost.
Two di¤erent empirical versions of the Lerner Index approach are available in the literature,
and both can be directly used at the rm-level of analysis, since they only need the availability of
balance sheet data. The basic one is a simple ratio between prots and sales of a single rm, as
in the case of Aghion et al. (2005) and Nickell (1996). A similar approach, suggested by Tybout
(2003), in which the PCM at the rm level is estimated taking the di¤erence between production
value and total variable costs (employment plus material costs) divided by production value,
has the same computational advantages, and will be used as our baseline.
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As a result, starting from yearly balance sheet data the rm-level PCM can be proxied as:
PCMit ' salesit   variable_costsitsalesit =
(p  q)it   (c  q)it
(p  q)it =
pit   cit
pit
for the rm i at time t, where quantity is simplied within the ratio, leaving in the expression unit
price p and unit variable cost c. The latter represents the sum of costs for materials and costs
for employees, therefore excluding the cost of capital, which is considered as a xed cost. The
theoretical PCM should take into account the unit marginal cost instead of the variable cost, but
the former is not available when considering yearly balance sheet data. While in this study we
adopt such an approximation, we will also test competition dynamics on the basis of alternative
proxies which do not su¤er from the possible biases deriving from such a simplication10.
Then, for a given NACE industry I we would have that the observed PCM is:
PCM It =
1
NI
X
i2I
PCMit
and I is the desired level of aggregation.
Alternatively, one could also retrieve the PCM as the weighted average of the individual
rmsPCMs, where weights are given by market share. In this case, for a given NACE industry
I we would have that the weighted PCM is:
gPCM It =X
i2I
sitPCMit
where I is the desired level of aggregation and sit are the market shares of individual rms in a
given year, such that
P
i2I sit = 1.
3.2 PCM in the services sector
From a theoretical point of view, the peculiarity of service sectors in a context of industrial
dynamics can be gathered when appraising the often used assumptions of a production function
characterized by Hicks-neutral technical change and constant elasticity of substitution (e.g. the
Cobb-Douglas), as factors of production of service rms are likely to be less adjustable than in
10As pointed out by Fisher and McGowan (1983), minimizing the biases in retrieving a rm-specic PCM
measure would require to include variable costs and other costs that help in increasing e¢ ciency, investment in
R&D or in patents, as the depreciation of the stock of the intangibles from one year to the other. This is because
the observed PCM implies the use of a rm-level accounting rate of return, not necessarily corresponding to
the economic denition of prots because of the missed capitalization of certain activities (for example research
activities).
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the manufacturing sector, due to the higher reliance of services on specic labour inputs, and
particularly high-skill labour. It then follows that services rms might be characterised by some
stickiness in the adjustment of the input (cost) component to productivity shocks, inducing a
slower adjustment of the structural competition parameters to the new equilibrium.
However for the calculation of the PCM and all other indexes that involve the denition
of marginal/variable costs, and thus not incorporate a measure of productivity, nothing should
change between manufacturing and services, but for the evidence of a possible generally higher
level of the labor cost component.
Another concern might derive from the quality of the available data. Waldmann (1991), in
a comment to the paper by Hall (1988), where a general methodology for calculating price-cost
margins is presented (see the next Section), warns that, in some service industries, measurement
errors in the construction of real value added might hamper the interpretation of the retrieved
PCMs.
Based on these priors, and notwithstanding the lack of detailed rm-specic data for services
until very recently, some papers focusing on the manufacturing sector consider nonetheless the
possibility of inclusion of services, claiming that it would not be a problem to extend the same
methodology to rms in this sector. For example, Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) from
OECD investigate mark-up ratios in manufacturing industries using industry level data sourced
from the OECD STAN database. The same authors however claim that the analysis could
be extended to service sectors. It is likely that the degree of competition in many services is
considerably lower than in manufacturing.(p.14).
And indeed, the few articles that inspect competition indicators in services industries aw-
lessly apply the same methodology to both manufacturing industries and services industries.
For example, Small (1997) investigates the cyclicality of mark-ups in manufacturing and service
industries in United Kingdom. He applies a slightly revised version of the Hall (1988) approach
developed by Haskel et al. (1995) to see whether mark-ups are pro or counter-cyclical. He claims
that a major di¢ culty involved in estimating the mark-up for non-manufacturing industries
is the limited amount of disaggregated data available for these industries.This lack of data
for non-manufacturing is why most articles restrict themselves to just looking at manufacturing
industries. (p.11) In his case, he only has data at the one-digit level for non-manufacturing
industries, as opposed to the two-digit level for manufacturing industries.
Nishimura, Ohkusa and Ariga (1999) estimate mark-ups over marginal cost for a panel of
large Japanese rms in 21 industries over 24 years (1971-1994). By virtue of their data source,
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the Nikkei NEEDS data base, they are able to include some service industries in their analysis,
namely trading companies, retailers and land transportation (excluding railroad). They apply
the same methodology to manufacturing and service companies without nding structural breaks
in their analysis.
Kiyota, Nakajima and Nishimura (2008) estimate rmsmark-ups for a sample of 16,000
Japanese rms in manufacturing and wholesale and retail industries over the period 1995-2002.
The authors apply the same methodology to rms belonging to manufacturing and services in-
dustries, and highlight that these coverage allows them to draw conclusions which are broader in
scope. Data are sourced from an annual survey prepared by the Research and Statistics Depart-
ment, METI, which covers mining, manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade rms, although
some services industries such as nance, insurance and software services are not included(p.10).
Again, data availability justies the selection of industries in the analysis: We focus on manu-
facturing and wholesale and retail industries because the number of rms in other industries is
rather small.(p.10)
Badinger (2007) applies the Roeger (1995) methodology on a sample of 10 European countries
over the period 1981-1999 in order to investigate the e¤ect of Single Market Programme. This
is the rst study on the Single Market to include also service sectors. The author states that the
only caveat that should be kept in mind when estimating mark-ups in service industries is that
the available data and standard capital stock measures may be less reliable there(p. 503). In
his analysis, he uses industry level data from the STAN database by OECD.
To this extent, the empirical literature dealing with balance sheet data generally proxies
capital with the tangible xed assetsvoice. Although, to the best of our knowledge, no one
has really arisen the issue, it might be the case that the latter proxy could be inappropriate for
services industries. Indeed, in these industries intangible xed assets, such as patents, could be
extremely relevant. However, our balance sheet data also have information on intangible xed
assets. Thus, in Section 4 we will investigate whether our competition indicators are sensitive
to the inclusion of intangible xed assets into the denition of capital.
3.3 PCM evolution across countries, industries and time
Figure 2 presents the evolution over time (years reported on the horizontal axis) of the average
observed PCM (vertical axis) by the NACE 2-digits industries included in the Pilot study and
across our eight countries, here grouped into Euro-area countries (Belgium, France, Germany,
Italy and Spain) and others (Poland, Romania and Sweden).
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At a rst inspection the PCM does not seem to present clear and di¤erent trends in the two
areas in terms of changes over time. As far as levels are concerned, instead, the Italian PCMs
appear constantly lower than the ones of other countries - with the exclusion of the real estate
sector (NACE 70), whose PCM dramatically increases over time. France instead is the country
that displays the highest margins among the euro-zone countries considered, while the levels of
price cost margins are rather homogeneous for Spain, Belgium and Germany. The three non-euro
countries included in our analysis are very heterogeneous in the levels of our relevant measure,
with Sweden having the highest PCM in four of the six industries taken into consideration.
Such a high degree of heterogeneity in the reported levels of PCM might be attributable to
di¤erent sample characteristics, e.g. Italy (the country with the lowest PCM in level) might be
characterised by a sample in which small and medium-sized rms are relatively more prevalent
with respect to France (the country with the highest PCM level). However, after having checked
the distribution of the Italian and French samples by rm sizes, we have found the two samples
to be rather homogeneous, and thus such a di¤erence must depend on other country-specic
(e.g. tax-related) characteristics which are exogenous to the current analysis. Since this nding
is important, as it greatly a¤ects the possibility of retrieving synthetic, area-wide indicators of
competition, we explicitly discuss the aggregation properties of our data in a specic part of
Section 8 of the study, where we show the di¤erences between the observed vs. the weighted
PCM.
Examining the PCMs across industries, we nd that in the services sectors there seems
to be an excalating trend of an already relatively high PCM: in fact, with the exception of
Poland, Germany and Belgium in the telecoms industry, all the countries display a persistent
or growing average PCM. This tendency is particularly evident in the real estate sector, where
the PCM displays a quite signicant positive trend. The retail sector is instead characterised
by a relatively lower average PCM (between 10% and 30% ), smaller with respect to the levels
of real estate and telecoms. Moreover, the margin remains almost constant in all the countries,
with possibly some exceptions in Italy and, to a lesser extent, France.
In manufacturing industries, the average levels of PCM are lower than the ones in services,
with a somewhat less marked tendency at the country level.
An interesting feature of the availability of rm-level PCM is that one can go beyond tra-
ditional analyses which look at the average evolution of PCM across industries (as the one
described above for the NACE 2-digits level of aggregation), retrieving information from the
entire distribution of rms over time. With this respect, we will present in what follows some
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descriptive statistics on the kernel-density estimated distributions of PCM for all the countries
of the Pilot study. In the exercise we have aggregated rms within services and manufacturing,
given the relatively large di¤erences existing across these two groups of industries, but the rel-
ative homogeneous trends existing within them for a given country, as shown in Figure 2. Of
course, the reader has to keep in mind that in the present study Manufacturing refers to three
industries: NACE 15, 24 and 34, while Services refers to NACE 52, 642 and 70.
In order to track the evolution of PCM distributions over time, we compare the distribution
in 2000 with the one in 2007. Also note that in the graphs we bound the PCM distribution
between 0 and 1 to increase readability (i.e. avoiding reporting a long, at left tail), while in the
tables below we report percentiles for the entire distribution (i.e. including also negative values
of the PCM). However, as it can be seen, negative values represent in general less than 5% of
the cumulated density of the reported PCMs.
We use Figure 3, which presents the distribution of PCM for German rms, to discuss a
number of common features of the country-specic PCM distributions. Both in manufacturing
and services, the distribution of the Price Cost Margin is skewed to the right and seems to
shift slightly to the left in time. The shape is consistent with theory: a mass of rms having
lower-than-the-average margins, and few rms that, because of their e¢ ciency (lower costs) or
because of market power, can extract very high PCM (the potential drivers of this distribution
will be explored in Section 4, in which we present the PCM decomposition). In a case like
this, characterised by an asymmetric distribution, the median is much more informative than
the mean as an indicator. Indeed, the mean value is more driven by extreme observations.
This nding would be true, in general, for all averagecompetition indicators developed by the
literature.
As for the dynamics, in Germany both average and median PCM decrease over time, and the
distribution becomes more skewed to the right, signaling that the number of rms having a PCM
lower than the mean of the industry has increased. The direction of the shift is again consistent
with the prediction of economic models: due to a shock that changes the market conditions
(more integrated markets, the EMU, etc.) incumbent rms have to face higher competition that
forces them to lower the prices and leads to some exit. In addition new entrants, having to
overcome entry barriers, will have a low PCM, which will contribute to the leftward shift of the
distribution.
As expected the PCM in service industries is persistently higher (6 to 4 percentage points if
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we consider the median) and increasingly dispersed than the one of manufacturing industries11;
nonetheless, the median PCM decreases more in the services sector (8% vs. 3% of manufacturing)
thus hinting at a possible convergence in time.
Instead, a di¤erent trend is present in Italy, as shown in Figure 4. The distribution of PCM
in the early years of the sample is very skewed to the right, as expected, and fairly concentrated
around the median (indeed for both sectors 75% of PCMs are lower than 0.14). However, in
both sectors the mean and median PCM increase over time, with the distributions becoming
more dispersed.
A possible interpretation of this nding is that rms have reacted to the progressive open-
ings of markets and the increased competition by increasing their product di¤erentiation, thus
choosing to target niche markets. The latter is consistent with evidence showing that from 2003
the average unit values of exported products have increased in Italy by more than 10%, a trend
di¤erent from other European countries, showing a certain quality upgrading of Italian produc-
tion12. In order to provide some preliminary evidence of this claim, in Section 8 we will discuss
trade penetration as a stimulus indicator, regressing it against the evolution of the Italian vs.
the German PCM.
The PCM distribution in services instead completely changes shape, becoming very irregular.
Also the median is no longer a signicant indicator, as there is small concentration of rms that
actually have a PCM around that value. Instead, we can identify two groups of rms: one
that has a lower PCM, more or less consistent with the one of the previous period; and another
one for which the PCM increased considerably. In this respect, it is interesting to notice that
the value of the 75% percentiles changed moving from a value of the PCM of 0.14 to a much
higher value of 0.74; consistently, the kurtosis a measure of the peaknessof a distribution 
dramatically decreases. Such a dramatic shift in the PCM distribution may be due (especially
as far as the right tail is concerned) to a compositional e¤ect: the sample we consider evolves in
time and the AMADEUS database progressively includes rms of smaller size after 2002. If this
entry is concentrated into new niche products in services, such a composition might explain the
higher PCM, since small rms, being unable to spread xed costs on a large number of products,
have higher average costs and might need to charge higher prices to protably operate in the
market. The evidence we have reported in Figure 2 on the increase of the PCM in the real estate
11 It is well known that services in Europe are much less integrated within the single market, due to technical
barriers (non-tradability) or lack of regulation (the EU services directive is supposed to entry into force by the
end of 2009).
12Altomonte and Barattieri (2007) show how this product upgrading is consistent with an increase in the PCM,
and seems to be driven by import competition of low-cost countries.
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industry (NACE 70) in Italy is consistent with the above ndings.
The development of the PCM distribution in Romania, reported in Figure 5, somewhat
mirrors the one in Italy. The PCM initial distributions are very skewed to the right and con-
centrated around the median. As for Italy, PCM values and their dispersion are increasing over
time, although in Romania the dynamics of the two industries seem similar. In the manufactur-
ing industry the average PCM increases by 49% while the median value by 46%; the distribution
remains skewed but, in the second period, the right tail weights more if compared to the period
1998-2002. In particular the values for the 3rd quartile shift from .51 to .82 indicating that
there is a mass of rms with a very high PCM (between .8 and .9) in the second period. Similar
features can be observed for services. The di¤erent transition dynamics experienced by Romania
across the two periods might be behind this trend.
Finally, it is interesting to notice how the PCM distribution for Poland, shown in Figure 6,
evolves over time in the two considered industries. As a caveat, we have however to be aware
that the distribution of rms across sizes in Poland is very di¤erent from the other countries,
as AMADEUS reports data on very few small Polish rms (see Section 4 for a discussion of the
extent of the bias).
The PCM in manufacturing, starting from a distribution similar to those of all the other
countries, follows the prediction of economic models: after the competition shock which may have
occurred following the entry of Poland into the EU, the average and median PCM decrease, due
to selection and entry e¤ects, with the curve shifting to the left and an increase in the skewness of
the distribution. The services industry is, in the rst period, characterised by a very dispersed,
non-single-peaked distribution, possibly an heritage of the planned economy system, in which
services were under represented in terms of overall distribution of economic activities. In the
second period the shape becomes more regular, as expected, and, as in the manufacturing case,
the distribution shifts to the left (lower values of mean and median).
Finally, comparing the levels of PCMs across the two groups of industries, we can see that in
Poland, like in Germany, there is a wide and persistent gap between values of median PCM in
services and in manufacturing. The di¤erence between the two industries is instead somewhat
less evident for Romania and Italy in the rst period, while it becomes relevant in the second.
All the other countries display PCM dynamics, reported in the following Figures, which are
intermediate situations of the cases discussed above.
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Figure 2: PCM evolution across countries, industries and years
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Figure 3: Distribution of observed PCM in 2000 and 2007, Germany
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Figure 4: Distribution of observed PCM in 2000 and 2007, Italy
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Figure 5: Distribution of observed PCM in 2000 and 2007, Romania
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Figure 6: Distribution of observed PCM in 2000 and 2007, Poland
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Figure 7: Distribution of observed PCM in 2000 and 2007, France
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Figure 8: Distribution of observed PCM in 2000 and 2007, Spain
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Figure 9: Distribution of observed PCM in 2000 and 2007, Belgium
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Figure 10: Distribution of observed PCM in 2000 and 2007, Sweden
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4 Estimated vs. observed PCM
4.1 The Roeger (1995) methodology
In order to validate the measure of PCM computed using balance sheet data, which has been
presented in the previous section, we adopt the following methodology, which is the same in-
troduced by Roeger (1995), who built on the work of Hall (1988). These authors start from a
standard production function:
Qit = Ait  F (Nit;Mit;Kit) (1)
where Qit is the output of rm i at time t, Nit;Mit and Kit are respectively the labour, material
and capital inputs and Ait is the rms productivity.
Starting from an expression for the marginal cost in presence of technical progress analogous
to the specication used by Hall (1988), it is possible to express the output growth rate as
follows:
dQit
Qit
=
PnNit
citQit
dNit
Nit
+
PkKit
citQit
dKit
Kit
+
PmMit
citQit
dMit
Mit
+ git (2)
where git is the productivity growth, cit is the marginal cost and PJ (with J = N;M;K) is the
unit cost of input factor J . The weights, hence, are the shares of each input in total costs.
Since under constant return to scale (CRS) the cost shares sum to one, it is possible to
rewrite equation (2) as:
dQit
Qit
  dKit
Kit
=
PnNit
citQit

dNit
Nit
  dKit
Kit

+
PmMit
citQit

dMit
Mit
  dKit
Kit

+ git (3)
If now we introduce imperfect competition, with a mark-up over marginal cost dened as it =
Pit
cit
, equation (3) may be written as:
dQit
Qit
  dKit
Kit
= it

Nit

dNit
Nit
  dKit
Kit

+ Mit

dMit
Mit
  dKit
Kit

+ git (4)
where now the  are shares in the value of production. If we now divide both sides by it =
1
1 it
and rearrange, we get:
dQit
Qit
 NitdNit
Nit
 MitdMit
Mit
  (1 Nit Mit)dKit
Kit
= it

dQit
Qit
  dKit
Kit

+ (1  it)git (5)
with the expression now written in terms of it =
Pit cit
Pit
, the Lerner Index or price-cost margin
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(PCM) of rm i at time t13.
The left hand side of Equation (5) is the Solow residual expressed in real variables, now
decomposed, on the right hand side, into two terms: a pure technology component git and a
mark-up factor (1  it). The problem in estimating equations (3) or (5) as in Levinsohn (1993)
is that unobserved productivity shocks git may be correlated with the input factors.
The latter is the traditional critique to the Halls (1998) approach for estimating mark-ups,
which is di¢ cult to overcome since instrumental variables are hard to nd at the rm-level.
However, the potential endogeneity of the error term can be overcome following Roeger (1995),
who is able to decompose the price-based (or dual) Solow residual according to the following
expression, comparable to equation (5):
Nit
dPNit
PNit
+Mit
dPMit
PMit
+(1 Nit Mit)dPKit
PKit
 dPit
Pit
=  it

dPit
Pit
  dPKit
PKit

+(1 it)git (6)
where PJ (with J = N;M;K) is again the unit cost of input factor J and the s are the shares
in value of production. Subtracting eq. (6) from eq. (5), one ends up with:

dQit
Qit
+
dPit
Pit

  Nit

dNit
Nit
+
dPNit
PNit

  Mit

dMit
Mit
+
dPMit
PMit

 
 (1  Nit   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
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+
dPKit
PKit

= it

dQit
Qit
+
dPit
Pit

 

dKit
Kit
+
dPKit
PKit

(7)
Again, on the left hand side of Equation (7) one nds the Solow residual, this time expressed
as a function of the nominal, rather than real or dual (price) variables. On the right hand side
the Solow residual is now decomposed in two variables, that is the Lerner Index multiplied by
the variable cost component (the di¤erence between the revenues and the cost of capital) of the
rm.
Note how in Equation (7) the unobserved productivity shock git is canceled out and therefore
the simultaneity bias previously discussed disappears. The Lerner index can thus be estimated
consistently. Moreover, Equation (7) implies that estimating the price-cost margin requires
information about the growth rates of production value, wage bill, material costs and the value
13 In the remaining of the study we will use indi¤erently the terms markup and price-cost margin, although, we
will be referring to the latter.
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of capital. Since no deation is required, also the omitted price variable bias is not a source of
trouble14.
Note that, following Konings et al. (2005), we may label the LHS of eq. (7) as DY and
the RHS as DX, thus obtaining a very synthetic notation for the equation adopted for the
estimation of the price-cost margins:
DYit = itDXit + it (8)
4.2 Literature review and main critical issues
A rst relevant issue in the measurement of mark-ups via the Roegers method is linked to pro-
ductivity: since the productivity shock is now excluded from the estimation, dynamic e¢ ciency,
i.e. e¢ ciency gains due to innovation, are particularly hard to disentangle from the retrieved
PCM estimates. In other words, rms experiencing a positive shock in productivity, e.g. because
of product innovation leading to higher quality or process innovation leading to lower costs, will
show-up in the data with a higher price-cost margin a¤ecting the industry-average.
It would be therefore necessary to validate the retrieved PCM with alternative indicators
which could provide information on the sources of the margin, i.e. whether it derives from higher
prices or lower costs.
A way to handle this problem has been suggested by Klette (1999). He estimates a production
function in logarithmic deviations from the representative rm, which is the median rm within
industry for each year:
q^it = a^it +
X
j2M
jitx^
j
it
where a lower case letter with a hat is the logarithmic deviation from the point of reference of
the corresponding upper case variable (e.g. q^it  ln(Qit)   ln(Qt) ), where Qt is the level of
output for the representative rm at time t. By changing reference point from year to year, he is
allowing for unrestricted technical change, and additionally is avoiding the problem of obtaining
proper deators. He is assuming that a rms productivity relative to the reference rm a^it can
be decomposed into a xed e¤ect ai and a random error term uit: a^it = ai + uit.
By treating ai as a xed e¤ect he is allowing cross-sectional di¤erences in productivity
14Tybout (2003) points out that, lacking specic information on rmsprices, which is common, it could be the
case that rms that rapidly increase their inputs tend to drive down their output prices more rapidly than the
industry averages, yielding a downward bias in the estimated markups. Klette and Griliches (1996) have been
the rst to discuss a similar omitted price variable bias in production functions estimation. De Loecker (2007)
discusses the problem within semi-parametric estimations of TFP.
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between rms to be correlated with the explanatory variables in the equation. Then, to eliminate
xed e¤ects, he estimates the model in rst di¤erences. Notice however that this methodology, as
Kettle recognizes, is not able to solve the problem of correlation between productivity di¤erences
uit and the di¤erences in rmschoices of factor inputs: "to the extent that a rm experiences
changes in productivity over time relative to the average rm, a productivity shock might be
correlated with changes in factor inputs to the extent that the shock is anticipated before the
factor demands are determined."
More recently, De Loecker and Warzynski (2009) propose an alternative framework which
fully takes into account the problem induced by rms productivity. They suggest to enrich Hall
(1988) specication by modelling unobserved productivity via the control function suggested
by Olley and Pakes (1996). They show that the inclusion of this term allows to relax the
assumption of constant returns to scale, as this estimation does not require the user cost of
capital. Moreover, they show that this methodology can be adapted to take into account the
selection process. However, their method requires the deationing of nominal, balance sheet
variables in order to retrieve the realgures for output and input.
A second problem to be taken into account is the role of capital and, in particular, the proper
measurement of the rental price of capital. Forsman et al. (1996) discuss this issue extensively.
In general, the standard Roeger estimates do not introduce any bias if measurement errors in
the levels of variables are su¢ ciently constant, which means that they disappear in di¤erences.
While this is generally the case with the measurement of capital stock, the situation is di¤erent
when facing the measurement of rental price of capital, which is not directly observable. The
customary way to measure it is through its denition: ((iit   t) + it)  PI , where iit is the
nominal interest rate, t is the ination rate, it is the depreciation rate and PI is the price of
capital goods. This denition is subject to a number of shortcomings.
A long bond yield may be not a su¢ cient proxy to describe the nominal cost of capital for a
single rm: indeed, rmssources of nance are rm-specic, and agency costs create a wedge
between nominal long rates and the true cost of capital. Secondly, Forsman et al. (1996) note
that changes in corporate taxation, such as investment deductions, are almost impossible to
capture in practice. Third, the correct deator is not an aggregate price index, but the expected
behaviour of the price of the particular capital good over the full life of the investment. Finally,
they note that the rate of depreciation varies from one capital good to another, and changes in
the composition of investments a¤ect the true rate of depreciation.
Additionally, Boulhol (2005) shows that Roegers overestimation of mark-ups cannot be
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attributed entirely to measurement errors, but a component is due to the technical nature
attributed to the capital measure. Indeed, Roegers equation is derived from a specication
treating capital as a variable factor, but capital is often found to be truly xed in the data. The
methodology may thus overestimate mark-up levels to the extent that the returns to scale on
the variable costs are decreasing. The suggested way to tackle this issue will be discussed in the
next paragraphs.
A radical way to totally avoid the problems related to the measurement of capital is to follow
Halls, rather than Roegers, approach, as the former does not require any computation of the
rental price of capital. For example, Siotis (2003) adopts Halls approach (1988, 1990), more
precisely the extension suggested by Domowitz et al. (1998), thus neglecting the problem. He
estimates the following specication:
4q = p
c
(sL4l + sM4m) + #
where 4q = log(QK ) = 4QQ   4KK , 4l = log( LK ) = 4LL   4KK and 4m = log(MK ) = 4MM   4KK ,
sL and sM denote labour and materials shares, as usual, and # is the rate of Hicks-neutral
technological progress. By reordering the terms, Siotis obtains:
4q   sL4l   sM4m = (1  )#+ 4q
where  is the Lerner index, and corresponds to p cp = 1  1p=c . As Klette (1999), he estimates
the model in rst di¤erences. Again, this allows him to clean from any rm-specic e¤ect that
may be related to productivity in levels.
Once again, the latter methodology implies the use of real, rather than nominal, variables,
and thus the distortions induced in deationing. To that extent, DeSouza (2009) shows, assuming
monopolistic competition, that the use of an industry-specic price deator leads to spurious
mark-up estimates as price dispersion is not taken into account. Indeed, when rm-specic prices
are not available, and we deate using industry-specic deators, we are actually estimating the
following equation:
drit   dpt = 
X
j
ijtdx
j
it + dwit
where drit is revenue growth, dpt is the industry-specic price deator, ijt are revenue share
of input j, dxjit is the growth in input j and dwit accounts for productivity growth. If there
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is not price dispersion (dpit = dpt ), the dependent variable is a perfect measure of rms
output. Otherwise, we are introducing an unobserved term in the equation, which implies
that the omitted variable bias is present. As a result, De Souza (2009) suggests an alternative
specication that, departing from Hall (1988) and imposing more structure on the model, is able
to properly control for unobserved price dispersion:
drit   dpt =
X
j
ijtdx
j
it +
1

(drt   dpt) +    1

dwit
where  is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties and  1 is the inverse of the
price-cost ratio. This methodology is perfectly suitable in order to estimate mark-ups within
a given industry, but might be ill-suited to retrieve mark-ups across industries and countries,
as for our goals, since the latter would strongly rely on our assumptions on the (exogenous)
estimates of elasticity of substitution.
As already discussed, another problem related to the use of capital derives from the fact
that capital may be both xed and variable, while the information on the amount of the two
di¤erent types of capital cannot be retrieved from the data. The share of xed (or sunk) capital
is rm-specic, and may vary systematically with the level of economic activity over time, as
well as with respect to rm size. However, Roeger and Warzynski (2004) show that it is possible
to estimate this share: using cost weights instead of revenue weights to obtain the primal and
dual Solow residual, one avoids the bias inicted by imperfect competition on the measurement
of the rate of technical progress, as suggested by Hall (1990). However, the presence of xed
costs creates a measurement problem which is analogous to the presence of mark-ups for the
measurement of Solow residuals when revenues are adopted as weights. The di¤erence between
primal and dual residual is roughly proportional to the size of the mark-up, when revenue weights
are adopted, and to the share of xed capital, when using cost weights. Therefore, the use of cost
weights allows to retrieve the share of xed capital, in the same fashion as the size of mark-up
is retrieved from residuals obtained with revenue weights.
A third problem has been highlighted by several authors, namely the fact that Roegers
approach assumes constant returns to scale, while Halls allows for the identication of both
mark-up and returns to scale. Several solutions have been proposed in the literature.
Klettes (1999) specication allows him to jointly estimate PCMs and returns to scale. He
notes that the output elasticities for factor j, jit, evaluated at an internal point, are dened
as jit = its
j
it , where it is the ratio between price and marginal cost, and s
j
it is the cost
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share of input j relative to total revenue. As various rigidities a¤ect capital, it is dubious to
assume that this denition holds for this input. Thus, he removes the hypothesis of constant
returns to scale, denes the elasticity of scale in production as the sum of output elasticities for
factors (it =
P
j2M
jit), and obtains the output elasticity for capital as: 
K
it = it   it
P
j 6=K
sjit .
Therefore, he takes the following equation and estimates it in rst di¤erences (to eliminate xed
e¤ects):
q^it = a^it + it
X
j 6=K
sjit(x^
j
it   x^Kit ) + itx^Kit
In this way, he is able to obtain both an estimate of returns to scale, it, and of PCM, it.
Additionally, he notes that "It is likely that the price-cost margins and scale coe¢ cients vary,
perhaps substantially, within each of the industries analyzed. Consider a well known example
from the US; concerns about market power in the software industry is focused on Microsoft
rather than on the average software producer". The proposed solution is a random coe¢ cient
framework, which allows for di¤erences in market power and scale economies across rms within
each industry. Interestingly, he nds more variation in market power and scale economies within
an average industry, as compared to variations between industries. A similar approach is used
in the already discussed paper by De Loecker and Warzynski (2009).
Additionally note that a possible way to attenuate the bias due to non-constant returns to
scale is to take into account size dispersion when computing PCM. In other words, an observed
PCM may be computed as an industry- and year-specic weighted average, where the weights
account for the presence of larger and smaller rms. In our analysis, we choose sales as weights.
Finally, a shortcoming of these models is that they assume perfect competition in labour
markets. However, ignoring labour market imperfections may imply an underestimation of the
estimated mark-up. Indeed, the part of the rms rent captured by workers is omitted. Moreover,
the hypothesis of perfect competition in labour markets is not realistic, especially in European
countries.
The latter issue has been raised by Crépon, Desplatz and Mairesse (2007). They extend Hall
(1988) model by assuming that wages and employment are jointly determined according to an
e¢ cient bargaining scheme between the rm and its workers. This boils down to an extension
of the Halls (1988) specication that includes a term for the bargaining power. Formally, Halls
estimating equation may be written as follows:
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(qit   kit) = it(L;it(lit   kit) + M;it(mit   kit)) + itkit +ait
where the variables qit, kit, lit, mit and ait are expressed in logarithms, and returns to scale
are equal to 1 + it .
This expression may be written also as:
SRit = itLERit +
it
it
kit + (1  it)ait
where SRit  (qit   kit)  L;it(lit   kit)  M;it(mit   kit), LERit  (qit   kit) and it
is the Lerner index. The proposed extension modies the model as follows:
SRit = itLERit +
it
it
kit +
it
1  itBARit + (1  it)ait
where BARit  (L;it  1)(lit  kit) and  is the union bargaining power, which is 0    1.
This extended approach has been tested by Crépon, Desplatz and Mairesse (2007) on 1026
manufacturing rms in France over the period 1986-1992, by Dobbelaere (2004) on the entire
population of Belgian manufacturing rms over the period 1988-1995 and by Abraham, Konings
and Vanormelingen (2009) on 6125 Belgian manufacturing rms over the period 1996-2004.
4.3 Variables denition and robustness checks
We now turn to the description of how variables have been constructed in order to implement
the Roeger (1995) estimation of mark-ups, as well as the robustness checks we have implemented
in order to attenuate some of the previously described shortcomings. As above, DYit is dened
as

dQit
Qit
+ dPitPit

 Nit

dNit
Nit
+ dPNitPNit

 Mit

dMit
Mit
+ dPMitPMit

  (1 Nit Mit)

dKit
Kit
+ dPKitPKit

where:


dQit
Qit
+ dPitPit

is constructed as SALESit SALESit 1SALESit 1 , where the variable SALESit is the
level of sales expressed in nominal terms, which has been declared by each rm in its
balance sheet;


dNit
Nit
+ dPNitPNit

is dened as WBit WBit 1WBit 1 , where WBit is the ratio of wage bill to the cost
of employees sourced from balance sheets;


dMit
Mit
+ dPMitPMit

is equal to MATit MATit 1MATit 1 , where MATit is the o¢ cial amount spent in
the purchase of material inputs and services;
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Balance sheet information on output, labour and materials are reported in nominal terms,
thus corresponding to the product of quantity times price. As regards capital, we have already
noticed that the denition of the rental price of capital is not straightforward and is debated in
the literature. Being aware that the correct treatment of capital costs is crucial in estimating
mark-ups (Boulhol, 2005) we propose three alternative denitions, which we have tested in our
validation.
1) We dene Kit as the sum of tangible and intangible xed assets as reported in balance
sheets. We dene PKit as the (rt + it)  PI , where:
- rt; real interest rate, is obtained as a di¤erence between the long term interest rate (gov-
ernment bond yields, 10 year-maturity) and the ination rate (all-items HICP) in a given year
t, both sourced from Eurostat;
- it is dened as DEPitKit 1 ; where DEPit is the amount of depreciation of tangible and intangible
assets declared in balance sheets, which has been limited to the (0; 1) interval. Thus, we retrieve
a rm specic measure of depreciation;
- PI is an investment good price index retrieved from the EU AMECO database.
This is our "baseline" specication.
2) We dene Kit as the sum of tangible and intangible xed assets as reported in balance
sheets; we dene PKit as the (rit + it)  PI , where:
- rit; real interest rate, is obtained using balance sheet data and is dened as the rm-
specic nominal interest rate, obtained as the ratio of the interest paid to total debt, minus the
ination rate (dened as above). Note that this denition entails a reduction in the number of
observations, either because the information on the interest paid and/or the total debt is not
available, or because the ratio may yield some implausible results (rit has been limited to the
(0; 1) interval);
- it is dened as above;
- PI is dened as above.
3) We dene Kit as the sum of tangible xed assets as reported in balance sheets, thus
neglecting intangible xed assets. We dene PKit as the (rit + it)  PI , where:
- rt; real interest rate, is obtained as a di¤erence between the long term interest rate (gov-
ernment bond yields, 10 year-maturity) and the ination rate (all-items HICP) in a given year
t, both sourced from Eurostat;
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- it is dened as DEPitKit 1 ; whereDEPit is the amount of depreciation of tangible assets declared
in balance sheets, which has been limited to the (0; 1) interval. Thus, we retrieve a rm specic
measure of depreciation;
- PI is an investment good price index retrieved from the EU AMECO database.
Note that the distinction between tangible and intangible xed assets is available for Italy
only.
Finally, assuming perfect competition in both product and factor markets and constant
returns to scale, we can replace the elasticities with factor shares. Therefore, Nit and Mit have
been constructed as the ratio of the wage bill over sales and materials over sales, respectively. We
are aware that is a potential source of problems, as described in previous section. Nonetheless,
this is a straightforward implication of Roegers approach, followed among others by Konings et
al. (2005).
Moving to the RHS, we know that DXit is dened as

dQit
Qit
+ dPitPit

 

dKit
Kit
+ dPKitPKit

; where
the rst term in the sum is dened as above, and the second term is constructed using the three
alternative denitions involving the price of capital described above.
Before moving to the estimation, the samples of rms have been preliminary cleaned from
implausible observations, in order to minimise measurement errors which, as we have seen, may
a¤ect the results. Specically, we have removed all those observations for which any of the
following variables was reported with a negative sign: total assets, sales, wage bill, number of
employees and materials. Moreover, we have checked the values of the remaining variables of
interest, replacing with a missing observation negative values reported for depreciation, interest
paid and total debt. Finally, consistently with the assumptions of the theory, we have removed
from our database those observations showing a negative observed PCM. Negative observed
PCM constitute 18.7% of observations in the three manufacturing sectors, and 24.8% of obser-
vations in the service industries considered15. The latter allows us to reduce the variance of our
estimated coe¢ cients and retrieve signicant PCM estimates which are ex-ante consistent with
the theoretical setup from which our structural estimators are derived, although at the cost of
missing potentially relevant mechanisms of market adjustment.
15This di¤erence reects the better quality of balance sheet data available for manufacturing sectors versus
service sectors.
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4.4 Results
4.4.1 Choice of DX and estimating technique
After having constructed our dependent and independent variables, we regress DX on DY using
alternative econometric specications.
First, we estimate equation (8) for each NACE 3-digit industry, using our three alternative
denitions of the capital term and pooling together observations across years16. Since the
distinction between tangible and intangible assets is available for Italy only, this is the only
country for which we have run this type of exercise.
Table 5 reports the correlations between the estimated PCM obtained with the three alter-
native denitions of capital and price of capital. We can observe that our "baseline" denition is
strongly correlated (0.8) with the second denition (the one adopting rm level interest rates).
On the other hand, the third denition, which considers only tangible xed assets and their de-
preciation, is poorly correlated with both other denitions (0.5 and 0.4 vs. 0.8). This highlights
the role of intangible xed assets, which we suspect is particularly relevant for services rms.
Table 5: Correlations between di¤erent estimated PCM measures - OLS
definition 1 definition 2 definition 3
definition 1 1.00
definition 2 0.81 1.00
definition 3 0.50 0.41 1.00
All correlations are significant at 1% level
To this extent, Badinger (2007) applies the Roeger (1995) methodology on a sample of 10
European countries over the period 1981-1999 in order to investigate the e¤ect of the Single
Market Programme. The latter is the rst study on the Single Market to include also service
sectors. The author warns that when estimating mark-ups in service industries data and stan-
dard capital stock measures may be less reliable.17 In his analysis, he uses industry level data
from the STAN database by OECD. Nonetheless, when dealing with balance sheet data, the
proxy generally used for capital is tangible xed assets; although to the best of our knowledge
no one has really arisen the issue, it might be however the case that the latter proxy could be
inappropriate for services industries. Indeed, in these industries intangible xed assets, such as
16Notice that, given our approach closely linked to Roeger (1995), we have to address the issue of the rental
price of capital. As discussed in the literature review, other authors (e.g. Siotis, 2003) can avoid this problem
by estimating a markup via a methodology closer to the original Hall (1998) approach, which on the other hand
involves a proper estimation of the TFP term.
17See page 22 of this Study.
46
patents, could be extremely relevant.
To further explore this issue, we have thus re-run our specication separating the manufac-
turing industries from services. As it can be seen in Table 6, controlling or not for intangibles is
clearly important for services: when applied to services industries, our third denition including
only tangible assets correlates more poorly with the baseline (0.43 vs. 0.54) with respect to the
case of manufacturing. On the contrary, our rst two denitions are very much correlated in
services (0.9).
Table 6: Correlations between di¤erent estimated PCM measures - manufacturing vs. services
Manufacturing Services
definition 1 definition 2 definition 3 definition 1 definition 2 definition 3
definition 1 1.00 definition 1 1.00
definition 2 0.55 1.00 definition 2 0.93 1.00
definition 3 0.54 0.34 1.00 definition 3 0.43 0.43 1.00
All correlations are significant at 1% level All correlations are significant at 1% level
The fact that the two measures report a di¤erent behaviour when the sample includes services
is therefore a rst general result of our analysis. Clearly, an implication of this result is that in the
subsequent analysis on the countries included in the sample it may be worth estimating the PCM
using only denition 1 and denition 2 of

dKit
Kit
+ dPKitPKit

, i.e. including intangibles. Moreover,
the distinction between tangible and intangible xed assets as well as their depreciation is in
general not available in balance sheet data (e.g. it is available in the AIDA sub-database for
Italy, but not in AMADEUS), and therefore the third denition might not be replicable in
other countries. This is not a problematic issue, since we have shown that the inclusion of
intangible xed assets gives us a more complete picture of capital, and is especially relevant
when considering services.
In terms of estimating technique, we have also addressed the time dimension of our data.
First, we have estimated the same baseline equation with the inclusion of a set of time xed
e¤ects, which however did not alter the overall correlation reported in Table 5. Then we have
estimated our specication interacting the time dummies with our DX term, in order to retrieve
yearly PCM measures. The results, reported in the Table 7, have yielded very similar measures
of estimated PCMs.
Finally, since the use of rst di¤erences introduces a form of serial correlation of the error
term, we have taken the latter into account, by means of a generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimation technique. Following Siotis (2003), we adopt an Arellano Bond (1991)
one-step estimation technique. Siotis (2003) presents results using three, four and ve lags,
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Table 7: Correlations between di¤erent estimated PCM measures - OLS and time dummies
definition 1 definition 2 definition 3
definition 1 1.00
definition 2 0.76 1.00
definition 3 0.61 0.43 1.00
All correlations are significant at 1% level
nonetheless, given our shorter time period (10 year, from 1998 to 2007), we are forced to limit
our analysis to a three lags specication. We observe that results are extremely sensitive to the
number of lags included in the analysis. Additionally, we nd that the correlation between the
estimated PCM is highly sensitive to variables denition using this methodology, and generally
much less robust, as shown in Table 8.
Table 8: Correlations between di¤erent estimated PCM measures - GMM
definition 1 definition 2 definition 3
definition 1 1.00
definition 2 0.43** 1.00
definition 3 0.68*** 0.09 1.00
*** significant at 1% level
** significant at 5% level
Therefore, in the remaining of the analysis we have chosen to adopt an OLS specication,
with controls for the time dimension of our data. We are aware that GMM would be a proper
estimation technique, but the short time period (ten years) considered in the analysis, and the
extremely high sensitivity of the estimates to the choice of the model specication do not allow
signicant PCM estimates to be obtained at the required level of disaggregation.
4.4.2 Estimated vs. observed PCM
Once having identied our baseline specication in terms of measurement of the rental price of
capital (denition 1 and role of intangibles), and the appropriate estimating technique (OLS vs.
GMM), in this section we show how and to what extent the estimated PCM ts the observed
PCM using alternative specications which control in di¤erent ways for the time dimension. For
consistency with the results derived above, we keep on using the Italian data for this exercise.
First, we estimate eq. (8) for each NACE 3-digit industry, over the whole sample of Italian rms
in the industries included in the project, i.e. pooling all data across time (Figure 11). Then, we
estimate the same equation, but this time splitting the sample into two periods: 1998-2002 and
2003-2007 (Figure 12).
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Figure 11: NACE 3-digit estimated (v. axis) vs. observed PCM, pooled sample - Italy
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Finally, in order to assess the evolution over time of the price cost margins, we interact the
explanatory variable with time dummies. Thus, we are able to retrieve time-specic estimates for
the PCM at NACE 3-digit level. In Figure 13 we thus plot the observed PCM and the estimated
one (always using our baseline denition in terms of DX and OLS). The t is generally good:
the slope coe¢ cient of the red line is 0.65, with a t statistic equal to 9.61. Overall, there are only
few outliers, while for most industries there is a close correspondence between the estimated and
the observed PCM.
As a result, we choose this specication which controls for individual time dummies as our
preferred one for the remaining of the analysis.
4.4.3 Italy vs. Germany
Once having chosen the baseline methodology (choice of DX, estimating technique, treatment
of the time dimension), we are now able to further investigate these estimates by disentangling
results for manufacturing industries versus services industries and by comparing the outcome
across countries. To this extent, we report here the comparison between Germany and Italy,
based on the whole sample of Italian and German rms belonging to the industries included in
the project. First, we consider the relationship between the estimated vs. the observed PCM,
as above.
A number of features already emerge from Figure 14. First of all, looking at the overall t
of the regressions it is clear that, especially for Germany, the Roeger methodology tends to
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Figure 12: NACE 3-digit estimated (v. axis) vs. observed PCM, 1998-02 vs. 2003-07 samples -
Italy
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Estimated vs. Observed PCM: 1998-02 vs. 2003-07
generate an upper bias in some of the estimated mark-ups (estimated PCMs tend to be larger
than the corresponding observed PCM), consistently with the results reported in the literature.
On a more positive note, instead, the t does not deteriorate when looking at services. Rather,
at least for Italy, the estimated mark-ups track fairly well the observed ones in these industries.
We then focus on the relationship between the estimated PCM and the weighted PCM,
where the market shares of each rm (based on sales) have been used as weights. The idea is
to overcome the other critique associated to the Roeger methodology which imposes constant
returns to scale. The intuition is as follows: larger rms might benet from higher plant-level
economies of scale, thus leading to lower total average costs; at the same time, in our measure
of PCM, marginal costs are proxied by the average variable costs, not a¤ected by economies of
scale, as discussed in the previous section. As a result, in a oligopolistic market where rms
have some market power (e.g. deriving from product di¤erentiation), small rms might need
to cover the higher average xed costs induced by their smaller size by charging higher prices,
thus resulting in a potentially higher PCM (given the way we measure them) with respect to
large rms18. On the contrary, large rms might decide in equilibrium to exploit their scale
economies in order to lower their prices (thus keeping the PCM constant), or possibly to gain
18For example, in a product-life cycle model, small rms entering the market with a new di¤erentiated product
might benet from a higher market power.
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Figure 13: NACE 3-digit estimated (v. axis) vs. observed PCM, year-specic sample - Italy
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Full sample; All industries included in the project
higher prots (in which case the PCM would also increase) if competition is not strong enough.
The weighting of PCM would thus partially attenuate the potential upward bias induced by
small rms operating in some market niches on the observed average price-cost margin.
And in fact, when comparing the observed vs. weighted PCM we can clearly see, for both
Germany and Italy, and across industries, a tendency to lower averages for the weighted PCM
(with few exceptions, weighted PCMs, on the vertical axis, tend to be smaller than the corre-
sponding unweighted PCM, on the horizontal axis, or, in other words, the slope of the tting
line is smaller than 1), as reported in Figure 15.
Finally, we show the relationship between the weighted observed PCM (on the horizontal
axis) and the estimated one (on the vertical axis). Not surprisingly, since both measures entail a
correction with respect to the observed unweighted PCM, but in di¤erent directions, the overall
goodness of t worsens signicantly.
4.4.4 Robustness of results across di¤erent samples
As a nal robustness check, we have performed an analysis of compositional e¤ects, estimating
the PCM over di¤erent samples.
A rst check restricts the analysis to all those rms with more than 10 employees. In this way,
we are neglecting small rms, which may induce a lot of noise in the estimates, while poorly
contributing to the overall value added of the sector. Figure 17 shows that the correlation
between observed PCM and estimated one. Focusing on Italy, we can compare this graph with
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Figure 14: Estimated (v. axis) vs. observed (unweighted) PCM - Italy vs. Germany
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the scatterplot obtained on the full sample. Two di¤erences emerge: rst, the overall t improves
as the slope coe¢ cient is now 0.72 (t-stat=10.48); secondly, due to the reduction in the number
of observations, the estimates may be more imprecise in those industries in which there were
already few observations, thus leading to possible outliers, e.g. the estimated PCM close to 1
(the point estimate is 0.96) corresponds to NACE 703 for year 2006, and is obtained on a sample
including 1711 observations. In the full sample, the estimated PCM for that industry in 2006
is 0.38, much closer to the value of 0.33 for the observed PCM. This estimate is computed on
a sample of 3183 observations. Notice that similar dynamics are present when analysing the
German sample. Evidently, in those industries in which small rms are abundant, this type of
sample restriction may be detrimental, and thus once again we have a conrmation of the high
sensitivity of the estimated PCM to the chosen level of disaggregation.
Finally, we repeat our exercise on a balanced sample, i.e. we exclude those rms that enter
or exit the sample during the time period considered (see Section 5 for the description of the
routine). Results are presented in Figure 18.
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Figure 15: Weighted (v. axis) vs. (unweighted) observed PCM - Italy vs. Germany
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Again, the t of the estimated PCM is rather good: the estimated slope for Italy is equal to
0.65 (t-statistic=8.79), while for Germany it is 1.13 (t=6.08). The two outliers on the top left
part of the graph on Italy corresponds to NACE 155 in year 2003 and NACE 154 in year 2002.
These results are obtained on 2193 and 521 observations respectively, while in the full sample
the observations are 2740 and 724, with a drop in the number of observations equal to 20% and
28% respectively.
Thus, once again those industries which present more pronounced dynamics are subject to
a larger drop in the number of observations, which negatively a¤ects the preciseness of the
estimates.
4.5 Conclusions
The Roeger methodology discussed in this section has been widely used, and rened, in the
literature in order to retrieve consistent estimates of the price-cost margins. However, as for
the Hall approach, both methods have been originally conceived for their use on industry-level
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Figure 16: Estimated (v. axis) vs. weighted PCM - Italy vs. Germany
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data, while the goal of this study is to specically take into account rm-specic information.
Moreover, the exercise undertaken here has to maintain comparability across industries and
countries, thus introducing further constraints on the analysis.
All these issues have led us to start our analysis sticking to the original Roeger (1995) ap-
proach for retrieving mark-ups since, as the latter is based on nominal balance sheet information,
it ensures immediate comparability across countries. Moving to the Halls approach, and all the
subsequent renements of this methodology, would in fact imply the use of relatively aggregate
industry and country-specic deators which are likely to introduce a systematic error com-
ponent in our crossEuropean comparisons. Moreover, the use of industry-level price deators
would also further exacerbate the problem of unobserved rm heterogeneity (as individual rms
prices are unobserved) which instead this Report tries to tackle as much as possible.
Clearly, as pointed out in this section, the Roeger (1995) approach su¤ers itself from a num-
ber of shortcomings, in particular related to the assumption of constant returns to scale, which
we have evaluated by comparing observed, weighted and estimated PCMs across sectors (man-
ufacturing and services) and countries (Italy and Germany). The analysis has revealed that an
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Figure 17: Estimated (v. axis) vs. observed PCM, rms with more than 10 employees - Italy
vs. Germany
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aggregation of observed rm-level PCMs vs. those estimated through the Roeger methodology,
with appropriate corrections for the role of intangibles in order to take into account the case
of services, tend to move along a similar direction in the countries and industries considered.
It then follows that observed rm-level PCMs, when aggregated, do not convey a distorted
message with respect to a theoretically sound econometric estimation structurally derived from
rst-order conditions (the Roeger method), which is reassuring.
However, being the Roeger methodology based on the assumption of constant returns to
scale, it correlates less well with weighted (by size) PCM measures, which instead correct for
economies of scale at the rm level, a feature we ideally want to consider in the analysis.
Moreover, the retrieved aggregate PCMs via the Roeger approach are very sensitive to the
level of aggregation used: since the implicit assumption in Roeger is that the estimated PCMs
are common to all the rms in a given sample, a detailed analysis of industrial dynamics clearly
implies a progressively ner levels of disaggregation (e.g. by NACE 3-digit industry, country
and year) in order to attenuate the rm-level unobserved heterogeneity bias implicit in common
assumptions of mark-ups across industries. However, the ner the level of disaggregation (and
thus the lower the unobserved heterogeneity bias), the lower the number of available observations
and thus the higher the standard errors of the estimated coe¢ cients. As a result, the researcher
is faced with a trade-o¤ between accuracy of the estimates and usefulness of the estimated
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Figure 18: Estimated (v. axis) vs. observed PCM, balanced samples - Italy vs. Germany
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values. According to our experience in this Pilot study, Roeger-(or Hall-) type of estimates
are accurate at the NACE 2-digits level of disaggregation (incidentally, the latter is the level
of disaggregation generally employed in the literature), but at this level the usefulness of the
retrieved mark-ups is limited for the purposes of this study. Finally, a synthetic indicator of
PCM as retrieved from the Roeger approach is such that dynamic e¢ ciency, i.e. e¢ ciency gains
due to innovation, a particularly relevant feature in our analysis, can hardly be disentangled
from the retrieved estimates, as the individual contribution of each rm to the aggregate PCM
is hard to measure.
For all these reasons, in the follow-up of the analysis we have chosen to use as the main
indicator of competitive pressures a decomposition of the (weighted) price-cost margin changes
at the rm-level. As directly observed PCMs can be aggregate without particular distortions
with respect to estimated ones, we believe the use of the former is more straightforward and does
not imply computational intensive steps should the analysis need to be extended or repeated
over time.
Most importantly, the aggregation from the bottom of rm-level mark-ups allows to actu-
ally use rm-level heterogeneity in order to extract information on the evolution of industrial
dynamics as competitive pressures in the single market evolve. In particular, by decomposing
the same PCM changes according to a number of specic features, as it will be clear in the
next section, such an approach allows us to derive some conjectures also on changes in dynamic
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e¢ ciency (i.e. quality improvements) undertaken by rms in the market.
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5 PCM Decomposition
5.1 Methodology
After having discussed the validation of our directly observed PCM, in this Section we depart
from the analysis of average PCMs measured at industry-level in order to exploit the potential-
ities of rm-level data. To this extent, we calculate the rst di¤erence of the (weighted) PCM
and decompose the latter in ve components, with the aim of catching three di¤erent possible
responses to competitive pressures: the classical reduction of the PCM rms have to face in order
to maintain the same level of demand through time; the shift of some rms towards production
of goods with a higher content of value-added (niche markets or product di¤erentiation); the
e¤ects deriving from the demography of rms entering and exiting the markets, resulting from
the lowering of institutional and technological barriers.
To that extent, we calculate at the NACE 3-digit level a weighted change of the PCM as:
PCMt+1   PCMt =
X
i2t+1
msii t+1 pcmi t+1  msi t pcmi t
where I is a given NACE 3-digit industry, PCMit is the price-cost margin of a given rm i
and msit is its market share, at time t and t+ 1. The components of the weighted average are
disentangled as follows, according to a Lespeyres decomposition19:
PCMt+1   PCMt =
X
i2I
264 within effectz }| {msi t(pcmi t+1   pcmi t) + reallocation effectz }| {pcmi t(msi t+1  msi t)
375+
X
i2I
264 interaction effectz }| {(pcmi t+1   pcmi t)(msi t+1  msi t)
375+
X
i2It+1nI
msi t+1 pcmi t+1  
X
i2ItnI
msi t pcmi t| {z }
entry exit effect
We begin our analysis of the decomposition by considering the e¤ects that involve incum-
bent rms, i.e. rms that we consider as operating in time t, for which the elements of the
19Note that the latter decomposition is also discussed by Boone et al. (2007) as the starting point of the
indicator of competition, suggested by him, the Relative Prot Di¤erence (RPD), which we will employ in the
next section of the study.
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decomposition take the following meaning:
 the within e¤ect is the change attributable to the pricing behaviour of the incumbents
given their market share: a negative sign would show a more aggressive pricing policy;
 the reallocation e¤ect accounts for the redistribution of market shares among incumbents,
holding the PCM constant;
 the interaction e¤ect gives information about the underlying market dynamics: a nega-
tive sign would show that PCMs and market shares are moving in di¤erent directions,
either because their activity is expanding thanks to a reduction in PCM or because their
importance in the sector is decreasing after an increase in the PCM; a positive sign, in-
stead, would indicate that shares and margins are moving in the same direction showing
a non-standard e¤ect due to competitive pressures;
 the e¤ects of entry and exit are instead indicative of the market dynamics that follow
after the removal of both technological and institutional barriers, fostering entry, and the
exogenous shocks (e.g. the increased competitive pressures from China) that can oblige
some rms to exit.
As already discussed in Section 2, an important limitation of the AMADEUS database is in
its ability to record exit and entry, as the number of rms available in a given country might
change from year to year as new rms are added to the database, while at the same time inactive
rms are dropped from the database if they stay inactive for more than ve years. In order to
cope with these shortcomings, we will consider a rm as an entry in the market in a given
year when a positive value of its revenues is present in that year, no values are present in the
preceding years, and its incorporation can be dated no more than two years before that given
year. We consider indeed that there can be a lag from the legal incorporation of a rm to the
beginning of its economic activities. That rm will be considered as an incumbent from the year
following the entry year, even if there are missing values for some years in the analysis, because
in that case we assume the missing values are due to lack of coverage of the database.
On the other hand, a rm will be considered as exiting from the same market when it is
considered inactive in the last available year of our database (an information available in the
AMADEUS database), or it has not reported data on revenues for at least two consecutive years
till the end of the period of analysis. Here as well we assume that there can be a lag from the
end of the legal entity and the e¤ective presence on the market (a rm could be considered as
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legally active also if not operating any more in the market). Note that, since our data start in
1999, the latter implies that there will be no exit data recorded before 2001.
A rst implementation of this routine, without the correction for the date of incorporation,
has been made by Altomonte and Colantone (2008), who analyse rm-level data for Romanian
rms, where the demography of the rm-level sample has been confronted with o¢ cial data of
the Romanian statistics o¢ ce, revealing that the method was a good proxy for what happened in
census data. The inclusion of the date of incorporation, an improvement of the routine adopted
in Altomonte and Colantone (2008), would allow us to clean entry data especially for rms
located in countries with poorer quality of the sample coverage. Actually, Romanian balance
sheet data can be considered strongly representative in terms of number of rms, while in other
countries, after controlling for any selection bias due to size or other characteristics of the rms
observed, we may have less observational units in the sample.
One important problem of this routine is the treatment of balance sheet data of exiting
rms: often, rms displaying negative PCMs, as costs exceed sales, end up in exiting from the
database. However in the decomposition algorithm this implies that the contribution of exiting
rms would enter the routine with a positive sign. Although we have very few cases of these
rms (less than 1% of our sample), sometimes the e¤ect might be large enough to change the
sign of the overall exit component, from negative to positive. In what follows, we have decided
not to clean our data from these rms, to avoid introducing a selection bias in our sample,
leaving the problem up for discussion in the cases in which it should eventually become relevant.
Another potential issue with this routine is that if the rm changes legal entity from one year
to the other (i.e. name of the rm or form of incorporation) it will be considered as an entry
even if the economic activity has never stopped or if that rm was already on the market but
was not obliged before to present balance sheets because of national regulations. A qualitative
check, even using the previous identity codes contained in Bureau van Djik, can help in solving
this problem, whose magnitude has to be assessed.
As a result, due to these methodological issues, in this Pilot study entry and exit data related
to the decomposition have to be interpreted with some caution20.
5.2 PCM decomposition across countries
We present here the results for three countries that in our opinion can be considered as prototype
of their group: France as model for countries belonging tho the EMU, Sweden as a representative
20 Incidentally, notice that the RPD measure introduced in the next Section is not a¤ected by this problem.
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of EU countries that do not have the single currency and Poland as an example of new EU country
that should have completed a process of transition towards a market economy before entering
the Single Market21. In terms of timing, we have calculated the decomposition year by year in
order to catch the industry dynamics and control for the competitive pressures deriving from
the introduction of the euro as a single currency in 2002 and the entry of China into WTO in
2001. As 2007 is the last year in the sample we do not observe exit for this year. We report in
what follows the PCM decomposition for the years 2000 and 2006, since PCM changes for 2007
might be slightly upward biased.22
5.2.1 EMU Countries - France
We can see that the selected manufacturing industries (NACE 15, NACE 24 and NACE 34)
show di¤erent dynamics in competition in the two di¤erent subperiods once looking at 3-digit
level of disaggregation, as reported in Tables 9 and 10. For example, in the rst period there is
a certain tendency to increase in margins, while this trend is reverted when we consider the year
2006. The trend is evident for the services sectors which seem to su¤er from lack of competitive
pressures, which in turn leads to increased PCMs, consistently with the PCM distribution graphs
previously analysed.
Overall, the main contributors to a downward pressures of PCM in 2000 are the within- and
the reallocation e¤ects, indicating that, on average, margins are decreasing and market shares
of rms with higher margins are reducing. It is interesting to note that the interaction e¤ect in
both periods shows non-standard results as a response to competitive pressures, since it tends
to remain positive for a certain number of industries. The latter implies that PCMs and market
shares are moving in the same direction, indicating that either there are some rms that are
able to gain market power after moving towards the production of goods with a higher content
of value added (a higher PCM that implies a higher market share) or rather some rms are
not able to detain market power even after lowering their prices (lower PCM and lower market
share).
Also, we see that the entry e¤ect displays (as it should) a positive sign, whose magnitude
tends to be sizeable with respect to the other terms of the decomposition especially for the real
21Poland has become part of the European Union in the rst wave of accession in May 2004.
22The tables for all the countries and years covered by the Pilot database are reported in the Statistical Annex
of the Report, together with the decompositions at the NACE 2-digits level, in order to develop initial indicators
which are consistent with the level of aggregation of the Market Monitoring exercise. Results are available upon
request.
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estate industry (NACE 70). As previously discussed, entering rms, which are generally small
in size, have not only to reach a minimum e¢ ciency scale but also to cover a higher average xed
cost with a lower volume of production, whereas big incumbent rms can smooth the xed cost
of capital on larger volumes of production. Given the possibility to di¤erentiate the product, a
start-up may x a higher price and still gain market power once entering the market. Finally,
the negative contribution to the PCM induced by the exit e¤ect is more relevant in the second
period, consistently with the increase in competition possibly induced by the introduction of the
euro and the higher international competitive pressures23.
Table 9: PCM decomposition, 2000, France
FRANCE
MANUFACTURING
NACE 3-digit Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate
151 -0.0048289 -0.0176701 -0.0010319 0.0236908 0 0.0001599
152 -0.0084646 -0.0842725 0.0017843 0.1060485 0 0.0150957
153 -0.0070425 -0.0775497 0.015109 0.0965517 0 0.0270685
154 0.0204 -0.0363468 -0.0038718 0.0436661 0 0.0238475
155 0.0062842 0.0125132 0.0004809 0.0043705 0 0.0236488
156 0.0040402 -0.077493 -0.001209 0.0747641 0 0.0001023
157 -0.0107553 -0.0554208 0.0014811 0.0462072 0 -0.0184878
158 0.0015008 -0.0242495 0.0031532 0.0300745 0 0.010479
159 -0.0147292 -0.0269765 0.001171 0.0237766 0 -0.0167581
241 -0.0275736 -0.0254231 0.0019097 0.0276924 0 -0.0233946
242 -0.0877777 -0.0113365 -0.0005787 0.0132889 0 -0.086404
243 -0.0153603 -0.0013227 0.00094 0.0099883 0 -0.0057547
244 0.0235682 -0.0081626 -0.003812 0.0149446 0 0.0265382
245 0.0078996 -0.0102011 0.0007306 0.0221421 0 0.0205712
246 -0.0054618 -0.0187801 0.0019224 0.0131031 0 -0.0092164
247 -0.0732339 -0.0018619 -0.0014955 0 0 -0.0765913
341 1.88E-03 0.0001089 1.56E-05 0.0003314 0 0.0023389
342 -0.0032065 -0.0425674 0.0036699 0.0404924 0 -0.0016116
343 -0.0126151 -0.0010102 0.000666 0.0079478 0 -0.0050115
SERVICES
521 0.0028334 -0.020817 -0.0007307 0.0276793 0 0.008965
522 -0.0001493 -0.0303264 0.0000478 0.0295099 0 -0.000918
523 0.0045463 -0.0494966 -0.000666 0.082906 0 0.0372897
524 -0.0025834 -0.0418782 0.0008556 0.0568708 0 0.0132648
525 0.0103128 -0.0247194 -0.0026932 0.0381475 0 0.0210477
526 0.0012239 -0.0184735 0.001797 0.036511 0 0.0210584
527 -0.0039395 -0.0171778 -0.0004886 0.0258043 0 0.0041984
642 0.0051452 -0.0027687 0.0012255 0.0975824 0 0.1011844
701 0.0005285 -0.0348707 0.0370192 0.0224877 0 0.0251647
702 -0.0031146 -0.0188557 -0.0019356 0.027371 0 0.0034651
703 0.0000568 -0.0210543 -0.0011359 0.0565617 0 0.0344283
2000
23Remember that, due to the coverage of AMADEUS database, it is very likely that the exit e¤ect could be
underestimated. In fact, rms that have not reported balance sheet data for more than ve years are excluded
from the database.
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Table 10: PCM decomposition, 2006, France
FRANCE
MANUFACTURING
NACE 3-digit Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate
151 0.0033481 -0.0085897 0.0004703 0.0043934 -0.0089919 -0.0093698
152 -0.0046701 -0.0191713 0.0010908 0.0150001 -0.0057224 -0.0134729
153 0.0074701 0.0501134 0.0063002 0.0002805 -0.0425572 0.021607
154 0.0043417 -0.0005656 -0.0002125 0.0000708 -0.0012416 0.0023928
155 -0.0146269 0.0259815 -0.0009648 0.0005788 -0.0318067 -0.0208381
156 -0.0008201 0.0036733 -0.00067 0.0007462 -0.0025746 0.0003548
157 -0.0002186 -0.0229649 -0.0000717 0.0865075 -0.0098575 0.0533948
158 0.0019814 0.0175829 0.0017172 0.0086675 -0.0164771 0.0134719
159 0.0013498 0.0022307 0.0017292 0.002892 -0.0194647 -0.011263
241 -0.0121632 -0.016901 0.0032168 0.0016873 -0.0117707 -0.0359308
242 0.0377492 -0.0073005 -0.0017027 0 -0.0003561 0.0283899
243 0.0002925 0.0015462 0.0005032 0.0015446 -0.0061294 -0.0022429
244 0.0047249 0.015503 0.0000127 0.0052952 -0.0060821 0.0194537
245 0.0025533 0.0148744 0.0001602 0.0009411 -0.0245315 -0.0060025
246 -0.0148856 -0.0181063 0.0088646 0.0063282 -0.0012225 -0.0190216
247 0.0260701 -0.0448745 0.027782 0.0000326 0 0.0090102
341 -4.74E-03 0.001603 -2.66E-05 0.0000108 -0.0000288 -0.003181
342 0.0066456 0.0152562 0.0033984 0.0026071 -0.0181074 0.0097999
343 -0.0175988 -0.0023294 -0.0020577 0.0015256 -0.0003976 -0.0208579
SERVICES
521 -0.0081428 -0.0112748 0.0080597 0.01462 -0.0019613 0.0013008
522 -0.0016251 -0.000879 0.0008675 0.0106281 -0.0102685 -0.001277
523 -0.003667 -0.0277609 0.0008979 0.0142135 -0.0067337 -0.0230502
524 -0.0032938 -0.0028129 0.0008851 0.0077744 -0.0059954 -0.0034426
525 0.0020008 0.0012341 -0.0027235 0.0138847 -0.0075051 0.006891
526 -0.0024106 -0.0013583 0.0050504 0.0044434 -0.0069223 -0.0011974
527 -0.0038187 0.0032946 0.000762 0.0071899 -0.0107289 -0.0033011
642 0.0022533 -0.0003229 0.0005326 0.0004017 -0.0015962 0.0012685
701 -0.0018956 -0.0074288 0.0045347 0.0107911 -0.0243256 -0.0183242
702 0.0013839 0.0327762 -0.0159612 0.012846 -0.005201 0.0258439
703 -0.0011655 -0.0111408 0.0010185 0.0052221 -0.0213157 -0.0273814
2006
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5.2.2 Non-euro Countries - Sweden
The Swedish case is slightly di¤erent from the French one, since there is no clear-cut di¤erence
observed between the two periods. In the rst period, we see that there is a number of 3-digit
industries in which competition has enhanced with decreasing PCMs across both manufacturing
and services industries. In particular, it is noteworthy that the within e¤ect, the reallocation
e¤ect and often also the interaction e¤ect hint to the existence of pro-competitive dynamics in
the country.
In the second period, the dynamics remain similar, with possibly less market dynamics in the
services sector, as conrmed by the PCM distribution graphs reported in the previous Sections.
More in general, these dynamics are consistent with a lack of a pro-competitive e¤ect induced
by the euro in the country, although in a context of fairly healthy competition.
Results are reported in Tables 11 and 12.
Table 11: PCM decomposition, 2000, Sweden
SWEDEN
MANUFACTURING
NACE 3-digit Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate
151 -0.055262 -0.0061969 -0.0004928 0.0107496 0 -0.0512021
152 -0.0427841 0.0113614 -0.0084464 0.0063022 0 -0.0335669
153 -0.0015776 0.0280569 -0.0063395 0.001505 0 0.0216448
154 0.0142361 -0.0028655 0.0005168 0.0000651 0 0.0119525
155 -0.0058097 -0.2517863 0.0050152 0 0 -0.2525808
156 0.0297184 -0.058103 -0.006902 0.1151336 0 0.079847
157 0.0026635 -0.0023971 0.001242 0 0 0.0015084
158 -0.0050285 -0.0290103 0.0014604 0.0053454 0 -0.027233
159 -0.0124064 0.0247542 -0.0015071 0.0000543 0 0.010895
241 -0.0161271 -0.022756 0.0029222 0.0003282 0 -0.0356327
242 0.0103685 -0.0008598 0.0068951 0 0 0.0164038
243 -0.0051981 0.0186961 -0.0053414 0.0002257 0 0.0083823
244 -0.0036183 0.0010681 0.0002044 0.0014909 0 -0.0008549
245 -0.0376507 -0.0112486 0.0117565 0.0030395 0 -0.0341033
246 0.0012165 -0.0248751 -0.001035 0.0011577 0 -0.0235359
247 -0.0043273 -0.0000832 0.0001639 0 0 -0.0042466
341 -7.97E-06 0.0000799 9.16E-07 0.000026 0 0.000098846
342 -0.0149192 0.0012789 -0.0080096 0.012772 0 -0.0088779
343 -0.0020047 0.0027331 0.0003237 0.0015466 0 0.0025987
SERVICES
521 -0.0061342 0.0006209 -0.0004687 0.0009569 0 -0.0050251
522 -0.0014434 0.0017023 -0.0002025 0.0018759 0 0.0019323
523 -0.0167557 0.0003445 -0.0001046 0.0001586 0 -0.0163572
524 -0.0187514 -0.0172521 0.0007464 0.0086034 0 -0.0266537
525 -0.0070973 -0.0015797 0.000899 0.0007864 0 -0.0069916
526 0.0094202 0.0010551 -0.0042681 0.0060172 0 0.0122244
527 -0.0440626 -0.0269304 0.0081427 0.0373193 0 -0.025531
642 0.0001601 0.0001144 0.0002981 0.0001074 0 0.00068
701 -0.0249181 0.0121808 0.0004207 0.0001084 0 -0.0122082
702 -0.0070447 -0.0030172 0.0001254 0.0042311 0 -0.0057054
703 -0.0048506 -0.0057973 -0.0015492 0.004749 0 -0.0074481
2000
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Table 12: PCM decomposition, 2006, Sweden
SWEDEN
MANUFACTURING
NACE 3-digit Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate
151 -0.0027645 -0.0008452 0.0000909 0.0012267 -0.0016544 -0.0039465
152 -0.0013653 0.0020695 0.0009806 0.0007401 -0.0036027 -0.0011778
153 -0.0026833 0.0146302 -0.001661 0.0010084 -0.0006522 0.0106421
154 -0.0030466 -0.0039401 0.001342 0 0 -0.0056447
155 -0.0008848 -0.036715 0.0005185 0.0001663 0 -0.036915
156 -0.0392304 -0.0027977 0.0017952 0 -0.0127791 -0.053012
157 -0.0004373 -0.0080826 0.0002833 -0.0004286 0 -0.0086652
158 -0.000874 -0.0023284 -0.0014326 0.0011582 -0.0031758 -0.0066526
159 -0.0010459 -0.0154923 -0.0001159 0 0 -0.0166541
241 -0.00136 -0.0004615 -0.0012297 0.0001592 0 -0.002892
242 -0.0227596 -0.0559257 0.0011315 0.0717455 0 -0.0058083
243 -0.0008192 0.0043247 -0.0007882 0.0019354 0 0.0046527
244 -0.0004183 0.0010972 0.0002583 0.0017884 -0.00000143 0.00272417
245 0.0062877 -0.0107597 -0.0018729 0.0021279 0 -0.004217
246 -0.0036293 0.0351502 0.0010275 0.0000577 -0.0045696 0.0280365
247 -0.0145101 0.004409 0.0004834 0 0 -0.0096177
341 -7.44E-05 0.0040547 -8.79E-04 0.0000298 0 0.0031315
342 0.0002114 0.0113564 0.0010133 0.0038759 -0.0165962 -0.0001392
343 -0.0018698 0.0026469 -0.0002861 0.0004185 -0.0009964 -8.69E-05
SERVICES
521 0.000639 -0.0033985 0.0003419 0.0009265 -0.0005894 -0.0020805
522 0.0004405 -0.0001905 -0.0005823 0.0028246 -0.0004927 0.0019996
523 0.0077944 -0.0004163 -0.0000506 0.0004114 0 0.0077389
524 0.0004478 -0.0060498 -0.0001267 0.0095638 -0.0019574 0.0018777
525 -0.0058518 -0.0190409 -0.0001392 0.0043808 0 -0.0206511
526 -0.0038209 -0.0009431 -0.0012553 0.0308609 -0.0261142 -0.0012726
527 -0.002812 0.0107649 -0.0023335 0.0013077 0.0000309 0.006958
642 -0.0000691 0.00191 -0.0002562 0.0000126 -0.00000977 0.00158753
701 -0.0090041 -0.0280458 0.0051839 0.0005945 -0.0152355 -0.046507
702 -0.0006412 -0.001513 0.0003663 0.0033547 -0.0040428 -0.002476
703 0.0004375 0.0082934 -0.0007891 0.0045535 -0.0016743 0.010821
2006
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5.2.3 New Member States - Poland
Poland is a representative case of a new member of the European Union that has undertaken a
process of transition towards a market economy. The aggregate PCMs at sector level displayed
in Table 13 show a certain persistency in year 2000, as only few industries experience negative
changes, while the situation improves in 2007, as reported in Table 14. The latter is consistent
with the process of transition ongoing in Poland over the period considered. In particular, we
may expect a catching-up process in terms of productivity (the so called Balassa-Samuelson
e¤ect) in the early years of transition, in which rms experience tightening budget constraints
leading to a renewed attention in terms of cost-e¢ ciency, as well as a di¤erentiation of products
(in that helped by the increasing presence of multinational corporations) meeting an increasingly
sophisticated demand of consumers. All these factors are consistent with relatively sustained
PCM in the early 2000s. However, the progressive adoption of the acquis communautaire, and in
particular the implementation of the EU competition policy is likely to lie behind the reduction
of PCMs experienced by the country in the latest years.
Table 13: PCM decomposition, 2000, Poland
POLAND
MANUFACTURING
NACE 3-digit Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate
151 0.0061102 -0.0014153 -0.0013904 0.0055906 0 0.0088951
152 -0.0017704 0.0052003 -0.00000185 0.0112349 0 0.01466295
153 0.006973 -0.0158657 -0.0029978 0.0106314 0 -0.0012591
154 0.0044527 0.0156333 . 0 0 0.020086
155 0.0119223 -0.104723 -0.01772 0.0397013 0 -0.0708194
156 0.0102921 0.0075774 -0.000165 0.0084961 0 0.0262006
157 -0.0041385 0.0108057 -0.0005525 0.0041623 0 0.010277
158 -0.0010717 -0.0208783 -0.0016027 0.0242436 0 0.0006909
159 -0.0039544 0.0469843 -0.0007591 0.0034292 0 0.0457
241 -0.0045793 0.0094141 -3.29E-07 0.0850311 0 0.089865571
242 -0.0020732 -0.007154 0 0 0 -0.0092272
243 -0.0025379 0.0006914 -0.00000485 0.0085815 0 0.00673015
244 0.008669 0.0166311 -0.0017578 0.0167522 0 0.0402945
245 -0.0136882 -0.0444075 -0.0001143 0.1457994 0 0.0875894
246 -0.009698 -0.0091715 0 0.002087 0 -0.0167825
247 -0.003263 -0.0084329 . 0 0 -0.0116959
341 -2.43E-03 0.0068782 -1.79E-06 0.0008634 0 0.00531281
342 -0.0213157 -0.008001 0 0.022722 0 -0.0065947
343 -0.0585502 -0.0154323 -0.0010701 0.0213613 0 -0.0536913
SERVICES
521 0.0052788 -0.026148 -0.0037764 0.0311481 0 0.0065025
522 0.0013125 -0.0063144 -0.0004861 0.075711 0 0.070223
523 -0.0241902 -0.0208363 -0.0002125 0.0265581 0 -0.0186809
524 -0.0025188 -0.0340824 -0.0070859 0.0492621 0 0.005575
525 0 0 . 0.2207395 0 0.2207395
526 -0.0086462 -0.0859847 -0.0000474 0.0489327 0 -0.0457456
527 0.0137302 -0.0015462 -0.0003114 0.005449 0 0.0173216
642 0.0052048 0.0072876 -0.0002808 0.0006767 0 0.0128883
701 0.022975 -0.1042895 -0.0131178 0.2277641 0 0.1333318
702 -0.0020672 -0.0107466 -0.0023284 0.0490832 0 0.033941
703 -0.0165461 -0.3631657 -0.0071301 0.2560501 0 -0.1307918
2000
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Table 14: PCM decomposition, 2006, Poland
POLAND
MANUFACTURING
NACE 3-digit Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate
151 0.0025561 -0.0128836 -0.0009766 0.0080919 -0.0060616 -0.0092738
152 0.0076998 -0.006305 -0.0015525 0.0055161 -0.0011155 0.0042429
153 0.0026583 -0.0187369 0.000571 0.0085385 -0.0055322 -0.0125013
154 -0.0000398 -0.0442876 0.0000407 0.0007378 -0.0094498 -0.0529987
155 0.0000191 -0.0227563 0.00033 0.0016119 -0.0006443 -0.0214396
156 0.0171908 -0.0126995 -0.0050805 0.0064494 0 0.0058602
157 -0.0006913 -0.0079478 -0.0010813 0.0029286 -0.0041551 -0.0109469
158 -0.0127611 -0.0290054 0.0035058 0.0129997 -0.0035337 -0.0287947
159 -0.0000887 0.0443533 0.0006945 0.0041831 -0.1414027 -0.0922605
241 0.0584696 -0.0297672 -0.0160347 0.003476 -0.0024977 0.013646
242 -0.000219 0.0020882 0.0001587 0.0002887 0 0.0023166
243 -0.0041444 0.0036767 0.000332 0.0041155 0 0.0039798
244 0.0027116 -0.0027279 0.0026634 0.0017964 -0.0008167 0.0036268
245 0.0126743 0.0321672 0.0015933 0.0070431 -0.0298982 0.0235797
246 -0.0002489 -0.0173956 0.000054 0.0043076 -0.0010623 -0.0143452
247 -0.0174045 -0.0048086 0.0014197 0.0014987 -0.000267 -0.0195617
341 -9.35E-03 0.0043611 2.64E-04 0.0002536 -0.0004881 -0.0049563
342 0.0030866 -0.0148556 0.0006205 0.0329425 -0.000404 0.02139
343 -0.0046053 -0.0076291 0.0002818 0.0018728 -0.0100097 -0.0200895
SERVICES
521 0.0043499 -0.033609 -0.001462 0.0089309 -0.0154076 -0.0371978
522 0.0073063 -0.0192921 -0.0021172 0.012006 -0.0019018 -0.0039988
523 -0.0019865 -0.0444515 -0.0023782 0.034695 -0.0029867 -0.0171079
524 0.0002439 -0.0107263 0.0005626 0.0178666 -0.0025664 0.0053804
525 -0.1312698 -0.4490885 0.1154489 0.0867966 0 -0.3781128
526 0.0082604 -0.0642213 -0.0020974 0.0133969 -0.0032662 -0.0479276
527 0.0215486 -0.1309511 -0.00738 0.0333867 0.0001088 -0.083287
642 0.0014446 0.0002516 0.0003989 0.0050496 -0.0086476 -0.0015029
701 -0.0052574 -0.22637 0.0085097 0.1201575 -0.0154669 -0.1184271
702 0.0141606 -0.0394405 -0.0006196 0.0363591 -0.0141771 -0.0037175
703 0.0035825 -0.1059697 0.0005152 0.0170777 -0.0299644 -0.1147587
704 -0.017484 -0.5588343 0.0123654 0 0 -0.5639529
2006
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6 The RPD index
6.1 Methodological approach
The Relative Prot Di¤erences(RPD) measure, proposed by Boone (2008) is useful to over-
come the problems of heterogeneity, aggregation and attrition that could have arisen in the
previous sections. Moreover, this variable may be constructed using the same rm-level data
necessary to calculate the PCM, without any additional data requirements. It could be the
case that more e¢ cient rms would report lower costs (then having a higher rm-level PCM)
whereas less e¢ cient ones would show higher costs (therefore lower rm-level PCM). Given a
competition shock in the sector due to a more aggressive behaviour of the incumbents (e.g. a
lower elasticity of substitution among products) with consequent lower prices, less e¢ cient rms
would exit and their market shares would be redistributed among more e¢ cient ones, hence
eventually increasing the aggregate PCM.
That is a case where a positive competition shock determines a higher sector-level PCM, im-
plying that, under particular circumstances, the PCM measure is not monotonic in competition.
The RPD measure instead increases (decreases) not only for the enhanced (lower) competition
that arises from lower entry barriers, but also for competition that reallocates output to more ef-
cient incumbent rms within the sector, thus ensuring the respect of monotonicity with respect
to the direction of the competition shock24.
The rm-level measure is constructed as follows:
RPDit =
t(iU )  t(iL)
t(i)  t(iL)
where t is prot at time t, i is the rm whose RPD is measured and [iL, iU ] is the set of rms
belonging to a given industry and ranked by cost-e¢ ciency, from the less e¢ cient iL to the more
e¢ cient iU .
The graphical intuition is provided in Figure 19 below, where the inverse of normalized
prots is plotted against the inverse of normalized e¢ ciency RCEit =
C(iU ) C(iL)
C(i) C(iL) , measured in
terms of the inverse of costs for a sector k at time t25.
24Boone (2008) demonstrates that RPD is monotone in competition both if aggressiveness of incumbent rms
changes and if more e¢ cient rms enter into the market. Aggressiveness here can be modeled also as an increased
elasticity of substitution within a sector, whereas decreased elasticity of substitution would mean defense by rms
that can enter into market niches with less elastic consumersdemand. See Boone (2008) for further details.
25Following Boone (2008), the measure is plotted as inverse in the graph to take into account the possibility to
have iL = 0.
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Figure 19: Relative Prot Di¤erences in a given sector
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In this case, the more competitive a sector, the more the dotted line would be pulled to the
bottom right. From the graph, then, levels of competition within a sector can be computed as
the area below the RPD curve. The smaller the area below the curve, the higher it is the level
of competition within a sector. In the extreme case of Bertrand competition, homogenous good
and constant marginal costs, the area below the line would be zero and the curve would collapse
on the bold axis.
One advantage of the RPD measure is that one does not need to observe all rms in an
industry to calculate it properly, since the result holds for any subset of rms sampled: increasing
competition would in any case pull down the whole curve.
Another interesting feature of the RPD measure is that it is also strongly correlated with
the within e¤ect of the PCM decomposition previously analysed (Boone et al., 2007). The
latter allows to further assess the robustness of the within e¤ect as a selection indicator. As the
within e¤ect is not a¤ected by construction by the reallocation e¤ect, it is a better measure of
competition in principle. In practice, however, there are two problems that arise when using
the within e¤ect as a measure of competition. First, to correctly measure competition, the
within e¤ect has to be computed on a balanced panel (Boone, 2008). If one wants to measure
competition using the within e¤ect consistently over a period of, say, 10 years one can only
use data on the rms that are in the panel for all 10 periods. Alternatively, one can calculate
the within e¤ect for consecutive years from t to t + 1 and then with a new sample from t +
1 to t + 2 etc. In this way, fewer observations are lost. The disadvantage of this approach is
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that the reallocation e¤ect plays a role in the comparison of competition between t and t + 2
as the base year changes. In this way, the within e¤ect is not a consistent measure over the
whole period. The second problem is the lack of micro-rms in the balance sheet database. The
incompleteness of the database, in this sense, can bias the analysis of PCM in previous sections,
while this problem is solved by the RPD algorithm as the behaviour of observed rms takes
into account the behaviour of the (unobserved) competitors, and thus the measure is relatively
una¤ected by the sample selection bias or the attrition bias induced by the appearance of active
rms in the available balance sheet data.
In order to translate the previous theoretical setup into a workable empirical tool of analysis,
one has to deal with the high heterogeneity of rms in terms of their e¢ ciency vs. prots
relationship, often yielding incomplete orderings of curves over the (0,1) support. As a result, it
might be appropriate to proxy the relationship depicted above with a log-linear one, in which
the slope of the log-linearised variables can be estimated through the following OLS equation
for each of the two sub periods:
ln(RPDik) = 0 + 1 ln(RCEik) + "ik (9)
where RPD is the rm-level Relative Prot Di¤erence for rm i in sector k, RCE is the rm-
level relative cost-e¢ ciency for rm i in sector k, while 1 would be the estimated slope of
the relationship linking (relative) prot elasticity to (relative) cost-e¢ ciency of the sector. The
evolution along the two periods of this slope would give us a proxy of the evolution of the shape
of the RDP curve for every sector k.
Given our rm-specic balance sheet data, the conguration of prot that will be taken as
dependent variable (RPD) has been based on each rmsEBITDA (Earnings Before Interests
Taxes Depreciation and Amortization), while in terms of costs (RCE) we will use rm-specic
variable costs as already constructed for the PCM measure (essentially cost of materials and
costs of employees). In order to avoid a distortion induced by size e¤ects, we consider unitary
prot and cost, namely we divide both costs and EBITDA by sales, thus using unit-based sales
relative measure26. We estimate the coe¢ cient  year by year and, in order to identify the
possible changes in competition, we consider the di¤erence between the mean coe¢ cient of years
2006-2007 vs. the years 1999-2000, that is we report (^06 07   ^99 00) as well as its percentage
change. We have decided to employ averages of the initial and end periods in order to avoid
26Notice that controlling for size allows to directly link the cost measure of the RPD algorithm to the PCM.
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possible distortions generated by year-specic shocks to the estimated coe¢ cients.
6.2 Results for prototype countries
The analysis of the RPD index is reported in the following Tables for our prototype countries.27
In particular we report the average estimated (log-linear) slope coe¢ cient for a given NACE
3-digit industry and country as retrieved from Equation 9. The reported s are signicant at
the 1 or 5 per cent level, while we do not report coe¢ cients that are non-signicant for that
particular industry/period (generally this might be due to a lack of observations).
In terms of interpretation, as from the graph discussed above a lower  indicates a atter
slope of the RPD line, and thus a more intense competition in the market. We report in the third
column of our Tables the di¤erence between elasticities estimated in 2006-2007 vs. 1999-2000
and in the last column the percentage variation. In this way, a negative value would indicate a
change in the industry towards higher competition.
Although the percentage variation might be large at times, what is important to recall is that
the reported coe¢ cients measure the slope of the (log-linearised) relationship between RPD and
RCE. To the extent that the absolute value of the coe¢ cients tends to zero, as it does in many
cases, that is an indication of a quasi-Bertrand competition in the market. Clearly, given the
low absolute magnitude of the coe¢ cients, the percentage changes tend to be relatively large.
This is mostly evident in those cases in which the slope coe¢ cient increases (see Table 15).
In relative terms, we observe a prevalence of decreasing slope coe¢ cients across countries.
This result is apparent for France when comparing the pre and post-euro periods. The situation
for Sweden is instead more heterogeneous, with some of the estimated s not signicant in the
rst period, presumably due to limitations in the initial number of observations, while again
Poland displays marked improvements in competition, albeit for di¤erent reasons than France.
All these ndings are consistent with the increase in competition detected when analysing the
PCM decomposition in the previous section. Clearly, however, some degree of heterogeneity
across industries and across countries remains, together with some possible shortcomings of our
estimation strategy, which we now proceed to validate.
27Results for all the countries of the study are reported in the Statistical Annex of the Report, which is available
upon request.
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Table 15: RPD Index, France
FRANCE
 β99-00 β06-07 β06-07  - β99-00 %change
MANUFACTURING
151 0.05040625 0.01739185 -0.0330144 -65%
152 0.1446282 0.0540404 -0.0905878 -63%
153 0.0413578 0.05274855 0.01139075 28%
154 0.31452255 0.0414881 -0.27303445 -87%
155 0.1731161 0.0427685 -0.1303476 -75%
156 0.1085096 0.047346 -0.0611636 -56%
157 0.0339926 0.0442807 0.0102881 30%
158 0.02913055 0.01750345 -0.0116271 -40%
159 0.0368316 0.0154927 -0.0213389 -58%
241 0.06204355 0.00864085 -0.0534027 -86%
242 0.26436125 0.06843935 -0.1959219 -74%
243 0.1823482 0.1808918 -0.0014564 -1%
244 0.01922485 0.0358875 0.01666265 87%
245 0.0628532 0.00166405 -0.06118915 -97%
246 0.00792395 0.1206689 0.11274495 1423%
247 0.0394107 0.1404822 0.1010715 256%
341 0.03237855 0.0052286 -0.02714995 -84%
342 0.0905296 0.01590635 -0.07462325 -82%
343 0.0427801 0.02529335 -0.01748675 -41%
SERVICES
521 0.0133141 0.0121215 -0.0011926 -9%
522 0.0348562 0.0081235 -0.0267327 -77%
523 0.0316418 0.00631235 -0.02532945 -80%
524 0.00448815 0.0027059 -0.00178225 -40%
525 0.0171643 0.00542745 -0.01173685 -68%
526 0.00005195 0.0025196 0.00246765 4750%
527 0.05489745 0.0218502 -0.03304725 -60%
642 0.00333845 0.00032335 -0.0030151 -90%
701 0.000078 0.00005565 -0.00002235 -29%
702 0.0004349 0.0004792 0.0000443 10%
703 0.00065615 0.00022475 -0.0004314 -66%
nace 3-digits
6.3 Limits of the RPD index and robustness checks
Given its properties, and the advantage of being based on rm-level data avoiding at the same
time some of the shortcomings typical of micro data, the RPD index is a good candidate to be
used as a tool for the subsequent analysis of competition. However, also this indicator su¤ers
from certain limits.
In particular, from a theoretical point of view, the indicator is constructed for a given pa-
rameter ! measuring the aggressiveness of rms conduct in the market, e.g. the substitu-
tion elasticity between goods from di¤erent producers or the type of competition (Cournot or
Bertrand) played by rms (see Boone, 2008). It then follows that, in the application of the
theoretical measure, some limitations can be encountered, essentially due to the availability of
rm-level data. First of all, in the model described before we would need to control for the
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Table 16: RPD Index, Sweden
SWEDEN
 β99-00 β06-07 β06-07  - β99-00 %change
MANUFACTURING
151 0.09033755 0.0914587 0.00112115 1%
152 0.0604708 0.04872895 -0.01174185 -19%
153 0.05322915 0.18070325 0.1274741 239%
154 0.000466 0.000466
155 0.2462598 0.2462598
156 0.11786715 0.0255115 -0.09235565 -78%
157 0.0651785 0.0368819 -0.0282966 -43%
158 0.0641154 0.0490203 -0.0150951 -24%
159 -0.00014735 -0.00014735
241 0.01547115 0.05474015 0.039269 254%
242 0.45872465 0.45872465
243 0.07538935 0.15963635 0.084247 112%
244 0.06481785 0.06481785
245 0.05907095 0.00485585 -0.0542151 -92%
246 0.0015748 0.0015748
247 1.382468 1.382468
341 0.1407857 0.01199595 -0.12878975 -91%
342 0.00558345 0.1350418 0.12945835 2319%
343 0.0192772 0.0369181 0.0176409 92%
SERVICES
521 0.00441175 0.00441175
522 0.01630445 0.01630445
523 0.03222065 0.03222065
524 0.00480405 0.0104673 0.00566325 118%
525 0.0699123 0.0699123
526 0.00830105 0.02228545 0.0139844 168%
527
642 0.00711585 0.00711585
701 0.00935815 0.00935815
702 0.0009282 0.00155125 0.00062305 67%
703 -0.0038605 0.001951 0.0058115 -151%
nace 3-digits
elasticity of substitution ! between goods. However, when pooling rm-level data at the NACE
3-digit level, which is still a relatively aggregated industry-measure, we are treating equally
rms with di¤erent product mixes and, therefore, di¤erent elasticities of substitution among the
goods they produce. Since we do not have information on the demand faced by each rm, in
our measure we would be neglecting an individual variation in the elasticity of substitution !
perceived by a given rm. It can therefore happen that, following a competition shock, in which
price-cost margins should in theory decrease, less e¢ cient rms react by changing their product
mix towards products characterized by a lower elasticity of substitution; the latter would result
in increased mark-ups, on average, and therefore in an underestimation of the actual degree of
competition, if judged solely on the basis of this indicator. In this context, in other words, a
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Table 17: RPD Index, Poland
POLAND
 β99-00 β06-07 β06-07  - β99-00 %change
MANUFACTURNIG
151 0.40454355 0.02629325 -0.3782503 -93.5%
152 2.173445 0.0349816 -2.1384634 -98.4%
153 0.30060045 0.118144 -0.18245645 -60.7%
154 0.0318346 0.0318346
155 0.5648449 0.0413849 -0.52346 -92.7%
156 0.4825457 0.4115101 -0.0710356 -14.7%
157 0.2522424 0.1961858 -0.0560566 -22.2%
158 0.0933219 0.0710253 -0.0222966 -23.9%
159 0.20201865 0.20201865
241 0.0726672 0.08306975 0.01040255 14.3%
242 0.9239229 0.9239229
243 0.7335599 0.30574135 -0.42781855 -58.3%
244 0.15432795 0.05854605 -0.0957819 -62.1%
245 0.38544465 0.0329501 -0.35249455 -91.5%
246 0.12802655 0.12802655
247 0.2116221 0.2116221
341 0.3875224 0.4376077 0.0500853 12.9%
342 0.4722459 0.43539625 -0.03684965 -7.8%
343 0.1117702 0.24204815 0.13027795 116.6%
SERVICES
521 0.13344225 0.13344225
522 0.1876647 0.1876647
523 0.1915129 0.1915129
524 0.08712265 0.0416849 -0.04543775 -52.2%
525 0.1335417 0.1335417
526 0.27234375 0.08931765 -0.1830261 -67.2%
527
642 0.0738742 0.031208 -0.0426662 -57.8%
701 0.0008115 0.0008115
702 0.0906623 0.00480025 -0.08586205 -94.7%
703 0.0714207 0.0987718 0.0273511 38.3%
nace 3-digits
less aggressive pricing policy by rms would not imply the loss of market shares because the
products these rms are selling are perceived as rich in value added28.
Once we do not rule out the case of heterogeneous rm-specic elasticities of substitutions
within a given industry, it then follows that the ranking of rms according to the cost e¢ ciency
as in our previous Graph would not necessarily correspond to a monotonic ranking in prots on
the vertical axis since, as already stated, rms whose elasticity of substitution has dropped might
increase their prot for the same level of costs. On the other hand, an e¤ect usually associated
with competitive pressures, namely surviving laggards improving their cost e¢ ciency more than
leaders, might also generate a non-monotonic relation between costs and prots: to the extent
that laggards are such because they face a higher elasticity of substitution on their product mix,
28The latter case would yield a positive interaction term in the PCM decomposition generated by both a positive
change in PCM and a positive change in market share.
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an increase in their cost e¢ ciency would not necessarily be associated to a relatively higher share
of prots.
In addition, the same business cycle might inuence over time the shape of the relationship
between RPD and RCE. For example in a period of crisis, where a generalized decrease in
the propensity to spend prevails, consumers might move their preferences from quality and/or
varieties to the variation of prices. In this case, it would be again necessary to correct for the
price elasticity of the rm-level demand, if data are available to test a structural model.
Finally, as recognised by Boone et al. (2007), the non-linearities might derive from changes
in the ranking of rms over time as induced by entry and exit or by accounting issues relative
to the imputation of costs to balance sheets, a problem which has to be assessed.
To show the extent to which these non-linearities might a¤ect the data, we have tested the
relationship between RPD and RCE through a non-parametric third-order polynomial operator.
In what follows, as a matter of example we report the relationship calculated for the car industry
(NACE 341) across the eight countries in our study for two given years, 2000 and 2006.
The two graphs have been calculated throughout two di¤erent methodologies. In the rst
case, we relate the relative prot di¤erence of a given rm i as associated to the cost e¢ ciency
of the same rm i (rst method). In the second case, we do not restrict the data to a biunivocal
correspondence between RPD and RCE of a given rm, but simply relate the (ranked) RPD rm-
level measures with the (ranked) RCE measures. To the extent that the relationship between
RPD and RCE is by and large monotonic, the two measures should coincide. In case of non-
monotonic behaviours, which we cannot control given the lack of rm-specic measures on
the elasticity of substitution, the second methodology, by imposing monotonicity, allows to
minimize distortions induced by unobserved rm-level heterogeneity and thus calculate a more
conservative average relationship at the industry level29. By comparing the two graphs, however,
we derive two simplifying messages, that hold through our observed industries. First of all, the
choice of the methodology (rm-specic correspondence or general ranking) has little e¤ect on
the shape of the relationship between RPD and RCE; second, a log-linear approximation of the
relationship does not impose too much distortion on the data.
To better control for these potential limits of the RPD indicator, and derive more robust
results, in what follows we have implemented a number of related additional tests.
29For example, if the few less e¢ cient rms in a given NACE 3-digit industry enjoy some form of market
protection (e.g. because they are niche-producers or quasi-monopolists), they might benet from higher than
normal relative prots which, in our theoretical relationship, would imply a positive, rather than zero, intercept,
biasing the entire estimation of the shape parameter.
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Figure 20: RPD vs. RCE: non parametric relationship
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First of all, the interpretation of the retrieved coe¢ cient is not obvious, as in Equation 9 the
regressors are weighted in terms of the relative e¢ ciency/protability of the industry (recall that
a rm i is assessed with respect to the less e¢ cient / protable rm iL and the more e¢ cient /
protable one, iU ). An alternative specication, suggested by Boone et al. (2007) is to regress
in a panel model the (log) prot of a given rm i vs. its (log) costs, controlling for time- and
individual rm-xed e¤ects, in order to retrieve the estimated elasticity of prots to costs. To
the extent that rm-specic measurement errors are time-invariant, and that time dummies are
able to adequately control for cyclical e¤ects, the methodology would yield a result equally valid
as the RPD (in which the normalisation for the relative e¢ ciency in a given year essentially
achieves the same goal), with a clearer interpretation.
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Second, the analysis has revealed for a limited number of countries/industries a negative
or (more often) non-signicant slope of the estimated RPD coe¢ cient. As it can be seen, the
non-signicance of the coe¢ cients tends to be concentrated in the early years of the analysis,
and as such it is likely due to the relatively fewer number of observations available in those years
(as rms have been added to the database over time). However, as already discussed we are
imposing a log-linear specication for the slope coe¢ cient, while the relationship between RPD
and RCE might be relatively non-linear for certain industries, for the reasons previously stated.
As a result, our rst order approximation might be not adequate.
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of our results to the latter problem, we have recalculated
the RPD measure based on a proxy for the relative cost e¢ ciency (RCE) which derives from the
estimation of a stochastic production e¢ ciency frontier, rather than from our direct observation
of rmscosts.
In what follows we discuss the construction of these robustness checks.
6.3.1 Prot Elasticity
Prot elasticities (PE) are retrieved from the same Equation 9 employed for the calculation of
the RPD measure, with the only di¤erence that in this case we do not normalize prots and
costs with respect to the less/more e¢ cient rms, but rather use these variables in their absolute
(log) values, albeit always controlling for rm size by dividing our regressors for rmssales30.
We thus estimate the average (log-linear) slope coe¢ cients for a given NACE 3-digit industry
and country as retrieved from Equation 9, for each year.
The analysis of the PE index is reported from Table 18 to 20 for our prototype countries.31
As before, in order to identify the possible change in competition, we consider the di¤erence
between the mean coe¢ cient of years 2006-2007 vs. the years 1999-2000, that is we report
(^06 07   ^99 00) as well as its percentage change. The reported s are signicant at the 1 or
5 per cent level, while we do not report coe¢ cients that are non-signicant for that particular
industry/year (generally this might be due to a lack of observations at the rm level).
In terms of interpretation, in this case a higher  (in absolute values) indicates a higher
elasticity of prots to costs, and thus a more intense competition in the market. Since the
interpretation is slightly di¤erent with respect to the RPD, we report in what follows three
30Using a puremeasure of unitary cost as a regressor we incur of course in the same type of approximation
error discussed for the PCM.
31The Statistical Annex of the Report presents this measure for all the countries / industries / years included
in the study. Results available upon request.
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Tables for France, Sweden and Poland in which we show the di¤erence between elasticities
estimated in 2006-2007 vs. 1999-2000, together with the percentage variation. In this tables, a
positive value would indicate a change in the industry towards higher competition.
As a general nding, it can be seen that this indicator reports a stronger degree of hetero-
geneity across industries but also across countries with respect to the RPD. In particular, the
food industry and in general the services sector in France seem to display a lower elasticity of
prots to cost. The situation is more homogeneous in Sweden, where prots in most industries
have become over time more sensitive to costs, while the opposite is in general true for Poland.
Clearly, these ndings need to be further explored comparing them with others RPD-related
measure, as well as through a comparison with the within-e¤ect component of the PCM decom-
position reported in the previous section, an exercise carried out in the next Section.
6.3.2 RPD and stochastic frontier
Insofar, we have used an inverse measure of rmsvariable costs (normalised by sales) as a rst
proxy of e¢ ciency, as suggested by the same Boone (2008). However, such an approach might
su¤er from measurement error, to the extent that not all costs of a rm are correctly reported
in the balance sheet, or from an idiosyncratic component, to the extent that rms in a given
sub-sector might be subject to shocks in terms of costs which a¤ect their ranking in terms of
e¢ ciency.
To partly overcome these problems, we have recalculated the RPD measure using as a proxy
for rmsrelative e¢ ciency the ranking in terms of e¢ ciency frontier in production. In particular,
the stochastic frontier production function has been independently proposed by Aigner, Lovell
and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). Since then, there has been
considerable research to extend and apply the model32. The approach starts from a general
production function:
yi = 0 +
kX
j=1
jxji + "i
where yi is the logarithm of output and xji are the inputs. The stochastic frontier production
function assumes the existence of technical ine¢ ciencies of production of rms involved in pro-
ducing a particular output: each rm potentially produces less than it might due to a degree of
ine¢ ciency. This implies that the error term is actually dened as "i = vi   ui , where vi is a
32Useful reviews of research in this area are provided in Forsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980), Schmidt (1985),
Bauer (1990), Battese (1992) and Greene (1993).
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Table 18: Prot Elasticity Index, France
FRANCE
 β99-00 β06-07 β06-07  - β99-00 %change
MANUFACTURING
151 -2.4980125 -2.0301995 -0.467813 -19%
152 -3.011539 -2.206296 -0.805243 -27%
153 -1.5261405 -1.598132 0.0719915 5%
154 -1.5571225 -1.105288 -0.4518345 -29%
155 -2.543783 -1.733969 -0.809814 -32%
156 -1.4409255 -2.0201015 0.579176 40%
157 -1.5103645 -1.8606475 0.350283 23%
158 -2.455455 -2.406425 -0.04903 -2%
159 -1.272048 -1.046702 -0.225346 -18%
241 -1.098896 -1.134743 0.035847 3%
242 -1.0085617 -1.610797 0.6022353 60%
243 -2.027023 -2.263884 0.236861 12%
244 -0.812381 -0.69052305 -0.12185795 -15%
245 -1.0950978 -1.2030255 0.1079277 10%
246 -1.4985545 -1.605572 0.1070175 7%
247 1.31481965
341 -0.68062455 0.14913165
342 -1.397143 -1.596704 0.199561 14%
343 -1.7182525 -1.828953 0.1107005 6%
SERVICES
521 -4.1825075 -2.6641 -1.5184075 -36%
522 -3.606085 -2.8326045 -0.7734805 -21%
523 -1.930969 -1.7408585 -0.1901105 -10%
524 -2.3671915 -2.0077645 -0.359427 -15%
525 -1.1770505 -1.1677925 -0.009258 -1%
526 -1.691253 -1.3929725 -0.2982805 -18%
527 -2.0460695 -1.6715955 -0.374474 -18%
642 -0.7325132 -0.403122 -0.3293912 -45%
701 -0.1607785 -0.2158786 0.0551001 34%
702 -1.0299695 -0.88671375 -0.14325575 -14%
703 -0.55154555 -0.45737035 -0.0941752 -17%
nace 3-digits
random shock, and ui is a measure of the ine¢ ciency of the rm, which tells us the distance from
the production frontier. We assume that the ine¢ ciency terms are independently half-normally
N+(0; 2u) distributed
33.
An advantage of this methodology is the possibility to build a measure of ine¢ ciency without
imposing much structure on this term, as these technical ine¢ ciency e¤ects do not need to be
explicitly modelled within the theoretical stochastic production frontier, although the method-
ology can include some explanatory variable for the same ine¢ ciency (see Pitt and Lee (1981)
33ui =   ln(i) , where i is the level of e¢ ciency for rm i, and is dened for the interval (0; 1] . Therefore,
restricting ui  0 implies that 0 < i  1
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Table 19: Prot Elasticity Index, Sweden
SWEDEN
 β99-00 β06-07 β06-07  - β99-00 %change
MANUFACTURING
151 -2.58823 -2.1143215 -0.4739085 -18%
152 -2.570868 2.570868
153 -1.75482 -1.838271 0.083451 5%
154
155 -1.750223 -1.943458 0.193235 11%
156 -2.470744 -2.0398875 -0.4308565 -17%
157 -1.393774 -1.710112 0.316338 23%
158 -1.330099 -1.884747 0.554648 42%
159 -1.344597 -1.683144 0.338547 25%
241 -0.9312809 -1.390992 0.4597111 49%
242 -5.212907 -1.383546 -3.829361 -73%
243 -2.50539 -1.47931 -1.02608 -41%
244 -1.758168 -1.093642 -0.664526 -38%
245 -1.056031 -0.3159106 -0.7401204 -70%
246 -1.6447275 -1.863278 0.2185505 13%
247 -9.017731 9.017731
341 -1.868419 -1.5857685 -0.2826505 -15%
342 -2.063671 -2.2879455 0.2242745 11%
343 -1.493171 -1.6711775 0.1780065 12%
SERVICES
521 -1.4712139 -2.360234 0.8890201 60%
522 -1.1903073 -2.2003465 1.0100392 85%
523 -1.71296 -1.495707 -0.217253 -13%
524 -1.22735635 -1.6520825 0.42472615 35%
525 -1.30618 -1.023107 -0.283073 -22%
526 -0.64805445 -1.3934955 0.74544105 115%
527 -1.409773 -1.146049 -0.263724 -19%
642 -0.5168751 -0.7778938 0.2610187 50%
701 -1.550706 -0.8606618 -0.6900442 -44%
702 -0.79487205 -0.68137655 -0.1134955 -14%
703 -0.6143531 -0.7215485 0.1071954 17%
nace 3-digits
and Kalirajan (1981)).
In terms of estimation, the early literature has suggested to adopt a two-stage approach, in
which the rst stage involves the specication and estimation of the stochastic frontier produc-
tion function and the prediction of the technical ine¢ ciency e¤ects, under the assumption that
these ine¢ ciency e¤ects are identically distributed. The second stage involves the specication
of a regression model for the predicted technical ine¢ ciency e¤ects. However, note that the
second stage regression contradicts the assumption of identically distributed ine¢ ciency e¤ects
in the stochastic frontier. Thus, more recent contributions propose a model for the technical
ine¢ ciency in which the parameters of the stochastic frontier and the ine¢ ciency model are
estimated simultaneously, given appropriate distributional assumptions associated either with
cross-sectional data (Kumbhakar, Ghosh and McGuckin (1991), Reifschneider and Stevenson
(1991) and Huang and Liu (1994)) or panel data (Battese Coelli 1992, 1995).
Given our purposes, that is to derive a ranking of rms in terms of e¢ ciency in alternative
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Table 20: Prot Elasticity Index, Poland
POLAND
 β99-00 β06-07 β06-07  - β99-00 %change
MANUFACTURING
151 -4.7468405 -1.641704 -3.1051365 -65%
152 -2.0644115 2.0644115
153 -4.077299 -1.505407 -2.571892 -63%
154 -2.651091 2.651091
155 -3.2037805 -1.923053 -1.2807275 -40%
156 -3.668217 -2.07369 -1.594527 -43%
157 -4.937613 -2.3155305 -2.6220825 -53%
158 -3.374577 -0.9972255 -2.3773515 -70%
159
241 -3.101024 -1.659538 -1.441486 -46%
242 -4.833598 4.833598
243 -6.313168 -1.4877005 -4.8254675 -76%
244 -2.230865 -1.707014 -0.523851 -23%
245 -1.01478 -1.3216505 0.3068705 30%
246 -4.009096 -1.508305 -2.500791 -62%
247 -4.897038 -2.890292 -2.006746 -41%
341 -7.033611 0 -7.033611 -100%
342 -2.099953 -1.819687 -0.280266 -13%
343 -2.796987 -1.6632675 -1.1337195 -41%
SERVICES
521 -2.703096 -2.3938255 -0.3092705 -11%
522 -10.6788975 -1.16550285 -9.51339465 -89%
523 -1.0665161 1.0665161
524 -0.78456755 -1.0541244 0.26955685 34%
525 -1.114932 1.114932
526 -3.362952 -1.1554875 -2.2074645 -66%
527 -13.8117 0 -13.8117
642 -0.6457568 -0.4286585 -0.2170983 -34%
701 -0.5530675 0.5530675
702 -0.81260275 -0.5441782 -0.26842455 -33%
703 -0.98381825 -1.078754 0.09493575 10%
nace 3-digits
to the one retrieved by the observation of costs, in our robustness analysis we adopt the simplest
stochastic frontier specication, as we are not interested in developing a model to dene technical
ine¢ ciency. Therefore we estimate:
yit = 0 + 1kit + 2lit + 3mit + vi   ui
where yit is the log of sales, kit is the log of total assets (both tangible and intangible), lit is the
log of the wage bill and mit is the log of material costs.
We estimate a stochastic frontier using rm-level data by NACE 2-digit and country for
every year. We prefer to estimate the stochastic frontier at the NACE 2-digit level instead
of NACE 3-digit level as a larger number of observations is crucial for the convergence of the
maximum likelihood estimator. From the estimation we are able to retrieve a rm-specic term
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of technical e¢ ciency (TE) based on the distance of each rm observed in a given country/year
from the industry frontier. Notice that the extension to a multi-country setting of this approach
is straightforward: as far as we believe that rms in the same industry in di¤erent EU countries
operate with the same technology in a given year, we can in fact assume that they share the same
frontier. Therefore, we could simply pool together the observations from di¤erent countries.
After obtaining a time-varying rm-specic e¢ ciency term at the NACE 2-digits level of
aggregation, we create as before the term of normalized e¢ ciency RTEit =
TE(iU ) TE(iL)
TE(i) TE(iL) where
[iL, iU ] is the set of rms belonging to a given NACE 3-digit industry and ranked by technical
e¢ ciency, from the less e¢ cient iL to the more e¢ cient iU . Such a ranking of rms is then
used as an alternative proxy for the independent variable employed in Equation 9. Clearly, in
terms of interpretation, nothing changes with respect to the standard RPD measure previously
discussed, i.e. a lower  indicates a atter slope of theRPD line, and thus a more intense
competition in the market.
Therefore we have proceeded in calculating the di¤erence between the elasticities estimated
in 2006-2007 vs. 1999-2000 for the alternative measure of RPD, comparing them with the
standard measure. The results are reported in Section 7, in which we compare the messages
obtained from all our indicators of competition, including the simple prot elasticity.
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7 Measuring the intensity of product market competition
7.1 Screening market functioning from rm-level indicators
In the previous Sections we have presented two di¤erent methodologies to evaluate the outcome
of competitive pressures throughout rms, and namely a Laspeyres decomposition of rm-level
PCM changes and an index of Relative Prot Di¤erence (RPD), itself presented in its standard
version (following Boone, 2008) and in two robustness checks, that is the prot elasticity to
costs, and the RPD based on stochastic production frontiers (rather than cost measures) as a
proxy of e¢ ciency.
As all measures have their pros and cons, and all display a certain degree of heterogeneity
across industries, we suggest to combine them, for each industry/country in the study, in order to
identify those industries which present non-straightforward or problematicdynamics in terms
of market integration. Given the nature of the indicators we have been using (PCMs or indexes
measuring to the prot-to-cost relation of rms), the term problematicdoes not necessarily
relates to a problem in terms of competition since, as already discussed, PCMs might increase
due to an increase in product market competition, while the same relationship between relative
prots and relative costs might become non-monotonic, thus preventing (lacking a control for
the individual rm-level elasticity of substitution) an interpretation of our indexes in terms of
competition dynamics. Rather, these screening tests should be interpreted as an indication that
a given industry is behaving di¤erently with respect to a given benchmark in terms of market
integration.
In fact, the highly disaggregated nature of our indicators is such that the same benchmark
can be dened endogenously by the researcher. Consider for instance the PCM indicator. Theo-
retically, it would be possible to design at least three di¤erent benchmark indicators with respect
to an exercise aiming at measuring the extent of product market functioning. First of all, one
could wonder whether the level of PCM of a given industry in a given country has actually
experienced divergence over time with respect to the EU industry average. Second, one could
check whether the long-term changes of the PCM (from 1999-2000 to 2006-2007) have entailed
a persistent increase of the latter. Third, it is possible to measure the persistence of partic-
ularly high PCMs which do not change over time. All these three tests, which have di¤erent
relationship with the underlying competition dynamics, can then be combined with our indexes
of changes in competition dynamics (RPD) in order to derive interesting messages on the extent
of product market functioning.
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7.1.1 Divergence of PCM
In order to measure the industry-level convergence of PCM to the EU average, we have calculated
the mean square deviation (MSD) of the PCM in a given NACE 3-digit industry in a given
country and year, compared it to the industry average across the countries in our sample, and
then checked whether the MSD has decreased or increased over time. We have then marked those
industries in which the MSD has increased in the years 2006-2007 vs. the initial years (1999-
2000), which would therefore diverge from the EU industry average (dened on our sample) in
terms of PCM behaviour. Clearly, the latter would not necessarily be associated to competition
problems, to the extent that the divergence could take place from the bottom, i.e. the PCM in a
given country/industry might decrease more than the EU average, and thus diverge. Also, even
if the divergence takes place in terms of a country/industry PCM failing to decrease with respect
to a decreasing EU average, to the extent that costs retain a country-specic component (e.g.
labour costs) a non-decreasing PCM in a given industry might be the results of technological
improvements, better functioning of labour markets or a change in local demand conditions (in
terms of elasticity of substitution). This is why it is useful to couple the test on the divergence
of price-cost margins with a screening of the competition dynamics as emerging from our RPD-
based indicators.
To that extent, we will be using two of our three indicators (prot elasticity; RPD cost-based;
RPD frontier-based) and namely the prot elasticity and the RPD frontier-based. It turns out
in fact that the RPD cost-based and the RPD frontier-based are highly correlated (thus con-
veying essentially the same information), but the latter is more robust to measurement errors
in accounting costs, and thus the ensuing problems of potential non-linearities in the relation-
ship between relative prots and costs are greatly reduced. Our screening test for competition
dynamics would therefore highlight those industries in which the relationship between prots
and costs signals a potential anti-competitive behaviour, namely a signicant increase in the
average  of the RPD index or a signicant decrease of the average prot elasticity over the
period 1999-200734.
Combining the test on the divergence of price-cost margins (MSD) with the screening of
competition dynamics (PE and RPD indicators, respectively) yields Table 21, where we have
marked the result of our screening tests for each industry, highlighting those industries for which
34Recall that, in order to avoid spurious measures induced by year-specic shocks, we calculate the average slope
for 1999 and 2000 and compare it with the average slope for 2006 and 2007, only for those coe¢ cients turning out
to be signicant in our estimations. Clearly, all the caveats on the limits of our indicators in measuring actual
competitive practices by rms apply here.
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all three indicators are relevant.
Table 21: PCM divergence and competition screening
MSD PE RPD MSD PE RPD MSD PE RPD MSD PE RPD MSD PE RPD MSD PE RPD MSD PE RPD MSD PE RPD
151 X X X X X X X X X
152 X X X X X X X X X X X
153 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
154 X X X X X X X X X X X
155 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
156 X X X X X X X X X X X
157 X X X X X X X X X X X
158 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
159 X X X X X X X X X X X
241 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
242 X X X X X X X X X X
243 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
244 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
245 X X X X X X X X
246 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
247 X X X X X X X X X X
341 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
342 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
343 X X X X X X X X X
521 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
522 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
523 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
524 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
525 X X X X X X X X X X
526 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
527 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
642 X X X X X X X X X X
701 X X X X X X X X X X X
702 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
703 X X X X X X X X X X
Total 13 20 6 11 13 12 15 23 11 11 17 10 19 24 5 15 20 15 28 24 9 14 19 0
SUMMARY TABLE
Nace 3-digits
BE DE ES FR IT PL RO SE
Not surprising, we can see that most of the industries displaying a diverging behaviour asso-
ciated to unclear competition dynamics are concentrated in Romania and Poland, the two New
Member States of our sample. In the Euro zone, Spain stands out as a country in which industry
experiencing a PCM divergence also display a certain sluggishness in the relationship between
prots and costs, both in manufacturing (beverage industry, NACE 159 and car production,
NACE 341) and in services. Countries in continental Europe (Belgium, Germany and France)
display instead a much lower number of problematicindustries, although a diverging behaviour
per se is present in more than one third of the considered industries. In the latter case, most of
the divergence is concentrated in the services, rather than manufacturing industries.
Combining this information with the one available in terms of evolution of consumers price
dispersion in the Single Market, which has decreased substantially since 1996 (e.g. Ilzkovitz
et al., 2008) it is then likely that in Europe the degree of integration of factor markets (which
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directly drive the cost component of the PCM) seems to be lower than the one of product
markets, where consumersprices are determined. The precise extent to which costs vs. prices
drive the overall dispersion of the PCM across EU industries is analysed at the beginning of
Section 8.
7.1.2 Changes of PCM
A second benchmark in terms of product market functioning is given by the long-run changes of
the PCM over the period considered. In particular, we consider now those industries in which
the average PCM in 2006 and 2007 is higher than the average PCM calculated in 1999 and
200035.
Once again, an increase in the PCM over the period considered for a given industry does not
necessarily imply per se the existence of competition problems, as the considerations on dynamic
e¢ ciency we have mentioned throughout this study are such that an increase in competition
can be associated to the detection of increasing price-cost margins. However, combining this
information with a screening of the competition dynamics as emerging from our RPD-based
indicators might highlight those industries in which particular industrial dynamics (such as
restructuring processes, quality upgrading, increase in import penetration, phenomena not nec-
essarily associated to competition problems) or eventually anti-competitive practices (at least
for some sub-industries) might be worth investigating.
Combining the test on the positive change (D>0) of price-cost margins with the screening of
competition dynamics (PE and RPD indicators, respectively) yields the results shown in Table
22, where we have marked the result of our screening tests for each industry, highlighting those
industries for which all three indicators are relevant.
Once again, most of the problematic industries are concentrated in Romania and Poland,
countries in which industries experiencing an overall increase in the PCM over time tend also to
have a more sluggish relationship between prots and costs. However, the feature of increasing
PCMs is quite common across the considered industries and countries, to the point that unclear
industrial dynamics emerge also for a non marginal number of industries in Sweden and France
(both concentrated in food and chemicals).
Interestingly, when looking at the Euro area countries, the di¤erence in the behaviour of
manufacturing vs. services industries disappear, signalling that while divergence in PCM could
35Taking long-run di¤erences allows us to obtain more robust results, as these di¤erences are less sensitive to
the choice of particular years.
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Table 22: PCM change and competition screening
D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD
151 X X X X X X X X X X X X
152 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
153 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
154 X X X X X X X X X X X
155 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
156 X X X X X X X X X X X X
157 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
158 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
159 X X X X X X X X X X X
241 X X X X X X X X X X X X
242 X X X X X X X X
243 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
244 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
245 X X X X X X X
246 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
247 X X X X X X X X X X X X
341 X X X X X X X X X X X X
342 X X X X X X X X X X
343 X X X X X X X X X X X
521 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
522 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
523 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
524 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
525 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
526 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
527 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
642 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
701 X X X X X X X X X X
702 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
703 X X X X X X X X X X X X
Total 14 20 6 14 13 12 12 23 11 21 17 10 15 24 5 18 20 15 29 24 9 21 19 0
SUMMARY TABLE
Nace 3-digits
BE DE ES FR IT PL RO SE
have a sectorial component, being it more important for services (see the previous Table),
long-term PCM increases do not prevail in services with respect to manufacturing industries,
signalling that dynamic e¢ ciency gains (potentially explaining the long-term PCM changes)
operate throughout industries and countries in Europe.
Given the importance of these adjustments for the process of economic integration, in the
follow-up of the section we will discuss in some detail the results of this screening test for three
selected NACE 3-digit industries.
7.1.3 PCM persistence
As a nal benchmark of product market functioning, we have tested whether the PCM in a
given industry/country has displayed a persistent behaviour, i.e. it has remained above a certain
threshold with respect to the country average over the considered period. In particular, we have
selected those industries whose PCMs, in the year 2000, were one standard deviation above the
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country average PCM, and that have remained such in the year 200736. Interestingly, we have
detected very few cases of such persistency, mostly concentrated in Romania, as displayed in
Table 23.
Table 23: PCM persistence
Nace 3-digits BE DE ES FR IT PL RO SE Total
151 0
152 0
153 0
154 0
155 0
156 X 1
157 X 1
158 0
159 0
241 X 1
242 0
243 0
244 0
245 0
246 0
247 0
341 X 1
342 X 1
343 0
521 0
522 0
523 0
524 0
525 0
526 0
527 0
642 X 1
701 X 1
702 X 1
703 0
Tot by country 0 1 0 3 0 0 4 0 8
When combining the information reported above with our screening of competition dynamics,
however, none of the industries displaying persistence in PCM appear as problematic. The latter
clearly depends on the fact that our indicators are able to detect changes in the relationship
between prots and costs, and therefore might not react to a situation in which PCM remain
persistently higher over time. Clearly, such a persistency might depend on problems in terms of
competition, in this case not necessarily captured by our previous analysis.
7.2 A pilot analysis of industries: introduction
In what follows, we deepen our analysis of product market functioning by selecting three Pilot
industries, comparing all the relevant information we have gathered in the study, and adding as
36Note that now the benchmark is the country average across industries. It was the EU industry average across
countries when analysing PCM divergence.
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well some more traditional measures of competition such as the Herndahl index. In particular,
we rst present the PCM distribution of the industry across the eight countries, for 2000 and
2007. We then report for every year and every country the PCM decompositions, with the
interaction term divided into four addenda, in order to emphasize the relative contribution of
the addendum in which both the changes in PCM and the changes in market share are positive
(those cases potentially more detrimental for competition, or in which dynamic e¢ ciency might
be at play). Finally, we run our screening tests based on the overall changes in PCM and the
analysis of our two competition indicators (prot elasticity and RPD frontier-based), in order to
highlight in which country, and according to which indicator the industry might display unclear
industrial dynamics, comparing nally these results with the evolution of the Herndahl index
in the same industry.
We believe such a framework of analysis could be usefully employed as a pilot to carry out a
synthetic study on the intensity of competition in a given industry, based on rm-level indicators.
Of course, working at this level of disaggregation (NACE 3-digit industry in a given country
and year) the number of available observations might be reduced for some countries (see the
discussion on the validation in Section 2), and thus plotting the entire PCM distribution in a
given year might result problematic. Moreover, as already discussed, since 2007 is the last year
of our sample we have by denition a zero exit rate, and thus PCM changes for that year might
be slightly upward biased.
Nevertheless, also notice that a given NACE 3-digit industry does not correspond to the
competition case of relevant market, as even at this relatively disaggregated level of analysis
we are still pooling together rms operating in very di¤erent businesses37.
In particular, the industries we have chosen to analyse are the Beverage industry (NACE
159), the Car production industry (NACE 341) and the Distribution of food (NACE 522).
7.3 Pilot study: NACE 159 - Manufacture of beverages
7.3.1 Evolution of PCM distributions across eight countries
At a rst glance, the industry does not appear to present many problems of competition: in
four countries the density shifts to the left, hinting at pro-competitive dynamics in progress in
the industry. In Italy we notice that the distribution is more dispersed while in Belgium, Spain
and Sweden the distribution moves towards higher PCM values.
37For example, in the beverage industry (NACE 159) we are combining rms operating in the soft drink industry,
in the industrial alcohol industry and in the spirits and wine industry.
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7.3.2 PCM decomposition
We report the decomposition of the same industry year by year. From column 2 to column 6 we
show the addenda of the decomposition already discussed in the previous Sections and reported in
the Statistical Annex of the Report.38 In the last 4 columns we further decompose the interaction
term in a term in which both PCM < 0 and share < 0 (column I); a term in which both
PCM > 0 and share > 0 (column II); and two cases for the terms PCM > = < 0 and
share < = > 0 (column III and IV, respectively). We are particularly interested in Column II,
in which both PCM > 0 and share > 0, since if this term is relatively larger with respect to
I, III and IV then it would drive the sign of the general interaction term. This would imply that
rms with growing mark-ups would become bigger relative to the market, a scenario potentially
38Which is available upon request.
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indicating competition concerns or, in alternative, an important restructuring of the industry
(e.g. changes in the elasticity of substitution of goods). Large values in Column I, instead, could
be interpreted as a natural exit process where less e¢ cient rms are losing market shares and
thus preparing to exit the market.
Table 24: PCM Decompositions: NACE 159 - Beverages (A)
Belgium
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 0.005136 0.015003 0.000851 0.000749 0.000000 0.021740 0.000215 0.001099 -0.000323 -0.000139
2001 0.036829 -0.046182 -0.013444 0.012390 -0.000497 -0.010903 0.000174 0.000476 -0.000037 -0.014057
2002 0.006100 -0.003469 0.000165 0.001599 0.000000 0.004395 0.000151 0.000482 -0.000273 -0.000196
2003 0.013240 -0.017482 -0.000502 0.017466 0.000000 0.012723 0.000577 0.000567 -0.000053 -0.001592
2004 -0.021106 0.003566 0.000463 -0.000621 0.000000 -0.017698 0.000314 0.001378 -0.000884 -0.000344
2005 0.013283 -0.013382 -0.000644 0.000363 -0.000314 -0.000695 0.000422 0.000339 -0.000189 -0.001217
2006 -0.000920 -0.017228 0.000295 0.009432 0.000022 -0.008400 0.000451 0.000139 -0.000068 -0.000227
2007 -0.004992 -0.003820 0.004440 0.000204 0.000000 -0.004169 0.004222 0.000460 -0.000204 -0.000038
Germany
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 0.020975 -0.117411 -0.001679 0.113206 0.000000 0.015091 0.002340 0.000000 . -0.004019
2001 0.038945 -0.188276 -0.021069 0.069877 0.000000 -0.100523 0.003018 0.000276 . -0.024363
2002 -0.011783 -0.091586 0.005040 0.094604 -0.013885 -0.017610 0.006836 0.000165 -0.000019 -0.001943
2003 0.008205 -0.042523 -0.000914 0.105305 -0.002961 0.067113 0.000672 0.000762 -0.000460 -0.001887
2004 -0.028329 -0.084890 0.012533 0.041698 -0.002943 -0.061931 0.013999 0.000026 -0.000071 -0.001421
2005 0.014207 -0.069437 -0.003092 0.082397 -0.001815 0.022261 0.002208 0.000699 -0.000210 -0.005789
2006 -0.011002 0.003675 0.009972 0.028588 -0.046919 -0.015687 0.009723 0.001437 -0.001043 -0.000145
2007 -0.003422 0.049850 -0.002227 0.011318 0.000000 0.055519 . 0.001058 -0.003284 0.000000
Spain
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 0.002222 0.010684 0.001370 0.016428 0.000000 0.030704 . 0.008624 -0.029241 -0.016658
2001 -0.002245 -0.035526 0.004061 0.021523 -0.000001 -0.012189 0.006860 0.001640 -0.000624 -0.003814
2002 -0.002766 0.000338 -0.001301 0.003889 -0.000022 0.000138 0.002866 0.001673 -0.000519 -0.001578
2003 0.009527 -0.000414 0.001448 0.002644 0.000010 0.013213 0.002015 0.001911 -0.001219 -0.001259
2004 0.001911 0.016346 -0.000809 0.008535 0.000019 0.026001 0.001506 0.001349 -0.002754 -0.000910
2005 -0.003057 -0.025036 0.002908 0.002771 0.000020 -0.022394 0.004093 0.001144 -0.000670 -0.001659
2006 0.027596 0.014912 -0.005852 0.001294 -0.004089 0.033860 0.000651 0.004351 -0.002717 -0.008137
2007 -0.004009 0.018704 0.001473 0.006727 0.000000 0.022895 0.001498 0.002093 -0.001383 -0.000735
France
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.014729 -0.026977 0.001171 0.023777 0.000000 -0.016758 0.003709 0.000310 -0.000837 -0.002010
2001 0.006189 -0.027925 0.001654 0.030585 0.000000 0.010503 0.003140 0.001018 -0.001066 -0.001437
2002 0.023027 -0.063897 -0.001338 0.020259 0.000000 -0.021948 0.002017 0.000914 -0.000438 -0.003830
2003 -0.011715 -0.004382 0.003687 0.011051 -0.000051 -0.001409 0.005939 0.001499 -0.002019 -0.001731
2004 0.004516 -0.010993 0.001985 0.002223 -0.000003 -0.002273 0.002242 0.001619 -0.000781 -0.001094
2005 -0.002144 -0.014657 0.002428 0.009110 -0.000266 -0.005529 0.003180 0.001717 -0.000482 -0.001987
2006 0.001350 0.002231 0.001729 0.002892 -0.019465 -0.011263 0.002485 0.001779 -0.001343 -0.001191
2007 -0.005584 0.016336 0.001161 0.003101 0.000000 0.015014 0.000757 0.002612 -0.001710 -0.000499
Looking at our decompositions, as expected we nd a certain degree of heterogeneity across
the analysed countries. Among the countries that display an increase in the PCM distribution,
we see that competition in Belgium should not be an issue, as aggregate PCM is always declining
after 2003. In Spain, instead, with the exception of 2001 and 2005, the aggregate PCM is always
increasing and the same positive trend is shown by the within, reallocation and interaction
components. Moreover, while in the early years of our analysis the positive sign of the interaction
term is driven by Column I (PCM < 0 & share < 0), in 2006/2007 we have that Column II
(PCM > 0 & share > 0) becomes dominant, thus indicating a potential problem in terms
of competition.
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Table 25: PCM Decompositions: NACE 159 - Beverages (B)
Italy
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
1999 0.007665 -0.037027 0.010860 0.021917 -0.002192 0.001223 0.007982 0.009108 -0.000059 -0.006171
2000 -0.015034 -0.004700 0.007864 0.001485 0.000204 -0.010181 0.005516 0.004906 -0.001156 -0.001402
2001 0.008873 0.011030 -0.002284 -0.000561 -0.000036 0.017022 0.010519 0.011218 -0.005344 -0.018678
2002 -0.030704 -0.046878 0.039102 0.001157 0.000192 -0.037130 0.026729 0.016403 -0.001202 -0.002828
2003 -3.427767 -0.003973 3.465876 0.000668 -0.000276 0.034529 3.447372 0.024407 -0.001576 -0.004327
2004 0.005176 -0.017506 0.004471 0.006508 -0.004156 -0.005507 0.006292 0.003817 -0.000728 -0.004911
2005 -0.007487 -0.005702 0.014289 -0.000226 -0.028754 -0.027879 0.003548 0.015012 -0.002410 -0.001861
2006 -0.008243 -0.034934 0.051274 0.000987 -0.021177 -0.012094 0.010335 0.044694 -0.002896 -0.000860
2007 -0.017705 -0.284791 0.303477 0.002913 0.000000 0.003894 0.016930 0.291040 -0.002470 -0.002023
Poland
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.003954 0.046984 -0.000759 0.003429 0.000000 0.045700 -0.000759 0.000816 0.001204 -0.002779
2001 0.000065 0.000651 -0.000130 0.001905 0.000000 0.002491 0.002142 0.001454 -0.000398 -0.000130
2002 -0.000035 -0.054328 -0.000983 0.004053 0.000071 -0.051221 0.001185 0.000059 -0.000302 -0.000983
2003 -0.007836 -0.013462 -0.001232 0.013239 0.000000 -0.009291 0.000854 0.001895 0.000396 -0.000204
2004 -0.002463 0.001640 -0.000484 0.000061 0.000000 -0.001246 -0.000163 0.000400 0.000235 -0.000313
2005 0.004600 0.037959 -0.000059 0.002126 -0.003629 0.040998 0.002291 0.001422 0.001294 -0.000365
2006 -0.000089 0.044353 0.000695 0.004183 -0.141403 -0.092261 0.000409 0.001019 -0.000715 -0.000018
2007 -0.004108 0.038820 -0.000181 0.000739 0.000000 0.035271 0.000941 0.000901 0.001031 -0.000810
Romania
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 0.002161 0.010419 0.008402 0.003538 0.000000 0.024520 0.008164 0.009848 -0.003461 -0.006149
2001 0.003660 -0.074440 0.003634 0.114144 -0.000154 0.046844 0.014364 0.002177 -0.000305 -0.012601
2002 0.036104 0.001400 0.004785 0.001298 -0.000098 0.043489 0.005646 0.008655 -0.002698 -0.006818
2003 -0.008922 -0.002330 0.007670 0.001035 0.000037 -0.002510 0.008511 0.005087 -0.002572 -0.003356
2004 0.021204 -0.014651 0.008484 0.000205 -0.000089 0.015154 0.007759 0.006962 -0.001934 -0.004304
2005 0.042599 0.004218 0.002358 0.001264 -0.000708 0.049732 0.004009 0.005185 -0.000704 -0.006132
2006 -0.032761 -0.005933 0.006669 0.000275 -0.011454 -0.043205 0.008749 0.005984 -0.005051 -0.003013
2007 0.172086 0.019586 0.016637 0.000327 0.000000 0.208636 0.002490 0.029995 -0.000598 -0.015250
Sweden
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.012406 0.024754 -0.001507 0.000054 0.000000 0.010895 0.000252 0.000004 -0.001586 -0.000177
2001 0.024300 0.005195 0.000931 0.000005 0.000000 0.030430 0.000197 0.000969 -0.000005 -0.000230
2002 -0.019992 0.051395 -0.004555 0.000276 0.000000 0.027124 0.000060 0.000042 -0.004076 -0.000581
2003 -0.011829 0.004909 -0.000363 0.000000 0.000000 -0.007282 0.000027 0.000222 -0.000417 -0.000194
2004 -0.004813 -0.000304 -0.000195 0.000000 0.000000 -0.005312 0.000019 0.000018 -0.000085 -0.000147
2005 -0.004839 0.011629 -0.000077 0.000000 0.000000 0.006713 0.000067 0.000212 -0.000328 -0.000028
2006 -0.001046 -0.015492 -0.000116 0.000000 0.000000 -0.016654 0.000040 0.000100 -0.000222 -0.000033
2007 0.002821 0.010309 0.000816 0.000031 0.000000 0.013978 0.000186 0.000773 -0.000040 -0.000102
7.3.3 Screening test and market structure
In the rst part of this Section we have discussed a methodology to screen the intensity of
competition across industries on the basis of criteria based on the PCM evolution (long-run
changes) and two indicators of competition dynamics, the prot elasticity to costs, and the
relative prot di¤erence (based on the measurement of the e¢ ciency frontier). We report here
the results of the screening test across countries, and we compare these results with the evolution
of the Herndahl-Hirschman Index, calculated using the concentration of market shares of the
same rms, in order to have a feeling of the evolution of the market structure in the chosen
industry.
Table 26: Screening test: NACE 159 - Beverages
D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD
159 l l l l l l l l l l l
IT PL RO SE
Nace 3-digits
BE DE ES FR
Our screening test signals Spain as a problematic country as far as the Beverage industry
is concerned, a nding consistent with the previous analysis. Also the HHI for the sector is
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Table 27: Herndahl-Hirschman Index NACE 159
year BE DE ES FR IT PL RO SE
1999 0.10789 0.389396 0.024658 0.03652 0.023381 0.07639 0.056369 0.218732
2000 0.11927 0.273492 0.028534 0.033177 0.024248 0.079479 0.065125 0.228458
2001 0.098729 0.107356 0.027753 0.031718 0.019694 0.087389 0.068446 0.245761
2002 0.102357 0.121975 0.027934 0.022771 0.015404 0.082237 0.065817 0.292719
2003 0.10733 0.071496 0.02821 0.024876 0.02136 0.076419 0.065935 0.293192
2004 0.113586 0.051249 0.027499 0.023843 0.021059 0.080977 0.066191 0.292732
2005 0.107568 0.032334 0.027547 0.024684 0.020475 0.087292 0.069585 0.295961
2006 0.10078 0.036328 0.027215 0.026204 0.01816 0.070406 0.078773 0.281148
2007 0.104624 0.060762 0.02984 0.0279 0.015413 0.085446 0.096167 0.281915
NACE 159
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
increasing in Spain, hinting a possible rise in the concentration of the industry. However, the
increasing trend in the HHI is not peculiar of Spain, but rather it is found in almost all the
other countries, a nding which, in a sense, conrms the limitedness of synthetic indicators of
competition in retrieving the full spectrum of rm dynamics.
It then follows that protability in the Spain beverage industry is rising, while the market
becomes more concentrated. Clearly, to jump from here to the conclusion that in Spain there
are competition problems in the beverage industry is not appropriate, as the same industry is
composed of many di¤erent relevant marketswhich we are not exploring in details here (see
Section 9 to that extent). However, it would be interesting to analyse the reasons which are
leading to these peculiar industrial dynamics (possibly induced by the restructuring of the in-
dustry along large distribution chains), which di¤er from those we observe in the other European
countries included in the study.
7.4 Pilot study: NACE 341 - Manufacture of motor vehicles
7.4.1 Evolution in PCM distributions across eight countries
The analysis of the density functions of this specic industry is not very informative, due to
the small number of active rms, as reported in the validation previously discussed. We can
however notice a general increased dispersion in the PCM distribution, and signal that the
Spanish, French and Romanian densities shift to the right.
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7.4.2 PCM decomposition
When looking at the decompositions for the Car industry, we nd that the PCM is almost
always increasing in the latest years. This positive feature is coupled with a positive interaction
term, essentially driven by our Column II, in Germany, Italy and Spain, a fact that suggests the
presence of relevant industrial dynamics.
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Table 28: PCM Decompositions: NACE 341 - Car Production (A)
Belgium
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.001578 -0.005738 0.000868 0.000000 0.000000 -0.006447 0.000728 0.001572 -0.000944 -0.000488
2001 -0.011489 -0.001582 0.000798 0.000133 0.000000 -0.012141 0.001235 0.001113 -0.001144 -0.000406
2002 -0.010634 0.001194 0.000680 0.000000 0.000000 -0.008759 0.002744 0.000292 -0.001353 -0.001003
2003 -0.001236 -0.003326 0.002553 0.001337 0.000000 -0.000672 0.001998 0.001081 -0.000363 -0.000162
2004 0.008009 -0.003115 0.001457 0.000000 0.000000 0.006351 0.000225 0.001849 -0.000003 -0.000614
2005 -0.000145 -0.000370 0.000390 0.000000 0.000000 -0.000125 0.000234 0.000390 -0.000060 -0.000173
2006 -0.005534 0.003161 0.000057 0.000000 0.000000 -0.002315 0.000437 0.000301 -0.000645 -0.000035
2007 -0.076838 0.008281 0.044963 0.000000 0.000000 -0.023595 0.043933 0.001974 -0.000873 -0.000071
Germany
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.006889 -0.003493 0.000184 0.003021 0.000000 -0.007177 0.000445 0.000000 -0.000262 0.000000
2001 0.000403 0.000260 0.000770 0.005328 0.000000 0.006760 0.000408 0.000362 . 0.000000
2002 0.002240 0.002601 0.000382 0.000073 0.000000 0.005296 0.000013 0.000490 -0.000045 -0.000076
2003 -0.012614 0.004113 0.000275 0.000433 0.000000 -0.007793 0.000324 0.000424 -0.000474 0.000000
2004 -0.001129 0.000503 -0.000263 0.000004 0.000000 -0.000884 0.000066 0.000066 -0.000161 -0.000233
2005 0.000790 -0.000707 0.000620 0.000056 -0.000039 0.000720 0.000419 0.000210 -0.000005 -0.000003
2006 0.009209 0.018635 0.002738 0.000154 -0.001431 0.029305 0.000000 0.002879 -0.000140 0.000000
2007 0.000632 0.000598 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.001230 0.000093 0.000022 -0.000019 -0.000096
Spain
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.022646 0.001021 0.000694 0.000004 0.000000 -0.020927 0.002816 0.004371 -0.000547 -0.001893
2001 -0.011185 0.000003 -0.000165 0.000181 0.000000 -0.011166 0.000451 0.000010 -0.000404 -0.000222
2002 0.007303 0.013631 0.001167 0.000001 0.000000 0.022102 0.002182 0.013024 -0.000541 -0.001589
2003 0.011930 -0.027174 -0.002786 0.012379 0.000000 -0.005650 0.000141 0.000043 -0.000003 -0.002967
2004 -0.007796 -0.000188 0.000195 0.000016 0.000000 -0.007773 0.000410 0.000015 -0.000069 -0.000161
2005 0.000348 -0.004741 0.000445 0.006023 0.000001 0.002075 0.000347 0.000295 -0.000012 -0.000186
2006 0.001443 -0.003092 0.002266 0.000001 -0.000008 0.000609 0.000707 0.001716 -0.000007 -0.000151
2007 0.004584 0.026610 0.000241 0.000002 0.000000 0.031437 0.000026 0.001408 -0.000737 -0.000456
France
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 0.001883 0.000109 0.000016 0.000331 0.000000 0.002339 0.000017 0.000023 -0.000004 -0.000020
2001 0.000903 0.002937 -0.000021 0.000494 0.000000 0.004314 0.000025 0.000064 -0.000022 -0.000087
2002 0.000265 -0.012584 0.000174 0.000065 0.000000 -0.012080 0.000192 0.000141 -0.000001 -0.000158
2003 -0.001168 -0.000645 0.000181 0.000060 0.000000 -0.001572 0.000103 0.000126 -0.000005 -0.000043
2004 0.003129 0.004968 -0.000017 0.000093 0.000000 0.008173 0.000019 0.000135 -0.000056 -0.000114
2005 -0.009846 0.003604 -0.000398 0.000004 0.000000 -0.006637 0.000033 0.000028 -0.000456 -0.000004
2006 -0.004739 0.001603 -0.000027 0.000011 -0.000029 -0.003181 0.000049 0.000179 -0.000238 -0.000016
2007 -0.015721 0.002484 -0.000367 0.000000 0.000000 -0.013605 0.000067 0.000012 -0.000446 -0.000001
7.4.3 Screening test and market structure
Reporting the results of our screening test for the intensity of competition for the car industry,
we do not detect industries in which all our indicators raise attention, although we see that in
those countries where the interaction term of the PCM tends to be positive due to an increase in
margins associated with an increase in market shares (Germany, Italy and Spain) also the RPD
signals that prots are becoming less responsive to e¢ ciency. Clearly, one should investigate
whether this is a result of true competition problems, or rather a phenomenon in which relatively
less e¢ cient rms are changing their product mix towards segments of the market characterized
by higher value-added (e.g. cleancars) and thus higher margins.
When we compare this information with the HHI, we notice that in Spain and Sweden
the concentration is mildly increasing, while in Italy we assist to a quite dramatic rise of the
concentration in the last years. Finally, in Germany the index is decreasing. Once again, the
dynamics of this index seem to be partly not correlated with the detected evolution of industrial
dynamics.
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Table 29: PCM Decompositions: NACE 341 - Car Production (B)
Italy
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
1999 -0.003243 -0.002260 0.001875 0.001195 -0.000198 -0.002631 0.002442 0.001072 -0.000343 -0.001296
2000 -0.012749 -0.037118 0.006999 -0.008158 -0.000031 -0.051056 0.008919 0.000283 . -0.002203
2001 -0.022437 -0.007010 -0.004827 -0.000114 -0.000020 -0.034408 0.002302 0.000114 -0.005788 -0.001455
2002 -0.003577 -0.000138 0.001486 0.000045 0.000000 -0.002184 0.000622 0.001216 -0.000170 -0.000182
2003 0.003790 0.004463 -0.000845 0.025887 0.000029 0.033324 0.001425 0.000178 -0.000218 -0.002231
2004 0.017121 -0.001337 0.002331 0.000569 -0.000299 0.018385 0.000595 0.003589 -0.000207 -0.001647
2005 -0.003348 0.000319 0.000425 0.003767 -0.030261 -0.029097 0.000558 0.002498 -0.002606 -0.000025
2006 0.015591 -0.003704 0.007630 -0.000007 -0.000051 0.019459 0.003145 0.005215 -0.000497 -0.000232
2007 0.009205 -0.077576 0.085723 -0.000038 0.000000 0.017313 0.006066 0.080446 -0.000508 -0.000281
Poland
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.002427 0.006878 -0.000002 0.000863 0.000000 0.005313 -0.000728 . 0.000000 -0.000727
2001 -0.011126 -0.014815 -0.000534 0.000373 0.000000 -0.026102 0.003531 0.004001 -0.000251 -0.000534
2002 0.017469 -0.000324 -0.001245 0.000000 0.000000 0.015899 . 0.000418 -0.000140 -0.001245
2003 -0.016887 0.025134 -0.000118 0.000420 0.000000 0.008549 -0.006398 0.000025 0.001721 -0.008025
2004 -0.018849 0.006034 -0.000205 0.000118 0.000000 -0.012902 -0.003820 0.000654 0.000066 -0.004335
2005 0.004165 -0.004548 -0.001085 0.002149 0.000000 0.000681 -0.001293 0.000031 0.000078 -0.000317
2006 -0.009347 0.004361 0.000264 0.000254 -0.000488 -0.004956 0.000407 0.001011 -0.001144 -0.000010
2007 0.001742 0.003295 -0.000194 0.000069 0.000000 0.004912 0.000191 0.000173 0.000254 -0.000041
Romania
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.109745 -0.013348 0.003765 0.000000 0.000000 -0.119327 0.005270 0.000004 -0.001509 0.000000
2001 0.101445 0.005951 0.004281 0.001373 0.000000 0.113050 0.003451 0.001139 -0.000309 .
2002 -0.107869 -0.020780 0.014159 0.000000 0.000000 -0.114489 0.006874 0.007578 -0.000207 -0.000085
2003 -0.059655 0.039868 -0.119827 0.000000 0.000000 -0.139614 . 0.012200 -0.132027 .
2004 0.179400 0.114247 -0.152921 0.000008 0.000000 0.140734 0.042933 0.000000 . -0.195853
2005 -0.006490 0.039742 -0.037808 0.003058 -0.000008 -0.001505 . 0.020956 -0.058764 .
2006 0.127175 -0.008355 -0.089530 0.000000 -0.000052 0.029238 0.004468 0.000000 . -0.093998
2007 0.088945 0.003978 -0.018847 0.000577 0.000000 0.074653 0.000222 0.007505 -0.000085 -0.026489
Sweden
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.000008 0.000080 0.000001 0.000026 0.000000 0.000099 0.000002 0.000020 -0.000014 -0.000006
2001 -0.000085 0.000072 0.000026 0.000004 0.000000 0.000016 0.000035 0.000004 -0.000011 -0.000002
2002 0.000139 -0.000057 0.000098 0.000000 -0.000001 0.000178 0.000001 0.000133 -0.000005 -0.000031
2003 -0.000218 -0.000172 0.000168 0.000005 0.000000 -0.000217 0.000175 0.000001 -0.000003 -0.000005
2004 0.000008 -0.000015 0.000075 0.000002 0.000000 0.000069 0.000025 0.000066 -0.000012 -0.000004
2005 -0.000074 0.000191 0.000144 0.000172 0.000000 0.000434 0.000044 0.000108 -0.000005 -0.000002
2006 -0.000074 0.004055 -0.000879 0.000030 0.000000 0.003132 0.000004 0.000008 -0.000891 0.000000
2007 0.000093 0.000394 0.000112 0.000005 0.000000 0.000603 0.000014 0.000113 -0.000003 -0.000013
Table 30: Screening test: NACE 341- Car Production
D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD
341 l l l l l l l l l l l l
Nace 3-digits
BE DE ES FR IT PL RO SE
Table 31: Herndahl-Hirschman Index NACE 341
year BE DE ES FR IT PL RO SE
1999 0.17426 0.391262 0.139236 0.230748 0.147343 0.233299 0.675084 0.259204
2000 0.175693 0.350931 0.134902 0.224932 0.281398 0.217308 0.652253 0.268063
2001 0.173803 0.297457 0.134679 0.218711 0.415075 0.162834 0.653679 0.28914
2002 0.169942 0.290771 0.159219 0.179126 0.401734 0.166653 0.614771 0.266726
2003 0.164019 0.280866 0.123933 0.173941 0.318877 0.161635 0.399494 0.269482
2004 0.186479 0.281255 0.123032 0.186018 0.270017 0.167809 0.795637 0.25941
2005 0.195391 0.280899 0.112622 0.189054 0.311945 0.156529 0.658976 0.255866
2006 0.179039 0.263006 0.128131 0.187151 0.384131 0.1459 0.57738 0.287092
2007 0.185277 0.261196 0.161285 0.196772 0.415427 0.147246 0.728378 0.284861
NACE 341
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
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7.5 Pilot study: NACE 522 - Retail sale of food in specialized stores
7.5.1 Evolution in PCM distributions across eight countries
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Like in the previous industries considered, the distributions tend to become more dispersed
across countries, and, generally, the right tail becomes longer. Countries in which the PCM does
not decrease over time in the retail of food and beverage sector are Belgium, Germany, Italy,
Poland and Sweden.
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7.5.2 PCM decomposition
In the following Table we report the PCM decompositions for the considered countries
Table 32: PCM Decompositions: NACE 522 - Food Distribution (A)
Belgium
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 0.013685 0.001490 0.002504 0.000546 0.000000 0.018225 0.000712 0.001960 -0.000049 -0.000118
2001 -0.003687 0.001951 0.002545 0.001227 0.000000 0.002036 0.002964 0.000577 -0.000518 -0.000479
2002 -0.000430 0.009576 -0.003076 0.000203 -0.003345 0.002929 0.000079 0.001238 -0.003134 -0.001258
2003 0.003794 -0.024010 -0.002315 0.001914 -0.002415 -0.023031 0.001700 0.000000 -0.001371 -0.002644
2004 -0.005259 -0.031272 0.000688 0.006944 0.000000 -0.028899 0.001308 0.000022 -0.000007 -0.000635
2005 0.002730 -0.011728 -0.003800 0.004467 -0.000888 -0.009219 0.000473 0.000633 -0.003908 -0.000998
2006 -0.009694 0.001326 0.010212 0.001704 -0.024887 -0.021339 0.008163 0.002535 -0.000396 -0.000089
2007 0.004830 0.000477 0.001449 0.000346 0.000000 0.007101 0.001372 0.000594 -0.000411 -0.000107
Germany
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 0.015106 -0.003695 -0.002995 0.016816 0.000000 0.025232 0.000455 0.000000 . -0.003450
2001 0.052756 -0.092998 -0.047391 0.047608 0.000000 -0.040025 0.002635 0.000000 . -0.050025
2002 0.002068 -0.045067 -0.001666 0.195668 -0.000425 0.150578 0.001503 0.000000 . -0.003170
2003 -0.008017 -0.061589 0.003251 0.061450 -0.006167 -0.011071 0.003640 0.000187 . -0.000576
2004 0.004569 -0.066910 -0.001684 0.020269 -0.001964 -0.045720 0.001225 0.000056 -0.000034 -0.002931
2005 -0.006103 -0.026632 0.000959 0.042607 -0.008933 0.001898 0.001970 0.000147 -0.000060 -0.001099
2006 0.001823 -0.003304 0.000349 0.028349 -0.021732 0.005485 0.000289 0.000437 -0.000111 -0.000265
2007 -0.000967 0.041258 0.004687 0.006739 0.000000 0.051717 0.002561 0.003201 -0.001076 0.000000
Spain
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.000368 -0.005581 0.001154 0.008766 0.000000 0.003971 0.002772 0.001182 -0.000916 -0.002002
2001 0.002051 -0.012728 -0.000155 0.015438 -0.000029 0.004577 0.001842 0.001341 -0.001576 -0.001763
2002 0.001196 -0.005901 0.000352 0.006005 -0.000165 0.001487 0.001114 0.001922 -0.001506 -0.002680
2003 0.005842 -0.002394 0.001298 0.005102 -0.000073 0.009775 0.002119 0.002466 -0.001019 -0.002268
2004 -0.012881 -0.009782 0.004878 0.009239 -0.000123 -0.008668 0.005972 0.001690 -0.001021 -0.001763
2005 -0.002149 0.011624 -0.003175 0.002842 0.007009 0.016151 0.001460 0.001913 -0.005383 -0.001164
2006 0.001572 -0.001535 0.001849 0.003105 -0.008252 -0.003260 0.001998 0.002347 -0.001094 -0.001401
2007 0.000785 0.015005 0.001835 0.001451 0.000000 0.019075 0.001380 0.003039 -0.001858 -0.000726
France
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.000149 -0.030326 0.000048 0.029510 0.000000 -0.000918 0.002091 0.000436 -0.000373 -0.002107
2001 0.005859 -0.009433 -0.000644 0.009305 -0.000104 0.004984 0.000952 0.000855 -0.000726 -0.001725
2002 0.005579 -0.006195 0.000778 0.007649 -0.000025 0.007787 0.001106 0.001731 -0.000483 -0.001577
2003 -0.002748 -0.014698 0.001003 0.012888 -0.000040 -0.003595 0.001678 0.000906 -0.000507 -0.001074
2004 -0.001532 -0.006954 0.000618 0.009925 -0.000019 0.002037 0.001299 0.000764 -0.000511 -0.000934
2005 -0.001329 -0.009647 0.000379 0.009019 -0.000407 -0.001984 0.001241 0.000904 -0.000626 -0.001139
2006 -0.001625 -0.000879 0.000868 0.010628 -0.010269 -0.001277 0.001771 0.001001 -0.000823 -0.001082
2007 0.001540 0.000354 0.001196 0.010514 0.000000 0.013604 0.001119 0.001924 -0.000806 -0.001041
When looking at the decompositions we nd that only the Belgian gures of PCM are steadily
decreasing after 2002. In other countries the trend is unclear, although there seems to be a
certain persistence for positive values in Germany, Poland, Romania and Sweden. In Romania
in particular the Column II component of the interaction terms seem to play a signicant role,
while in Poland and Sweden, instead, even in the presence of positive aggregate PCM, the overall
interaction term is negative.
7.5.3 Screening test and market structure
The screening test conrms that Poland and Romania are actually displaying industrial dynamics
which should be checked in light of their potentially anti-competitive evolution over time, while
two out of three indicators are relevant also for Sweden.
Once again the HHI behaves di¤erently across countries: it displays decreasing gures for
Germany, France, Poland and Sweden, it is very volatile in Belgium, it remains almost constant
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Table 33: PCM Decompositions: NACE 522 - Food Distribution (B)
Italy
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
1999 0.028349 0.003865 -0.031038 0.006786 -0.001722 0.006241 0.002031 0.003001 -0.002014 -0.034056
2000 0.005085 -0.015545 -0.000689 0.000968 -0.001185 -0.011366 0.005802 0.003931 -0.000357 -0.010065
2001 -0.014319 -0.001162 0.020250 0.002521 -0.000277 0.007013 0.021546 0.004479 -0.001596 -0.004179
2002 -0.000481 -0.016721 0.001862 0.006852 -0.000108 -0.008596 0.003705 0.004317 -0.002805 -0.003356
2003 -0.013959 -0.000743 0.018380 0.000485 -0.000510 0.003653 0.018987 0.002933 -0.001307 -0.002234
2004 0.010951 -0.009438 0.003285 0.010856 -0.008481 0.007172 0.003308 0.005093 -0.001579 -0.003538
2005 -0.009208 -0.002596 0.008225 0.000017 -0.000980 -0.004541 0.010903 0.002911 -0.001804 -0.003785
2006 -0.000005 0.000877 0.004927 0.003593 -0.029245 -0.019854 0.003735 0.006126 -0.002562 -0.002372
2007 0.003120 -0.008117 0.007825 0.002175 0.000000 0.005003 0.004092 0.008994 -0.002962 -0.002299
Poland
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 0.001313 -0.006314 -0.000486 0.075711 0.000000 0.070223 -0.000486 . 0.000000 .
2001 0.008237 -0.010887 -0.001187 0.007896 -0.000214 0.003845 0.000275 0.000119 -0.000961 -0.002147
2002 0.011449 -0.001728 -0.000906 0.005925 0.000000 0.014739 0.000125 0.000538 -0.000610 -0.000906
2003 0.005809 0.000656 -0.000462 0.002627 0.000000 0.008629 -0.000032 0.000612 0.000112 -0.000293
2004 0.011635 -0.012843 -0.002554 0.004741 0.000000 0.000980 -0.002574 0.000104 0.000006 -0.000130
2005 -0.005901 0.013857 -0.000354 0.004041 0.000000 0.011644 -0.008323 0.000374 0.000193 -0.008536
2006 0.007306 -0.019292 -0.002117 0.012006 -0.001902 -0.003999 0.000263 0.000006 -0.000163 -0.002223
2007 0.002416 0.001530 -0.000776 0.010857 0.000000 0.014027 0.000018 0.000755 0.000164 -0.000125
Romania
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.011652 0.003349 -0.002234 0.002856 0.000000 -0.007681 0.004923 0.002394 -0.003792 -0.005759
2001 -0.024811 -0.007526 0.006403 0.001443 -0.000106 -0.024598 0.007702 0.003625 -0.002444 -0.002480
2002 0.004603 -0.003346 0.002683 0.001024 -0.000137 0.004827 0.004300 0.004400 -0.002040 -0.003977
2003 -0.001295 -0.000198 0.004434 0.001647 -0.000176 0.004413 0.005218 0.005471 -0.002540 -0.003715
2004 0.000806 0.003482 0.000300 0.001659 -0.000219 0.006028 0.004418 0.004282 -0.003722 -0.004677
2005 -0.001066 -0.015932 0.006286 -0.000984 -0.000271 -0.011968 0.007142 0.005054 -0.002017 -0.003892
2006 0.014047 -0.016403 0.015913 0.002262 -0.001306 0.014513 0.005336 0.018545 -0.001922 -0.006046
2007 0.741222 -0.008683 0.004663 0.001920 0.000000 0.739122 0.000465 0.173006 -0.000621 -0.168186
Sweden
year Within Reallocation Interaction Entry Exit Aggregate I II III IV
2000 -0.001443 0.001702 -0.000203 0.001876 0.000000 0.001932 0.000280 0.000218 -0.000534 -0.000166
2001 0.000754 0.000247 0.000096 0.000969 0.000000 0.002066 0.000314 0.000374 -0.000177 -0.000415
2002 -0.000588 -0.000147 0.000207 0.001554 0.000000 0.001026 0.000417 0.000207 -0.000181 -0.000237
2003 -0.000810 -0.000294 0.000423 0.001659 -0.000026 0.000952 0.000471 0.000348 -0.000218 -0.000179
2004 0.000868 0.003343 -0.000235 0.001980 0.000005 0.005961 0.000200 0.000405 -0.000678 -0.000162
2005 0.000267 0.000620 -0.000662 0.001374 -0.000089 0.001510 0.000350 0.000364 -0.000677 -0.000699
2006 0.000441 -0.000191 -0.000582 0.002825 -0.000493 0.002000 0.000920 0.000234 -0.001286 -0.000451
2007 -0.001255 0.004415 -0.000593 0.002778 0.000000 0.005345 0.000585 0.000466 -0.001055 -0.000589
Table 34: Screening test: NACE 522 - Food distribution
D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD D>0 PE RPD
522 l l l l l l l l l l l l l l
PL RO SE
Nace 3-digits
BE DE ES FR IT
in Italy, while it increases sharply in Romania. Given the di¤erent trend of concentration across
countries it is di¢ cult to link such a measure of market structure to the evolution of protability
in the industry.
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Table 35: Herndahl-Hirschman Index NACE 522
year BE DE ES FR IT PL RO SE
1999 0.079655 0.553156 0.007838 0.004462 0.015305 0.568429 0.019515 0.767529
2000 0.078142 0.440729 0.007573 0.003706 0.036722 0.499299 0.022867 0.733113
2001 0.083495 0.286243 0.006717 0.003486 0.03623 0.385046 0.018436 0.717258
2002 0.089668 0.184766 0.006213 0.003076 0.032279 0.342596 0.009688 0.700941
2003 0.194753 0.114666 0.005993 0.002802 0.035482 0.322734 0.01238 0.66569
2004 0.150522 0.075339 0.008091 0.002416 0.01915 0.255976 0.018583 0.588343
2005 0.118142 0.055656 0.00584 0.00222 0.023271 0.274554 0.034348 0.548843
2006 0.138801 0.051926 0.006065 0.001926 0.011534 0.201389 0.034438 0.500937
2007 0.149341 0.119756 0.006906 0.001927 0.010605 0.247341 0.052887 0.4506
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
NACE 522
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8 Aggregating the results at the EU level
8.1 PCM mean and dispersion at the EU level
The previous analyses have mainly dealt with the countries of interest separately. Each country
has been considered per se, and then results for each country have been compared across coun-
tries. This approach is methodologically sound, as it allows to investigate country level dynamics
excluding external factors. Nonetheless, it implicitly assumes that the relevant market for a rm
is dened by its country borders. As EU countries share a common market, this assumption
may be too strong. Indeed, especially after the introduction of the Euro, for many European
rms the geographical scope of their relevant market is now the whole EU (or at least the Euro
area)39.
In this section, we thus try to explore what messages can be derived assuming that all our
rms can be treated as operating within a unied market, that is one in which only di¤erences
across industries, not countries, matter. We will then discuss to what extent this assumption
can be validated by our data.
The next graph therefore reports, for every one of our 30 NACE 3-digit industries, the mean,
standard deviation and coe¢ cient of variation (standard deviation over mean) of the PCM
calculated over the rm-specic observations pooled together across countries, for every year. In
order to avoid distortions induced by the di¤erent market sizes (and the relative numerosity of
rms by country) and, most importantly, by the di¤erent evolutions of our country samples over
time (with new data on active rms being available at di¤erent times across countries), we have
constructed a pooled balanced sample of rms which were active in 1999 and we have explored
their PCM evolution until 2007. By pooling together these rms, the implicit assumption is that
their PCMs derive from a unique Europeandistribution, and are endogenously determined as
a reaction to common shocks these rms face.
What is clear from Figure 21 is that, on average, the PCMs across EU industries have
displayed an increasing trend over time (at an average annual rate of 1.3 per cent, signicant
at the 1% level), but their dispersion, as measured by the coe¢ cient of variation, has indeed
being reducing (at an average annual rate of -2.4 per cent, signicant at the 5% level). The
latter signals that a process of quality upgrading induced by dynamic e¢ ciency considerations
is certainly in place across European industries, while at the same time the overall dispersion of
39On the other side, in any country there are a number of rms whose relevant market is local, not even national:
for these rms a country-level analysis seems more appropriate than cross-country analysis.
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Figure 21: Aggregate evolution across countries of industry PCMs, 1999-2007
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the PCMs of these industries is being reduced, in line with the theoretical priors of a functioning
product and factor market integration40.
If we now split the overall evolution of the PCM dispersion using the introduction of the euro
as a threshold, we would however see that most of the reduction in the dispersion has actually
taken place before 2002, while a non-signicant trend persists after that year.
In the following graph we split further the sample distinguishing in eurozone vs. other
countries.
Figure 22: Aggregate evolution across countries of industry PCMs, Euro vs. non-Euro countries,
1999-2007
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A number of ndings emerge from Figure 22: rst of all, while starting with similar average
levels of PCMs in the early 2000s, industries operating in eurozone countries have seen a much
smaller increase of their PCM over time (an average increase of 0.8% vs. 2.3% for industries
within non-euro area countries), thus ending up with an average PCM over the considered period
of 20.8%, that is ve points smaller than the PCM of industries operating within non-eurozone
countries (25.8%). In terms of dispersion, the coe¢ cient of variation of PCM across industries in
the euro area is also signicantly smaller (.97 vs. 1.72), and, most interestingly, it displays a clear
and signicant downward trend (-3.4%) which essentially drives the downward trend detected
40The result is robust to the exclusion of 2007, to the exclusion of one country, Romania, whose PCM dynamics
in 2007 were particularly asymmetric with respect to the EU average, and to the same tests run on the unbalanced
sample of rms (with the only di¤erence of a slightly less signicant trend in the reduction of the coe¢ cient of
variation).
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for our full sample (the trend in the PCM dispersion of industries belonging to non-euro area
countries is not signicant)41.
However, if we now split again the sample around the year 2002, we would see that the
dispersion of PCM has seen a strong and signicant reduction before 2002 essentially due to the
behaviour of industries related to euro-adopting countries, while no trend is clear for non-euro
countries. On the contrary, after 2002, the dispersion of PCM in industries belonging to the
euro area tends to increase, while industries in non-euro countries tend to experience a slight
decrease.
In other words, it seems that the competitive shock entailed by the adoption of the euro has
had the e¤ect of greatly reducing the dispersion of PCM for those countries which were about
to enter the single currency, while it has had no e¤ect on non-euro countries. Once the euro
has been introduced, however, industries in the euro area have started to diverge in terms of
PCM, possibly due to phenomena of dynamic e¢ ciency stimulated by the higher competitive
pressures operating in the single market, combined with the greater weight now attached to
realdivergences in costs (factor markets), as convergence in nominal exchange rates is likely
to have played a role in the reduction of PCM dispersion in the period 1999-2002. At the same
time, however, the dispersion of PCM of non-euro countries is being slightly reduced.
8.2 The aggregation problem of PCM levels
The results derived insofar assume implicitly that PCM levels are directly comparable across
countries, in the sense that they derive from similar country-specic distributions of prices and
costs. While the former might be true to a certain extent, as a number of studies report that
consumersprice dispersion in Europe has experienced a downward trend since 1996, it could be
the case that within the single market systematic di¤erences in costsdistribution exist across
countries, e.g. due to di¤erent employment subsidies, payroll taxes, social security payments,
infrastructures, and other country-specic conditions (e.g. the extent to which home rms
in a given country take part in global supply chains providing them cheaper access to inputs
worldwide).
Since we are not able to distinguish rms by their relevant market, we can just provide some
hints on how the choice of the geographical dimension might a¤ect our results. To that extent,
we consider two sectors: beverages (NACE 159) and motor vehicles (NACE 341) in two di¤erent
countries: Italy and France. We choose these two countries as the analysis reported in Section 3
41Once again, these results are robust to the exclusion of a number of potential outliers.
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has shown that they di¤er in their level PCMs. In particular, recalling in Figure 23 the evolution
of the average PCM over time in the two countries, we can observe how the average price cost
margins are substantially di¤erent between France and Italy, with France showing higher PCMs.
Figure 23: Unweighted PCM over time, beverages
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Figure 24 reports the same plot using weighted average PCMs, where the weights are rms
share in total sales. The gap between the two markets seems even wider.
We repeat the same exercise for Motor vehicles, as shown in Figure 25. Still, we observe
large di¤erences as regards the average PCM in France and Italy. The picture is slightly di¤erent
when considering weighted PCM, as in Figure 26. Indeed, when assigning a greater weight to
the PCMs of large companies we observe a rise of average PCMs in Italy and a decrease in
France, possibly induced by the di¤erences in competition reported in the car industry for the
two countries, and previously discussed.
Overall, we can thus observe that these two countries show substantially di¤erent levels of
PCM in the two industries considered. Now, the question is: assuming that these two countries
make up the Euro area, can we simply pool the two series together in order to retrieve a synthetic,
Euro-based indicator of PCM?
If we assume that the two countries belong to the same common market, we should indeed
compute the average PCM weighting each rm by the relative share of the combined sales in the
two markets. This would yield the red middle line in Figures 27 and 28. Obviously, the average
PCM is a mean of the two PCMs previously found, with the average closer to the series of the
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Figure 24: Weighted PCM over time, beverages
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country whose market is larger.
However, since our average PCMs are retrieved from rm-level observations, we can precisely
evaluate the extent of the bias we might be introducing when considering averages across coun-
tries by plotting the entire distributions of PCMs in the two countries42. By doing so, we indeed
nd that these are poorly overlapping In particular, Figure 29 shows the kernel densities for
PCMs in beverages industry for France and Italy. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of
distribution functions rejects at 1% signicance level the equality between the two distributions,
both on the whole time period as in the two intervals (1999-2000 and 2006-2007) plotted. Table
36 shows the results.
In Figure 30 we repeat the exercise for PCMs in motor vehicles manufacture. Again, the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions rejects at 1% signicance level
the equality between the two distributions, both on the whole time period as in the two intervals
plotted. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis of equality of the distribution in all the two-sided
tests.
This suggest that, in levels, the distributions of PCM in France and Italy are di¤erent, and
can not simply be pooled together.
In order to get an idea of the bias we might be introducing, in Figures 31 and 32 we have
42Note that in this case we are not constraining the PCM to the (0,1) interval, as we are interested in the entire
density of the distribution. However, the cumulated density residing in the left tail of the distribution is fairly
small.
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Figure 25: Unweighted PCM over time, motor vehicles
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Table 36: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution of PCM
Beverages
D p-value corrected
France 0.0018 0.975
Italy -0.5169 0.000
Combined K-S:       0.5169 0.000 0.000
Motor vehicles
D p-value corrected
France 0.0098 0.910
Italy -0.5492    0.000
Combined K-S:       0.5492 0.000 0.000
reported the distributions of rm-level PCMs for France, Italy, and the articialPCM obtained
by pooling together the two country-specic ones. Again, we observe that the pooled distribution
is clearly di¤erent from the single countriesdistributions not only in terms of mean but also of
variance, thus relaying very di¤erent, and potentially biased, messages in terms of the type of
reallocation ongoing in the market.
To solve this important aggregation problem, nonetheless, we can exploit the nding, re-
ported in the previous graphs, of a quite symmetric pattern of adjustment of the distribution
over time for both Italy and France, and in general across the Euro area. And in fact, if we plot
the PCMs in rst di¤erences for the whole time interval, we observe that the two distributions
almost overlap. Results are shown in Figure 33 for beverages and Figure 34 for motor vehicles.
106
Figure 26: Weighted PCM over time, motor vehicles
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
P
C
M
 w
ei
gh
te
d 
m
ea
n
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
year
France Italy
Motor vehicles: PCM over time
This results suggests that, although countries di¤er in levels of price cost margins, when
considering the dynamics, e.g. the rst di¤erences (PCMt PCMt 1), the results are strikingly
similar.
Overall, we can thus conclude that pooling together PCMs from di¤erent countries does
not seem to be fully appropriate, since each countrys PCM distribution is determined by a
data generating process which is clearly country-specic. Nonetheless, country dynamics are
driven by common factors, as a consequence of EU driven market integration, and therefore
the distributions of rst di¤erences of price cost margins tend to share the same distribution,
and can thus be aggregated easily, and more importantly, without biases in order to provide
synthetic indicators valid for the aggregate common market.
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Figure 27: Comparison of di¤erent weights, beverages
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Figure 28: Comparison of di¤erent weights, motor vehicles
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Figure 29: PCM distribution, beverages
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Figure 30: PCM distribution, motor vehicles
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Figure 31: PCM distribution, beverages
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Figure 32: PCM distribution, motor vehicles
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Figure 33: PCM rst di¤erences distribution, beverages
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Figure 34: PCM rst di¤erences distribution, motor vehicles
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8.3 Evolution of aggregate PCM di¤erences
The aggregation of di¤erent countries has been proven to be a risky task. As shown in the previ-
ous section, it is not entirely appropriate to aggregate PCM levels across countries. Nonetheless,
a comparison in the annual changes in price-cost margins can be implemented. Table 37 shows
average PCMs for each NACE 3-digits industry over the eight countries included in the report.
Table 37: average change in PCM
Nace 3-
digits dPCM
151 0.0072
152 0.0043
153 0.0077
154 0.0059
155 0.0139
156 0.0131
157 0.0029
158 0.0091
159 0.0082
241 0.0021
242 0.0020
243 0.0040
244 0.0057
245 0.0026
246 0.0011
247 -0.0024
341 0.0045
342 0.0012
343 0.0005
521 0.0505
522 0.0150
523 0.0352
524 0.0117
525 0.0096
526 0.0253
527 0.0053
642 0.0238
701 0.0217
702 0.0102
703 -0.0034
Total 0.0206
Consistently with the overall trend detected in the previous paragraphs, we always observe an
average positive change in PCMs, apart from industries 247 (manufacture of man-made bres)
and 703 (real estate activities on a fee or contract basis). Notice however that these results are
obtained pooling together countries which are profoundly di¤erent in terms of GDP per capita
and market structure43.
43Note that the reported average change here is the simple average of industry-specic changes in PCM, while
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The full set of annual changes by country and NACE 3-digit industry over the period 1999-
2007 is reported in Table 38.
Table 38: average change in PCM across countries
Nace 3-
digits Belgium France Germany Italy Poland Romania Spain Sweden
151 0.0057 0.0005 0.0013 0.0055 -0.0001 0.0608 -0.0005 -0.0029
152 0.0002 0.0054 0.0102 0.0041 0.0028 0.0476 0.0023 -0.0071
153 0.0046 -0.0002 0.0033 0.0085 -0.0049 0.0636 0.0002 -0.0045
154 0.0074 -0.0073 0.0017 0.0029 0.0090 0.0326 0.0003 -0.0085
155 0.0004 0.0041 0.0018 0.0130 0.0039 0.0455 0.0018 0.0052
156 0.0031 -0.0021 0.0036 -0.0012 -0.0017 0.0329 -0.0034 -0.0048
157 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0025 0.0014 0.0011 0.0343 0.0016 0.0074
158 0.0020 -0.0020 -0.0017 0.0046 -0.0011 0.0485 0.0013 -0.0007
159 0.0023 0.0032 -0.0019 0.0058 -0.0015 0.0417 0.0013 -0.0218
241 -0.0048 -0.0009 0.0061 0.0013 0.0022 0.0296 -0.0016 -0.0027
242 0.0122 0.0003 0.0192 0.0013 -0.0148 0.0690 -0.0129 -0.0059
243 -0.0070 -0.0011 -0.0009 0.0027 0.0006 0.0327 0.0005 0.0006
244 0.0048 0.0029 -0.0014 0.0050 0.0038 0.0421 0.0002 -0.0044
245 0.0015 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0046 -0.0027 0.0294 -0.0016 -0.0055
246 -0.0042 -0.0004 0.0027 0.0021 0.0072 0.0103 -0.0014 0.0025
247 -0.0024 0.0045 -0.0173 -0.0081 -0.0045 0.0452 -0.0048 0.0030
341 0.0004 -0.0001 0.0048 0.0079 0.0063 0.0321 0.0020 0.0003
342 0.0063 -0.0006 0.0039 0.0043 0.0009 0.0051 0.0024 -0.0039
343 0.0075 -0.0010 0.0033 0.0004 0.0023 0.0168 -0.0046 -0.0024
521 0.0012 0.0007 0.0007 0.0182 0.0000 0.0893 0.0013 -0.0008
522 -0.0052 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0087 0.0044 0.0892 0.0011 -0.0029
523 -0.0033 -0.0024 0.0040 0.0198 0.0040 0.1086 0.0002 -0.0070
524 -0.0007 -0.0032 0.0041 0.0247 0.0031 0.0936 -0.0001 -0.0021
525 -0.0035 -0.0021 0.0056 0.0232 0.0476 0.0634 0.0004 0.0008
526 0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0004 0.0132 0.0101 0.0736 0.0024 -0.0022
527 -0.0062 -0.0034 -0.0083 0.0108 0.0054 0.0292 -0.0012 -0.0024
642 0.0320 0.0052 0.0127 0.0086 0.0192 0.0490 0.0084 -0.0020
701 0.0093 0.0004 0.0067 0.0455 -0.0042 0.0325 0.0025 -0.0191
702 -0.0065 0.0050 0.0057 0.0214 0.0134 0.0307 -0.0009 -0.0030
703 0.0004 -0.0038 0.0059 -0.0090 0.0060 0.0121 -0.0168 -0.0056
Total 0.0013 -0.0017 0.0037 0.0222 0.0037 0.0809 0.0004 -0.0023
Given the diverging trends we have detected for euro vs. non-euro area countries, and the
changes in the evolution of PCM over time, it is more informative to partition our results in
sub-groups.
First of all, we compare average changes in PCM in manufacturing industries versus services
industries. Table 39 reports the results. We observe that PCM dynamics are not always sta-
tistically di¤erent between manufacturing and services. Indeed, two countries display a similar
increase in PCM (Belgium and Spain), four countries present an average increase which is higher
in Section 8.1 we had derived the trend as a regression over the entire pooled (balanced) sample of rms.
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in services (Germany, Italy, Poland and Romania), while two countries only present an average
decrease in PCM: France (where the decrease is more pronounced in services) and Sweden.
Table 39: average change in PCM across countries: manufacturing vs services
Belgium France Germany Italy Poland Romania Spain Sweden
Manufacturing 0.0013 -0.0006 0.0011 0.0049 0.0007 0.0444 0.0003 -0.0022
Services 0.0012 -0.0019 0.0047 0.0272 0.0054 0.0854 0.0004 -0.0023
Test on the
equality of
means
*** ** *** *** ***
Total 0.0013 -0.0017 0.0037 0.0222 0.0037 0.0809 0.0004 -0.0023
As regards the average change in PCM over time, we may compare again averages before
and after the Euro. Table 40 reports the results obtained on the full sample, and on a balanced
sample, which excludes those rms who entered or exited from our sample during the time
period considered. As already discussed, this robustness check allows us to investigate whether
our results are a¤ected by asymmetric changes in the composition of the sample across countries.
Similar to what has been observed for the evolution of the PCM dispersion, we notice that
changes in PCMs were negative before the introduction of the euro, and then became positive
after 2002. Moreover, the di¤erence tends to be statistically signicant when considering services,
while it is generally poorly signicant in manufacturing industries. Notice that our results are
conrmed in the balanced panel.
As before, we split the sample distinguishing the countries belonging to the euro area (Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) from the non-euro ones (Poland, Romania, Sweden).
Table 41 shows the results. First, we observe that in a number of industries in the euro area the
average PCM change has been negative, while this result does not hold in the non-euro countries.
Moreover, the average change in PCM, even when positive, is always lower in euro countries
compared to non-euro ones, and this di¤erence is almost always statistically signicant44. This
evidence is in line with the results obtained when discussing PCM levels, in which the upward
trend was much atter for euro-area countries. Therefore, splitting countries according to the
adoption of the euro allows us to highlight di¤erent dynamics among the two groups.
Finally, we consider the evolution of PCM changes in the ve countries that belong to the
EMU distinguishing, again, in before and after the introduction of the euro. Results are reported
44The only exception is industry 342 (manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of
trailers and semi-trailer), however the di¤erence between the two averages is not signicant.
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in Table 42. Once again, similarly to what we have noticed when discussing PCM dispersion, we
observe that the competitive shock entailed by the adoption of the euro has limited the increase
in PCM for those countries which were about to enter the single currency, with many industries
experiencing a reduction in PCMs. Once the euro has been introduced, however, industries in
the euro area have started to experience slightly upward changes in PCM, again possibly due
to phenomena of dynamic e¢ ciency stimulated by the higher competitive pressures operating in
the single market.
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Table 40: average change in PCM before and after the euro
All Countries All Countries - balanced sample
Nace 3-
digits 1999-2001 2002-2007
Test on the
equality of
means
Nace 3-
digits 1999-2001 2002-2007
Test on the
equality of
means
151 -0.0060 0.0106 *** 151 -0.0038 0.0094 ***
152 -0.0006 0.0056 152 0.0005 0.0051
153 0.0081 0.0076 153 0.0128 0.0061
154 0.0054 0.0060 154 0.0177 0.0045
155 -0.0090 0.0199 *** 155 -0.0140 0.0186 ***
156 -0.0187 0.0223 156 -0.0294 0.0226 ***
157 -0.0002 0.0037 157 0.0020 0.0031
158 -0.0066 0.0125 *** 158 -0.0102 0.0116 ***
159 -0.0036 0.0109 *** 159 -0.0051 0.0090 ***
241 0.0010 0.0024 241 0.0002 0.0002
242 -0.0047 0.0039 242 -0.0083 0.0044
243 -0.0069 0.0070 *** 243 -0.0067 0.0050 ***
244 0.0048 0.0060 244 0.0030 0.0035
245 0.0011 0.0030 245 -0.0022 0.0016
246 -0.0047 0.0026 *** 246 -0.0065 -0.0001 **
247 -0.0072 -0.0011 247 -0.0118 -0.0027
341 0.0008 0.0055 341 0.0056 0.0018
342 0.0005 0.0014 342 0.0023 -0.0003
343 -0.0023 0.0012 343 -0.0050 -0.0010
521 -0.0104 0.0647 *** 521 -0.0131 0.0660 ***
522 -0.0027 0.0186 *** 522 -0.0035 0.0183 ***
523 -0.0052 0.0433 *** 523 -0.0096 0.0435 ***
524 -0.0013 0.0144 *** 524 -0.0021 0.0119 ***
525 -0.0040 0.0127 *** 525 -0.0039 0.0115 ***
526 -0.0082 0.0323 *** 526 -0.0103 0.0316 ***
527 -0.0075 0.0079 *** 527 -0.0102 0.0082 ***
642 0.0056 0.0260 *** 642 0.0024 0.0177 **
701 0.0104 0.0231 *** 701 0.0082 0.0121
702 0.0065 0.0110 *** 702 0.0054 0.0081
703 -0.0069 -0.0030 703 -0.0113 -0.0042
Total -0.0035 0.0256 *** Total -0.0053 0.0240 ***
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%
level, *** significant at 1% level
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%
level, *** significant at 1% level
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Table 41: average change in PCM: euro vs non-euro countries
Nace 3-digits Euro Non Euro Test on theequality of means
151 0.0012 0.0391 ***
152 0.0034 0.0091
153 0.0036 0.0297 ***
154 0.0009 0.0285 ***
155 0.0081 0.0369 ***
156 -0.0019 0.0299 ***
157 0.0008 0.0176 ***
158 -0.0001 0.0393 ***
159 0.0030 0.0350 ***
241 -0.0002 0.0172 ***
242 -0.0029 0.0405 **
243 0.0008 0.0216 ***
244 0.0027 0.0252 ***
245 0.0008 0.0148 ***
246 0.0002 0.0077
247 -0.0055 0.0262
341 0.0041 0.0065
342 0.0015 -0.0019
343 -0.0012 0.0067 **
521 0.0035 0.0865 ***
522 0.0007 0.0688 ***
523 0.0016 0.1015 ***
524 0.0026 0.0498 ***
525 -0.0012 0.0502 ***
526 0.0019 0.0654 ***
527 -0.0020 0.0218 ***
642 0.0085 0.0441 ***
701 0.0217 0.0179
702 0.0094 0.0126 *
703 -0.0091 0.0082 ***
Total 0.0042 0.0636 ***
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, ***
significant at 1% level,
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Table 42: average change in PCM before and after the euro: EMU countries
Only EMU Countries Only EMU Countries - balanced sample
Nace 3-
digits 1999-2001 2002-2007
Test on the
equality of
means
Nace 3-
digits 1999-2001 2002-2007
Test on the
equality of
means
151 -0.0036 0.0025 *** 151 -0.0013 0.0009
152 0.0021 0.0038 152 0.0003 0.0029
153 0.0092 0.0021 ** 153 0.0145 0.0008 ***
154 0.0153 -0.0023 *** 154 0.0259 -0.0048 ***
155 -0.0040 0.0113 *** 155 -0.0122 0.0095 ***
156 -0.0043 -0.0012 156 -0.0075 -0.0026
157 -0.0003 0.0012 157 0.0017 0.0005
158 0.0006 -0.0003 158 -0.0019 -0.0021
159 0.0005 0.0036 159 0.0021 0.0017
241 0.0006 -0.0004 241 -0.0004 -0.0030
242 -0.0054 -0.0021 242 -0.0038 -0.0016
243 -0.0049 0.0024 *** 243 -0.0048 0.0005 *
244 0.0053 0.0019 244 0.0043 -0.0018 *
245 0.0036 0.0001 245 -0.0013 -0.0019
246 -0.0038 0.0012 ** 246 -0.0056 -0.0013
247 -0.0033 -0.0062 247 -0.0085 -0.0061
341 0.0015 0.0048 341 0.0095 0.0010
342 0.0013 0.0016 342 0.0024 -0.0003
343 -0.0026 -0.0008 343 -0.0065 -0.0026
521 0.0023 0.0038 *** 521 0.0017 0.0002 **
522 0.0013 0.0006 522 0.0017 -0.0007 ***
523 0.0005 0.0018 523 -0.0035 -0.0009 **
524 0.0010 0.0029 *** 524 -0.0005 -0.0005
525 -0.0004 -0.0014 525 -0.0018 -0.0020
526 -0.0010 0.0025 ** 526 -0.0027 -0.0008
527 -0.0007 -0.0023 527 -0.0030 -0.0022
642 0.0049 0.0089 642 -0.0055 0.0029
701 0.0105 0.0232 *** 701 0.0080 0.0121
702 0.0080 0.0097 702 0.0065 0.0062
703 -0.0015 -0.0101 ** 703 -0.0047 -0.0115
Total 0.0019 0.0046 *** Total 0.0004 0.0007
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%
level, *** significant at 1% level
* significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%
level, *** significant at 1% level
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9 Extending the Pilot study: issues and possible solutions
9.1 Extending the number of countries
Table 43 reports the situation in terms of total number of rms in the AMADEUS database for
the remaining European countries not included in the study.
Table 43: Number of rms in the AMADEUS database for the other EU countries, 2007
Country N. of firms
Austria 176,099
Bulgaria 200,677
Cyprus 676
Czech Rep. 100,829
Denmark 199,399
Ireland 156,516
Estonia 73,856
Finland 82,950
Greece 29,335
Hungary 294,815
Latvia 7,982
Lithuania 10,550
Luxembourg 6,101
Malta 2,907
Netherlands 387,825
Portugal 305,160
Slovakia 11,516
Slovenia 37,980
United Kingdom 2,434,201
Based on the experience in the validation of data for the considered countries, the extension of
the analysis to countries such as Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands and Portugal
should be relatively straightforward. The inclusion of Hungary should be possible as far as the
PCM is concerned, but with the exclusion of those indicators requiring direct information on
employment data (e.g. frontier-based RPD, based on production function), as these data are
only sparsely available in balance sheet information of Hungarian rms. As shown, the inclusion
of Poland is technically possible, but one has to take into account the selection bias induced
on the PCM by the restriction of the analysis only to relatively large rms (>30 employees),
discussed in Section 4. As for the United Kingdom, the vast majority of rms do not report
employment and do not report sales, but only value added, thus making comparisons on the use
of a PCM indicator hardly possible.
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The situation of the Czech Republic has to be assessed, as of with Estonia and Finland.
For the remaining countries (Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia,
Slovenia) the existing data do not seem su¢ cient to allow an in depth analysis, although the sit-
uation might change as long as the national statistical o¢ ce release their existing, and generally
much more detailed databases.
9.2 How to deal with rm censored data
The quality of the rm-level databases varies across countries in the AMADEUS database,
as not every sample is constructed from census data. In particular, for some countries the
distribution of rms in terms of size might be censored to a given number of employees, or the
representativeness of the smaller rms might be not adequate. To provide an assessment of the
extent to which such a feature of the data might create a limitation for possible extensions of
the analysis, we compare here two countries included in our sample, Poland and Romania.
As already discussed in Section 2, the nature of rm-level data available for Poland is skewed
to the left with respect to other distributions, in the sense that micro rms tend to be severely
under-represented in the Polish sample. On the other hand, instead, Romanian data come
from the census of industrial rms, and thus ensure a fairly adequate representation of rms
distribution. Moreover, the two countries are comparable as they share a similar experience of
transition. Table 41 compares in particular the distribution of rms by size classes.
Table 44: Distribution of rms by size classes, Romania vs. Poland
Poland, Manufacturing Poland, services
Size class Freq. Percent Cum. Size class Freq. Percent Cum.
1-10 860 5.99 5.99 1-10 4,300 21.69 21.69
11-20 1,087 7.57 13.55 11-20 3,091 15.59 37.29
21-50 2,579 17.95 31.5 21-50 4,284 21.61 58.9
50-250 6,969 48.51 80.02 50-250 6,667 33.64 92.54
>250 2,871 19.98 100 >250 1,479 7.46 100
Total 14,366 100 Total 19,821 100
Romania, Manufacturing Romania, services
Size class Freq. Percent Cum. Size class Freq. Percent Cum.
1-10 32,964 66.84 66.84 1-10 464,250 93.01 93.01
11-20 6,815 13.82 80.66 11-20 22,526 4.51 97.52
21-50 5,407 10.96 91.63 21-50 8,892 1.78 99.3
50-250 3,163 6.41 98.04 50-250 3,026 0.61 99.91
>250 966 1.96 100 >250 461 0.09 100
Total 49,315 100 Total 499,155 100
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As it can be seen, rms up to 20 employees constitute only 14 and 37 per cent of all rms
in Polish manufacturing and services industry, respectively, compared with 81 and 97 per cent
for Romania. For rms larger than 20 employees, instead, the coverage for both countries seem
comparable, with 12,419 rms larger than 20 employees recorded for Poland in manufacturing,
vs. 9,536 in Romania, and 12,430 rms in services, vs. 12,379 for Romania.
In order to assess how this censoring of Polish data might a¤ect our result, we have re-run
the decomposition on Romania (for the period 1998-2002) censoring it to the threshold of 20
employees. In Table 45 we report the di¤erences obtained between the new decomposition and
the original ones.45
As it can be seen, with very few exceptions, limited (not surprisingly) essentially to the
services sector, the overall di¤erence between the two decompositions as induced by censoring
is below 0.1 points for all our measures across sectors. This is because the decomposition, being
based on a weighted PCM measure, is by nature relatively less a¤ected by micro rms. It then
follows that, with some caveats, the methodology here presented can be applied also to the case
of databases characterised by an overrepresentation of medium to large rms without major
biases in the analysis.
45Original Tables may be retrieved from the Statistical Annex of the Report, which is available upon request.
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Table 45: Censored (>20 employees) vs. standard decomposition, Romania
ROMANIA - Difference in the decompositions
Nace 3-digits within reallocation interaction entry exit aggreagate
MSNUFACTURING
151 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
152 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
153 -0.005 0.000 0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.000
154 -0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000
155 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
156 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
157 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
158 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
159 -0.002 -0.013 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000
241 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
242 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.018 0.000 -0.018
243 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.005 0.000 -0.005
244 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.000 -0.006
245 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.004
246 -0.002 -0.011 0.010 -0.004 0.000 -0.005
247 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
341 0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.001
342 -0.003 -0.012 0.013 -0.003 0.000 -0.004
343 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.003
SERVICES
521 -0.001 -0.010 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000
522 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
523 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
524 -0.004 -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
525 -0.008 -0.001 0.009 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
526 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
527 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
642 0.000 0.003 0.000 -0.006 0.000 -0.007
643 -0.004 -0.002 0.005 -0.007 0.000 -0.008
644 -0.006 -0.007 0.009 -0.013 -0.001 -0.015
701 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
702 -0.001 -0.006 0.009 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
703 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.003
1999-2002
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9.3 Changing aggregation level: NACE 3-digit vs. NACE 4-digit industries
The entire Report has been drafted starting from rm-level observations, but then constructing
synthetic indicators at the industry level measured at the NACE 3-digit level of aggregation. The
latter is a ner disaggregation with respect to the current existing level of analysis (traditionally
undertaken at the NACE 2-digits level), while at the same time it still ensures comparability
of the retrieved indicators across countries in synthetic tables as the one presented throughout
this Report.
On the other hand, a ner disaggregation level (e.g. NACE 4-digit) would allow the analysis
to become closer to the denition of relevant market traditionally employed in competition
studies, but would su¤er from a lack of numerosity of rm-level observations once industry,
country and year-specic indicators are constructed. A researcher would therefore face a clear
trade-o¤ in terms of economic relevance of the retrieved indicator vs. its correct measurement.
Moreover, to the extent that multi-product rms operating in a given industry encompass di¤er-
ent relevant markets (e.g. a car producer, producing cars in di¤erent segments of the market),
the benets of a ner disaggregation level would be non-existing (as balance sheet data do not
allow to distinguish the pricing behaviour for a given product), while the limitations of the
NACE 4-digit analysis would remain the same.
As we believe it is more important to have an unbiased understanding of a rough evolution
of competition (measured at the NACE 3-digit level), rather than a biased understanding of a
relatively more precise industrial dynamics (measured at the NACE 4-digit level), in this Report
we have chosen to work at the NACE 3-digit level of aggregation.
Nevertheless, to provide an idea of the extent to which a di¤erent level of aggregation might
convey a di¤erent message in terms of our selected indicators, in what follows we have calculated,
for a NACE 3-digit industry in which enough observations are available for each NACE 4-digit
sub-industry, the same PCM indicator. The industry in question is NACE 159 (beverages),
which itself is disentangled in 8 sub-industries (15.91 Manufacture of distilled potable alcoholic
beverages; 15.92 Production of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials; 15.93 Manufacture of
wines; 15.94 Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines; 15.95 Manufacture of other non-distilled
fermented beverages; 15.96 Manufacture of beer; 15.97 Manufacture of malt; 15.98 Production
of mineral waters and soft drinks).
In Figure 35 we compare the PCM distribution for three sub industries in France vs. Italy,
taking 2006 as the reference year.
As it can be seen, there is an important degree of heterogeneity of PCMs not only across
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Figure 35: PCM distribution of selected NACE 4-digit industries, 2006
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countries, as we have already discussed, but also across NACE 4-digit industries within the same
country, especially in France, while for Italy the three sub-industries display more or less similar
dynamics. Once again, therefore, average PCM indexes retrieved at the NACE 3-digit level can
provide useful indications on the overall general direction of the competitive behaviour of rms
in the single market, but can hardly be used to derive information on the underlying competition
dynamics, as the evolution of the underlying relevant marketsis very heterogeneous.
As a matter of general comparison, Table 43 reports for all the considered countries the
average changes in PCM in the considered period, for each NACE 4-digit industry.
Table 46: Censored (>20 employees) vs. standard decomposition, Romania
Nace 4-digits ALL BE ES DE FR IT PL RO SE
1591 0.01010 0.00579 -0.00334 0.00196 -0.00288 0.00070 -0.00095 0.06433 -0.01540
1593 0.00567 -0.00370 0.00285 -0.00084 0.00519 0.00831 0.00067 0.03423 -0.18994
1594 -0.00238 -0.00054 0.03034 -0.00185 -0.00108 0.08034 -0.05681
1595 0.01155 0.01309 -0.03541 -0.02280 0.01229 0.02815 0.04555 -0.00685
1596 0.00510 -0.00121 0.00768 0.00053 0.01557 0.00633 -0.02719 0.01163 -0.01749
1597 -0.01619 -0.00087 -0.05210 -0.02226 0.01442 -0.06966 -0.00691 -0.03849 0.01292
1598 0.01612 0.01018 -0.00295 -0.00874 0.00404 0.00318 0.00648 0.05109 -0.00934
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9.4 Stimulus indicators: PCM and trade penetration
9.4.1 Introduction
The same data insofar retrieved and discussed can be conveniently exploited in order to introduce
in the analysis some stimulus indicators able to better identify the sources and the directions of
the adjustments made by the single rm in terms of competition dynamics. In particular, it is
possible to assess through an econometric estimation how much of the variations of competition
as measured by the rm-level RPD index, as well as the PCM are accounted for by internal (to
the rm) features, such as rm size, and how much by external factors, such as the external
competitive pressures accruing from a process of international economic integration.
In particular, while an increased trade exposure should lower the prices of domestic rms (the
pro-competitive e¤ect of trade), rms might react to these increased competitive pressures by
endogenously compressing their product mix towards products characterized by a lower elasticity
of demand. At the same time, multi-product exporting rms might also restrict their availability
of traded products, with the result that an increased trade pressure has a non-obvious impact on
rmsmark-ups. Along the same lines, an increase in price-cost margins might not necessarily
signal a problem in competition in the short run, as long as the e¤ect is driven by an adjustment
of costs to the now available cheaper inputs.
In order to gather some evidence on all these possible e¤ects, in this section we test the
e¤ects of di¤erent measures of import penetration (horizontal and vertical, for both services
and manufacturing) on our rm-specic competition indicators, that is to say the PCM and the
RPD. Once again, as it is convenient for a Pilot study, we take a comparative perspective, by
testing these e¤ects for rms operating in Italy and Germany. Since we use both horizontal and
vertical trade penetration measures, we also broaden the analysis to all the industries comprised
in manufacturing and services, so as to gather a more comprehensive evidence of the e¤ects of
trade on price-cost margins.
9.4.2 Trade penetration measures
Information on trade ows has been provided by the COMEXT database of Eurostat as regards
manufacturing, and the UN Service Trade Database for service industries. Values of imports and
exports of the manufacturing sector were collected at a detailed product level according to the CN
8-digit classication used for custom purposes, for the period 1999-2007, considering the trade
ows of Italy and Germany with the rest of the World. The data were then reclassied at the 2-
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digit NACE rev. 1.1 level, using the relative correspondence tables provided by EUROSTAT. UN
Service Trade Database provides data on trade in services classied according to the Extended
Balance of Payments Services Classication (EBOPS): we build a concordance between this
classication and 2-digit NACE. Overall, we are able to obtain trade statistics for 18 service
industries expressed in 2-digit NACE classication.
Data on production in manufacturing were collected using EUROSTAT with its PRODCOM
database at a 8-digit product classication, whose codes were once again converted at NACE
industry detailed levels as done for trade ows. As regards services, data in production are
retrieved from EUROSTAT National Account statistics.
Import penetration indexes have then been constructed for both manufacturing and services
industries taking into account both a measure of horizontal import penetration and one of
vertical import penetration, H_impzjt and V_impzjt respectively, from country z in industry
j at time t. The horizontal penetration index (i.e. import penetration ratios considering the
industry of a¢ liation) is calculated as:
H_impzjt =
IMPzjt
IMPzjt + PRODzjt
(10)
where IMPzjt are the total imports of Germany or Italy (z) in industry j in year t, while
PRODzjt is the national output of industry j in year t retrieved from the PRODCOM database.
The index is therefore bounded between 0 and 146.
The measure of the vertical import penetration, V_impzjt, is somewhat more complicated,
since it reects the linkages present in the upstream industries. Following Smarzynska Javorcik
(2004), who has used a similar indicator in order to measure "vertical" FDI presence, the index
is computed as the weighted average of the upstream industrieshorizontal import penetration
ratios using as weights the time-varying input-output coe¢ cients retrieved from the Italian and
German Input-Output matrixes, which distinguish between general gures for intermediates and
specic amounts of imports used by economic activities for production purposes47. The indicator
46Results are robust when using an import penetration index calculated excluding exports from the denominator.
47 In order to check whether the latter display a clear time-trend, we have checked the correlation between the
1996 and the 2003 input-output coe¢ cients, which turned out to be very high and signicant. However, a process
of technological change is in some cases quite relevant, with di¤erences in coe¢ cients ranging from -15% (the
weight of sector 23 - petroleum products - as input of itself) to +12% (the weight of sector 34 - motor vehicles -
as input of itself).
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has thus been constructed as
V_impzjt =
X
k if k 6=j
akjt H_impzkt (11)
where akjt is the weight of industry k as input of industry j at time t.
9.4.3 Trade penetration and competition
Once endowed with our import penetration indexes, calculated both horizontal and vertical
and for both manufacturing and services trade, we relate these measures to competition by
estimating for each country z the following general model:
Compijt = 0 + 1H_impjt + V_impjt +Xit + t + ijt (12)
where Compijt is our rm-level proxy measuring competition through PCM or the RPD index,
while H_impjt and V_impjt are the industry-specic import penetration measures discussed
above, Xit are controls at the rm-level, while t are time-xed e¤ects.
When using rm-level PCM as a proxy for competition, in order to wipe out rm-level xed
e¤ects potentially inducing a serial correlation in the error term, we have rst-di¤erenced our
dependent variable. Firm-level characteristics are however accounted for including a control for
rm size, proxied by the logarithm of employees at time t-1. We have also clustered the standard
errors at the industry level in order to take into account that we are regressing rm-specic
observations against industry-level covariates, a fact that might induce a spurious downward
bias in our standard errors.
We estimate an OLS specication with time dummies in order to control for the presence of
a time trend. Alternatively, we estimate a between e¤ects estimator, which produces regressions
on rm means. Notice that by considering rm means over time, we are already taking into
account time variability, and time dummies are therefore redundant.
Table 47 presents the results of the above specication, again for both Italy and Germany
in the manufacturing sector.
Results show that import penetration may a¤ect a rms price-cost margins in di¤erent and
contrasting ways, consistently with the idea that working with heterogeneous rm-level data, the
presence of multi-product rms might generate outcomes di¤erent from traditional representative
rmsmodels. Indeed, we nd horizontal import penetration to be positively related with the
change in price-cost margins, although this e¤ect is statistically signicant only in the Italian
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Table 47: Average PCM and Trade Penetration, Manufacturing
Dep Var: PCMt-PCMt-1 Italy Italy Germany Germany
import penetration 0.0401*** 0.0729* 0.391 1.308
(0.0130) (0.0404) (0.452) (1.122)
osm -0.0890*** -0.133* -0.137 -0.444
(0.0217) (0.0726) (0.322) (1.595)
oss -0.585 -3.454* 9.135 28.81*
(0.806) (1.876) (8.882) (15.32)
sizet-1 -0.00974** -0.0114*** 0.0556 0.161*
(0.00405) (0.00410) (0.0556) (0.0895)
Constant 0.0619*** 0.0768*** 0.485 -1.129*
(0.0103) (0.0230) (1.191) (0.592)
Specification OLS BE OLS BE
Time dummies Yes No Yes No
Observations 322412 322412 11571 11571
Groups 90061 5694
sample48. On the other hand, vertical import penetration from other manufacturing industries
is associated with a fall in rms PCMs. Interestingly, we nd that vertical import penetration
in services has di¤erent e¤ects across the two countries considered: while it leads to a reduction
in PCMs in Italy, it is related to a rise in PCMs in Germany.
For rms operating in the services sectors, we do not obtain any signicant impact of import
penetration on PCMs, in any way measured. Table 48 tells us that changes in price-cost margins
in service industries are not inuenced by neither horizontal nor vertical import penetration. The
results concerning horizontal import penetration and vertical import penetration are coherent
with previous ndings. The index of import penetration in service industries is much more
limited in size, being on average equal to 0.08 and 0.13 in Italy and Germany respectively,
against 0.32 and 0.40 in manufacturing, respectively. Thus, it is not surprising that import
penetration in services fails to a¤ect PCMs.
As an alternative specication, we have then re-estimated our Equation (12) using as depen-
dent variables the estimated  for every sector j and year t, that is the ^jt as retrieved from our
RPD Equation 9. Table 49 presents the results of this exercise for Italy and Germany, where the
RPD measure has been retrieved for each NACE 3-digit industry of the manufacturing sector,
regressed against the horizontal penetration index of the same NACE 3-digit industry49.
48Estimates are impecise in the German sample, but we suspect that this may be due to the lower number of
observations.
49We cannot retrieve vertical penetration measures at the NACE 3-digit level, as our available I/O tables are
at NACE 2-digit, nor for the time being we have been able to retrieve trade data for services at the NACE 3-digit
level of disaggregation.
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Table 48: Average PCM and Trade Penetration, Services
Dep Var: PCMt-PCMt-1 Italy Italy Germany Germany
import penetration 0.159 0.347 3.292 0.730
(0.17) (0.53) (3.78) (0.83)
osm -0.0125 -0.0594 0.205 1.409
(0.069) (0.20) (1.11) (1.14)
oss 0.297 0.286 2.737 -0.332
(0.17) (0.70) (4.41) (1.18)
sizet-1 -0.0105 -0.00484 0.00690 0.0190
(0.0097) (0.015) (0.012) (0.031)
Constant 0.00779 0.0189 -0.810 -0.245
(0.026) (0.067) (0.87) (0.26)
Specification OLS BE OLS BE
Time dummies Yes No Yes No
Observations 150774 150774 4226 4226
Groups 57683 2340
Interestingly, we nd that import penetration a¤ects RPDs di¤erently in the two countries
considered. While we observe an anti-competitive e¤ect in Italy, both in the OLS and the BE
specication, import penetration has a pro-competitive e¤ect in Germany. This result conrms
previous ndings on changes in PCM reported in Table 47: horizontal import penetration leads
to an increase in price-cost margins in Italy, not induced by a reduction of costs, but rather by a
higher elasticity of prots to costs. The result is thus consistent with the idea that rms might
react to these increased competitive pressures by endogenously compressing their product mix
towards products characterized by a lower elasticity of demand, with a resulting positive change
in mark-ups.
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Table 49: RPD and Horizontal Trade Penetration, Manufacturing - NACE 3-digit
Dep var: RPD indicator Italy Germany Italy Germany
Import penetration 0.101***
(0.000)
-0.172
(0.278)
0.101**
(0.041)
-0.449**
(0.045)
Year2001
0.007
(0.024)
-0.647**
(0.001)
Year2002
-0.055**
(0.020)
-0.307*
(0.095)
Year2003
-0.072**
(0.002)
-0.496**
(0.001)
Year2004
-0.103***
(0.000)
-0.604**
(0.001)
Year2005
-0.097***
(0.000)
-0.620**
(0.001)
Year2006
-0.115***
(0.000)
-0.610**
(0.001)
Year2007
-0.136***
(0.000)
-0.629**
(0.001)
Constant
0.164***
(0.000)
0.97***
(0.000)
0.093***
(0.000)
0.565***
(0.000)
Specification OLS OLS BE BE
Time dummies yes yes no no
Observations 776 712 776 712
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